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 1 Introduction 
Piotr Mikuli and Grzegorz Kuca 
This book analyses and discusses issues related to the accountability and transpar-
ency of public power and mutual interactions between the two concepts. 
We believe that the term ‘accountability’ is quite elastic and inclusive. One 
has to remember that conceptualising this term may present difficulties due to 
the lack of a proper equivalent in other languages. We argue, however, that it 
includes various procedures for assessing individual behaviours of incumbents of 
state organs in the performance of their duties (including punitive ailments that 
may befall them but also rewards), many mechanisms involving reporting on this 
performance (reporting), and various instruments that refer to material (organ-
isational) substrates of a state organ or the whole branch of government. Thus, 
the notion of accountability includes some kind of relationship between either 
an individual (i.e., an incumbent of a state organ) and an institution endowed 
with competences in this respect or between two institutions. The spectrum 
of these relations may include specific elements described by using expressions 
(apart from accountability) such as ‘responsibility’ or ‘liability’. In the sphere 
of constitutional and legal norms in a national state or at the level of a suprana-
tional organisation, the aforementioned relationship undoubtedly has normative 
significance, including legal consequences of applying accountability measures. 
Nevertheless, some legally prescribed accountability procedures may not evoke 
an immediate legal effect, or these legal effects may be more general and limited 
to a particular branch of the law. Within such an approach, one can mention, 
for instance, the so-called political accountability mechanisms, such as deciding 
upon a vote of no-confidence motion by a chamber of parliament. In turn, the 
legal accountability of state organs’ incumbents may also signify applying a direct, 
repressive legal sanction for breaching the constitution or a statute (a constitu-
tional tort). 
The direct link between accountability and transparency has at least a twofold 
meaning. First, we have to assume that all measures connected with holding 
people and institutions accountable must be straightforward, clear, and open 
to eliminate illegal behaviour and the possibility of corruption. Second, both 
notions interact with each other as they constitute important public values con-
nected with the idea of democracy and the rule of law, and with other critical 














2 Piotr Mikuli and Grzegorz Kuca 
mechanisms (Harlow 2014). The sovereign can make conscious electoral deci-
sions only when the activities of those who are in power are transparent. In turn, 
‘good transparent policies contain methods of accountability’, and ‘transparent 
policies also provide information to citizens and improve their ability to make 
choices about the services they receive’ ( Ball 2009 , p. 300). Thus, transparency 
and accountability interrelate with fundamental constitutional principles, which 
are also characteristic features of the idea of good governance (Harlow 2006, 
p. 204ff.). On the other hand, Kosař and Spáč observe that transparency does not 
necessarily contribute to public institutions’ proper and desirable actions, which 
is why accountability and transparency should be treated separately. Neverthe-
less, they rightly add that transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, and 
the former is a separate concept that ‘operates as the contingent circumstance 
that might influence whether a certain form of accountability will bring about a 
particular set of results’ ( Kosař and Spáč 2018 , p. 42). 
The contributions included in this collective volume have been divided into 
three parts: the institutional and objective approach ( Part I : Law); the subject 
approach, referring to a recipient of rights ( Part II : Fairness and Rights); and the 
functional approach, referring to the executors of law ( Part III : Authority). 
In Chapter 2 , Kyriaki Topidi argues that the traditional framework governing 
the relationship between the state and citizens has changed radically in the 21st 
century. Instead of a binary structure between the two main actors—the state 
and citizens—the present setting involves multiple state and non-state actors as 
well as transnational ones, all involved in the process of producing public goods. 
The shift is also connected to the extension of the public space to the digital 
sphere. One of the core questions in terms of governance, therefore, relates to 
the ways the state can position itself in the battle for accountability that occurs in 
the media, including social and alternative media. These trends are most evident 
in the regulation of online content at the EU level. The exercise of free speech 
can be offensive and can contribute to a climate of prejudice and discrimination 
against certain groups. Kyriaki’s chapter engages with the normative dimensions 
of the balance between the need to control and limit incitement to violence 
and the fundamental right to freedom of expression as it is exercised in online 
contexts.
In Chapter 3 , Grzegorz Kuca concentrates on the impact of economic crises
on the budget process. Specifically, the author states that the budget process
is now beginning to vary from its traditional theoretical model, which entrusts
the government with the power to prepare and execute and parliament to adopt
and control a state budget. This transformation refers to both formal and sub-
stantive matters; that is, it concerns form and content as well as the actual
course of the budget process. It also changes the control of both the parlia-
ment’s and government’s actions with judicial review. Therefore, from the per-
spective of public debt and budget deficits, numerous essential questions must
be answered, including those referring to the change in the central bank’s role.







In Chapter 4 , Jelena Kostić and Marina Matić Bošković raise the issue of 
financial accountability and transparency of public sector financial operations in 
the Republic of Serbia. Financial accountability in the public sector in this con-
text includes accountability to ensure efficient, economical, and effective public 
spending. Transparency of public spending is part of accountability to citizens 
since they contribute to public revenues. The authors explain key challenges for 
financial accountability and the key reasons for the development of such chal-
lenges, and the behaviour of financial control institutions in Serbia that frame 
challenges. Based on an analysis of the Supreme Audit Institution’s reports of the 
Republic of Serbia, the authors highlight the problems that exist in practice and 
propose recommendations for improving the current situation. 
In Chapter 5 , Piotr Mikuli and Maciej Pach focus on the current legal mea-
sures concerning disciplinary accountability of judges in Poland. The authors 
focus on solutions applied in Poland after several legal modifications that the 
Law and Justice Party introduced between 2015 and 2020. The Polish case con-
stitutes a warning that the concept of accountability, especially related to judicial 
power, may be applied in an abusive way. The disciplinary liability measures were 
introduced in this country under the guise of ensuring greater efficacy of such 
procedures and judicial power transparency, but they de facto aim to intimidate 
the entire judicial system. This must also be perceived in light of the systematic 
breach of the rule of law in Poland. 
In Chapter 6 , Arianna Vedaschi explains how the tensions between transpar-
ency and accountability and state secrecy implied in security-related operations 
are addressed by Italian legislators and courts, especially in times of severe politi-
cal stress; namely, those characterised by the ongoing threat of international 
terrorism. As a first step, the chapter explains the choice of the Italian jurisdic-
tion as the main context for the research from a methodological perspective, 
and it defines the notions of transparency and accountability from a theoreti-
cal perspective. Vedaschi’s research focuses on mechanisms designed to ensure 
oversight of intelligence operations and accountability of agents, and on the 
relationship between intelligence services and the executive as framed by laws 
that courts interpret. She also highlights some challenging issues emerging from 
the described background and discusses whether and how some aspects of the 
Italian intelligence framework could be improved to achieve a better balance 
between the values at stake. 
In Chapter 7 , Guillermo Jiménez explains that this institution, established in 
the late 1920s, has played a critical role in the Chilean constitutional landscape. 
It operated for decades as a court substitute and complemented judicial review 
in the task of ensuring executive branch accountability. The chapter describes 
this office’s main structure and functions, emphasising its monocratic organisa-
tion and its combination of a variety of auditing, binding legal interpretations, 
and internal review powers, as well as its close interaction with both bureaucracy 
and the legislature. The chapter concludes by placing the Chilean comptroller-
general in the broader context of Latin American struggles to ensure legality and 
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In Chapter 8 , Thomas Sedelius refers to accountability in the semi-presidential 
system of government. Despite an increasing amount of research about the for-
mal role and prerogatives of the presidency in these systems, we still know little 
about the various channels for public accountability in dual executive systems. 
Sedelius’ study partly addresses this gap by empirically examining how presidents 
in semi-presidential systems utilise their option to  go public to establish citizen 
support to pursue their agendas. Aware of their popular support, presidents can 
effectively use the option of public addresses to compensate for their formally 
weaker powers. Sedelius uses a comparative case study design that includes two 
Central European countries (Lithuania and Romania) and Finland as long-lasting 
cases of European semi-presidentialism. He explains the interplay between execu-
tive power and citizens. Each country represents a unique semi-presidential path: 
high levels of institutionalisation and the weakening of a historically strong presi-
dency in Finland in 2000; general intra-executive stability under a personalised 
political system in Lithuania; and party system instability, strong presidential 
influence, personalised politics, and high institutional tensions in Romania. 
In Chapter 9 , Eugenia Kopsidi and Ioannis A. Vlachos contend that the rela-
tionship between elected officials’ political and criminal—or more broadly, legal— 
responsibility is linked inextricably to the quality of the rule of law. According to 
Article 86: 
Only the Parliament has the power to prosecute serving or former members 
of the Cabinet or Undersecretaries for criminal offences that they committed 
during the discharge of their duties, as specified by law. The institution of 
specific ministerial offences is prohibited. 
In this sense, as the authors emphasise, the legislature seems to substitute the 
judiciary, which is a constitutional deviation from the foundational principle of 
separation of powers. Combined with the explicit prohibition of establishing spe-
cifc ministerial offences, such as procedural immunity, seems to craft a rather 
entitled and privileged legal framework that encourages impunity among high-
ranking political fgures. Moreover, the parliamentary majority at any time can 
revoke impeachment resolutions or suspend prosecutions and relevant investi-
gatory proceedings. Although offcially intended to safeguard cabinet members 
from groundless complaints and politically driven prosecution, this special proce-
dure governing criminal ministerial liability in Greece has led to constitutionally 
controversial solutions. The authors argue in this context that the vague notion 
of political responsibility tends to absorb its criminal counterpart, essentially lead-
ing to penal exoneration and escalating mistrust in political institutions. 
In Chapter 10 , Francesca Sgrò examines the constitutional value and legisla-
tive implementation of transparency and accountability concerning the public 
administration, with a particular emphasis on public contracts. She assesses how 
transparency and accountability—which are traditionally expressions of the consti-
tutional principle of public administration’s ‘impartiality’ according to the Italian 













they have acquired an autonomous ontological relevance that partially emanci-
pates them from the constitutional principle of impartiality, bringing them closer 
and functionalising them to other different constitutional principles that guide 
public action, such as ‘good performance’ (efficiency) and ‘legality’ (protection 
from corruption) within the public administration under Article 97. The chapter 
ends with some constitutional considerations about the highlighted evolution of 
the principles of transparency and accountability from the Italian perspective— 
from principles strictly linked to the public administration impartiality concerning 
autonomous principles and values that are open not only to administrative actions’ 
legality but also to the good performance of the public administration. 
In Chapter 11 , Natalie Fox refers to the process of the UK’s withdrawal from 
the European Union in the context of the Brexit negotiations started after the 
notification of Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union. The author won-
ders how accountability in the divorce process from the EU should be construed. 
This question is closely linked to the pro-Brexit campaign’s main argument to 
‘take back control’ and consequentially regain sovereignty. Parliament is obligated 
to monitor and control the negotiation process as a matter of accountability. The 
legal analysis is also complemented by an examination of the interpretation and 
application of the principle of transparency from a legal and political perspective. 
The ‘maximum level of transparency’ was embraced in the Brexit discussions, and 
the approach to openness was instrumental. Although the Brexit negotiations are 
a striking example of the rising importance of the concept of transparency, the 
UK government embraced the Brexit talks in a particular way. The UK sought to 
avoid the scenario called a ‘no-deal’ Brexit but consistently exposed a tough line 
on the issues where it was difficult to reach an agreement despite the fact it would 
result in the so-called hard Brexit. 
To sum up, the chapters included in this volume contain reflections on the 
developments of the various accountability mechanisms and institutions in times 
of rapid change. We believe that these chapters, therefore, answer questions con-
cerning the efficiency of accountability and transparency mechanisms from the 
perspective of consolidated democratic systems as well as various tendencies of 
democratic decay and infringement on the rule of law. 
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 2 Accountability in the globalised 
digital age 
Online content moderation and hate 
speech in the European Union 
Kyriaki Topidi 
2.1 Introduction: a new accountability environment 
The traditional framework governing the relationship between the state and its 
citizens has radically changed in the 21st century. Instead of a binary structure 
between the two main actors, the present setting involves multiple actors—both 
state and non-state as well as transnational—all involved in the process of produc-
tion of public goods. This multiplicity/plurality has inevitably affected the locus 
and operationalisation of accountability. 
The digital era and the challenges that it brings fit quite well in this complex, 
multilateral framework. Whether a researcher refers to the presence and the role 
of corporate (private) actors or to the levels of regulation in various (relatively 
new and still developing) policy areas, such as online speech regulation, the impli-
cations for accountability are real and pressing. The regulation of online content, 
particularly in connection to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, 
is a powerful reminder of the perennial constitutional (and governance) question 
of how power should be distributed and regulated in the digital ecosystem. With 
online expression becoming easier and more plural than ever, it is worth consid-
ering how the power to regulate such expression is handled, often in the service 
of (not always benevolent) political aims that will likely influence and ultimately 
determine who shall govern ( Joshi 2017 ). 1 
In classical constitutional studies, the concept of accountability has signified 
compliance with and respect for the principles of legality and due process ( Bam-
forth and Leyland 2013 ). It involves the justification of an actor’s performance of 
one’s duties towards others to whom accounts are owed, through the use of stan-
dards to measure one’s performance and with possible consequences for the actor 
if the standards are not met ( Bovens 2004 , pp. 447–448;  Nollkaemper and Cur-
tin 2007 , p. 4). Accountability has traditionally operated on two levels: the prac-
tical and the ethical ( Bishman 2016 , p. 2). As digital technology has essentially 
reconfigured the features of the constitutional environment and, more broadly, 
1 Joshi (2017 ) mentions the examples of former President Donald Trump (United States), 




10 Kyriaki Topidi 
the relation between society and technology, accountability is also firmly con-
nected at present to the degree to which regulatory systems that are applicable 
online consider public values and ethical commitments. Additionally, with private 
entities emerging alongside states as actors involved in the governance of online 
public space, the process of being called to account for one’s actions becomes 
equally relevant for both sets of actors but within a different governance constel-
lation when compared with a state-citizen frame. This new constellation requires 
new normative perspectives on principles and processes that are applicable to the 
digital setting, which is of interest to this discussion (Marshaw 2006). In more 
contemporary terms, holding one to account not only carries the obligation to 
disclose information and justify one’s actions; it also presupposes a social relation-
ship between the actor and the relevant accountability forum ( Nollkaemper and 
Curtin 2007 , p. 8). As an inherently relational concept, accountability is built 
around transparency, control, punishment, and restoration. 
Particularly for the purposes of this contribution, transparency is approached 
as the degree of asymmetry of information between the actor that owes account-
ability as opposed to the actor to which the account is owed ( Bishman 2016 , 
p. 3). The transparency objective more specifically allows access to the way that 
an actor exercises decision-making and attains certain outcomes. In other words, 
it operates as a criterion for the extent to which accountability is pursued. Nor-
matively, transparency can also be connected to the improvement of the quality of 
decision-making by actors, an increase in citizen participation and the cultivation 
of trust, and (legal) empowerment and the realisation of individual rights ( Buijze 
2013 , pp. 4–5, 7). When applied to digital governance, legal scientific knowledge 
of the empirical functions of transparency (along with its effects), as discussed in 
this chapter, is incomplete and still evolving. Ultimately, the concept of account-
ability is used as extending beyond describing a process to exploring a practice 
linked to democracy, dialogue, responsibility, and responsiveness ( Rock 2017 ). 
From the perspective of fundamental rights, the digital age has particularly 
affected the way(s) that freedom of expression is exercised. In more ways than 
one, social media platforms are now in a position to moderate the flow of infor-
mation in the digital public square. In the words of Mark Zuckerberg, ‘in a lot 
of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company’ (cited 
by Langvardt 2018 , p. 1357), touching even intimate aspects of its users’ lives. 
Through digital methods of surveillance of citizens using the internet or through 
ways to censor online expressions, accountability is currently also linked to the 
‘manufacture [of] consent, sabotage [of] dissent’, and the broader shaping of 
public opinion ( Joshi 2017 ). Within such a framework, online platforms are the 
battlefields of such accountability concerns. However, to what extent does a digi-
tal society relying on algorithms challenge democratic frameworks? More specifi-
cally, in what ways does the role of content moderation afforded to (private) social 
media companies constitute a challenge to accountability? To address these ques-
tions, it is useful to first approach the concept of  content moderation. According 
to Flew et al. (2019 , p. 40), content moderation can be defined as ‘the screen-
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according to relevant communications and publishing policies’. Such moderation 
can occur before or after the publication of online content. The constitutional 
dimension of moderation is directly linked to accountability mechanisms. This is 
because of its heavy reliance on both automated resources (e.g., prioritisation, 
geo-blocking) and human ones to fulfil its moderation tasks, with limited clarity 
on the division of tasks between humans and machines. However, for account-
ability assessment purposes, the constitutional tension in most instances arises 
from information technology (IT) platforms’ commitment to protect free speech 
while fulfilling a business purpose (De Gregorio 2020, p. 3). The combination of 
the concern to maintain a business-friendly digital ecosystem with the upholding 
of fundamental rights is precisely the starting point of accountability concerns. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that online platforms, understood (for the 
purposes of this analysis) as providers hosting third-party content, have a respon-
sibility but not a full-fledged duty to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, 
in contrast to states. As such, the need to balance various constitutional interests, 
particularly in the European context, has effectively led to the transformation of 
the online public space from an opportunity to exercise such rights/freedoms to 
a potential risk of curtailing them ( Pollicino 2019 ). The activation of such risk is 
triggered not only by the special characteristics of the online public sphere or the 
change in the regulating actors but also by the concentration of online modera-
tion powers to a limited number of online platforms, coupled with the expanding 
use of artificial intelligence (AI). 
The evolution of the role of online platforms in online content governance is 
understandably in flux at present; private entities, such as Facebook, have begun 
to acknowledge their ‘broader social responsibility’ to combat polarisation and 
extremism ( Zuckerberg 2018 ). This task should also be placed in correlation to 
the amount of content in need of moderation.2 The magnitude of the produced 
content has provoked numerous discussions around the subjectivity of decision-
making related to the vast number of online expressions, particularly in the sensi-
tive areas of hate speech and the fight against misinformation. 
The idiosyncratic character of online speech moderation does not stop here. 
The speed, anonymity, volume, and platform dependence of online expressions 
make enforcement through state judicial mechanisms unrealistic. Instead, moder-
ators in international call centres, typically located in the Philippines, Ireland, Sin-
gapore, India, or Eastern Europe ( Langvardt 2018 , p. 1362), are called to assess 
and qualify online speech. In sum, the current governance dynamics in online 
content moderation point to systemic deficiencies in the aspects of rule of law 
and due process guarantees and, by extension, to accountability and transparency. 
Specifically, in the field of freedom of expression, content moderation requires 
the exercise of judicial balancing (between competing rights and interests) and 
public enforcement of measures, usually carried out by state actors ( de Gregorio 
2 According to  Zuckerberg (2018 ), Facebook alone has reviewed two million pieces of content 
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2019 ). Several layers of accountability concerns emerge as a result of the delega-
tion of powers from the state to private actors of this nature: when regulating 
online speech, private companies (i.e., social media platforms) propose and apply 
their own standards of protection, usually in the form of their own internal com-
munity standards, terms of use, or policies. These standards, including the ways 
that they are applied by content moderators, often remain obscure and unsuitable 
for a democratically accountable public activity ( Langvardt 2018 , p. 1356). Fur-
thermore, as the balancing of rights and interests is performed and enforced by 
social media companies themselves, they also indirectly decide which right pre-
vails in each case. Per the current European Union (EU) legal framework, these 
same non-state actors can be held neither accountable nor responsible for hosting 
third-party content 3 (provided that certain conditions are met), thus indirectly 
allowing the risk of proliferation, expansion and flourishing of hateful expres-
sions. In terms of the review of platforms’ decisions to remove content, there is 
often little in terms of transparency on how appeal processes are performed and 
reviewed ( Culliford 2020 ). Resolving disputes between users and platforms then 
becomes an element that is tightly connected to accountability. Appeals on any 
contested decisions submitted to independent bodies also require the existence of 
dispute resolution procedures, guaranteeing transparency and impartiality. This 
last concern appears to be reconsidered by measures such as the recent appoint-
ment of Facebook’s Oversight Board, which will act as an  appeals instance and 
will be able to overturn the company’s decisions on whether individual pieces 
of content should be allowed on Facebook and Instagram.4 Overall, responding 
to accountability concerns seems to be an ongoing, multifaceted process, where 
platforms are developing and refining their rules and standards as circumstances 
require and in the light of evolving events. 
This contribution focuses on one of the core values of contemporary constitu-
tionalism in a digital society: accountability. Through the discussion of practices
adopted in the regulation of hate speech online, the analysis employs a methodolog-
ical approach that combines governance with the emerging digital constitutionalist
frame to reflect on both the value of accountability as a normative concept and the
more empirical elements of its practice, as adopted by private actors. The analysis
aims to offer insights on the articulation of the web of rights, governance norms,
and limitations that regulate the exercise of accountable power on the internet.
To do so, this chapter first considers in more detail the implications of the 
shift in online content moderation from states to online platforms in the fast-
developing area of digital constitutionalism. The second part of the analysis 
examines more closely how the most common tools of online content modera-
tion pose a challenge to accountability in order to explore the current trends in 
the European legal landscape regarding the question. The chapter concludes with 
a consideration of the challenges ahead. 
3 Articles 14–15 of the E-Commerce Directive. 
4 See indicatively, BBC, ‘Facebook unveils its plan for Oversight Board’, 17 September 2019, 
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2.2 Digital constitutionalism and the regulatory shift 
As ‘architects of public spaces’ ( Gillespie 2017 , p. 25), digital platforms are 
expected to become more accountable in making and amending the rules con-
cerning online expressions and interactions. Their legitimacy, in classic consti-
tutional terms, is inevitably connected to legality and commitment, particularly 
to values of the rule of law such as consent, procedural fairness, or predictability 
( Suzor 2018 , p. 2). 
This alignment to liberal constitutional values presupposes a number of pro-
cedural safeguards. Namely, it requires a core body of clear, consistent, and fair 
rules governing online content, allowing due process guarantees in case of dis-
agreement between the involved parties. This growing and evolving body of rules 
is connected to the standards of legitimacy for governing online content in the 
digital age, appropriately labelled  digital constitutionalism ( Douek 2019 , p. 1; 
Suzor 2018 , p. 2). 
It is noticeable that in the case of online content moderation, private actors 
are the ones responsible for setting such rules. This complicates the requirements 
for accountability as it involves ‘a diverse, contested environment of agents with 
differing levels of power and visibility: users, algorithms, platforms, industries and 
governments’ ( Crawford and Lumby 2013 , p. 279). Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of accountability standards cannot be underestimated for broader gover-
nance and democracy purposes; the present generation lives in a world where 
false news travels faster than verified news ( Vosoughi et al. 2018 ) and where hate 
speech circulates in manifold layers. 
The modalities of digital expression are unprecedented in terms of constitu-
tionality and freedom of expression. The use of the internet to produce online 
speech now offers the possibility to do so anonymously, concealing the speaker’s 
location and his/her humanity (i.e., the ‘bot’ problem) (Wojcik 2018). 5 These 
features that are specific to online speech not only have governance implications 
(e.g., potential harm to democratic regimes and processes) but also affect the 
levels of accountability in the digital sphere, as the rules/standards devised by 
private IT companies are required to determine the nature of a fast-growing pro-
portion of speech produced online. In terms of accountability, of equal concern is 
the gradual development of automated filters that pre-emptively regulate content 
prior to publication. 
However, there is no uniformity across national jurisdictions or international 
bodies on whether the classic offline constitutional framework can be applied 
to the online legal sphere by analogy ( Suzor 2018 , p. 3). The focal point of 
the constitutional uncertainty is the issue of the platforms’ liability to third 
parties for content placed on their networks. Of course, this comes with the 
broader concern about whether these platforms are simple ‘hosts’ as opposed to 
5 According to Twitter, 10% of US accounts and perhaps a greater percentage in other coun-
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‘regulators’ of content, in which case they have to set rules on how their systems 
are used. In Europe, pressure and legislative initiatives towards platform regula-
tion are intense. In essence, the trend is towards ‘forced self-regulation’ of the 
platforms ( Persily 2019 , p. 22), imposing on them the duty to remove content 
that is illegal or contrary to their internal standards, provided they are notified 
of its existence on their networks. The German approach to the question has 
been widely discussed, with some criticism.6 It has opted for the imposition of 
a (statutory) duty on social media companies to establish a mechanism to con-
sider complaints. This duty raised a number of policy concerns, including the 
fear that IT platforms will ‘over-block’ content to avoid fines, and the persistent 
discriminatory effects of blocking/deleting content on some groups more than 
others. It also carries the risk of privatisation of the judiciary due to the review 
and interpretation function of criminal law being passed to non-state entities 
( Heldt 2019 , p. 5). 
Superimposed on the issue of the platforms’ function is the nature of digital 
media platforms as private business entities with the discretion to manage their 
private properties. However, this discretion has encountered scepticism insofar 
as platforms are not neutral (i.e., their technical features, such as algorithms, 
shape the type of information that users can access;  Suzor 2018, p. 3; Persily 
2019 , p. 5) 7 and relies on the assumption that users are rational and autonomous 
actors in the digital marketplace ( Suzor 2018 , p. 3). How then does a regula-
tor address bias in algorithmic selection and content moderation, censorship, or 
abuse/harassment occurring through online media? 
Consequently, the call for the establishment of users’ rights against online plat-
forms has become more pressing and, within it, the setting of limits in the exer-
cise of the power of platforms in the context of digital constitutionalism. After 
all, accountability mechanisms assume a certain defensible vision of the common 
good ( Allan 2001 ), which then leads to the establishment of rules against which 
such accountability should be measured. 
In the case of online content moderation, the terms of the setting of such
limits face two basic, interconnected conceptual hurdles. The first concerns
the division between private and constitutional law, which becomes of lim-
ited use in this case since private entities regulate online space, as mentioned.
Second, the current rule-of-law guarantees have been devised for states, not
private actors. Additionally, from the perspective of equality, any rules that
will be devised should be applied in clear, equitable, and predictable terms for
users. However, these features would only satisfy the formal aspects of equal-
ity. Most current controversies on the impact of online content moderation
concern indirect discriminatory effects, whereby groups of users promoting
6 The Law for the Improvement of the Legal Regulation of Social Networks (Netzwerkdurchset-
zungsgesetz—NetzDG) came into force on 1 October 2017 and has been fully implemented 
since 1 January 2018. 
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certain opinions are affected disproportionately due to race, gender, religion,
or sexual characteristics.
In parallel, platforms are gradually adopting ‘state-like’ characteristics when 
attempting to regulate online content. Given the constant evolution of the dig-
ital regulatory regime and the characteristics of online speech (particularly its 
speed and volume), legal formulations covering comprehensively dangerous and 
authoritarian online speech have yet to be identified. Ultimately, for private com-
panies that are responsible for online content moderation, what places them in 
a special position is their impact on both individual rights and matters central 
to democracy ( Douek 2019 , p. 1). In this sense, the question of the direction 
of self-regulation rules represents an important constitutional moment for the 
digital era. 
2.3 Content moderation instruments and accountability 
Any restriction to freedom of speech—which is not in itself an absolute right— 
should be publicly explained and justified to limit arbitrariness. The account-
ability dimension of online speech governance thus includes both the  processes
through which platforms decide on content and the  substantive rules they use 
to do so.8 Equally important, when pushing for regulation, governments should 
also consider the impact of the use of technological tools (AI tools, filters, etc.) 
in the process of speech moderation on society and other fundamental rights. As 
experience has shown so far, the rapid evolution of the nature of online disputes 
due to technological developments and the use of new practices online will likely 
complicate the task, especially when states have to negotiate the governance of 
the digital expression with private online platforms. 
From a regulatory perspective, the main question remains whether states
should regulate platform censorship or leave it to the market in order to bal-
ance accountability concerns in the first case and protect the right to business
in the second. Behind this dilemma lie two competing visions of freedom of
expression. One claims that based on political realism and out of the concern
to allow the marketplace of ideas to function, reduced levels of regulation are
desirable. The other is in favour of a stricter framework in the exercise of free-
dom of expression to avoid harm. In the European legal space, there is a grow-
ing preference for states to impose additional legal duties on online platforms
in order to mitigate the current situation, where a limited number of private
companies determine the content of and implement the right to freedom of
expression.
As mentioned, content moderation policies are usually spelt out in a platform’s 
internal rules. Transparency and accountability concerns have often been raised 
in connection to the consistency in the application of such standards. 9 These 
8 For a different view, see  Douek (2019 , p. 7), who argues that government regulation should 
focus on processes rather than substantive rules. 
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concerns involve not only appeals’ processes to correct content reviewing errors 
but also other substantial accountability concerns, such as the opaque character 
of decision-making during reviews or decisions to bar users temporarily or per-
manently for content violating the terms of use. 
In connection to hate speech, platforms either rely on users to report such
an incident or on automated means to detect it. More sophisticated tools are
also being developed in an attempt to counter the spread of online hate more
efficiently. The example of Facebook’s most recent initiatives is illustrative;
since 2019, Facebook has introduced a policy ‘banning the explicit praise, sup-
port, or representation of white nationalism and white separatism’ ( Facebook
Civil Rights Audit 2019 , p. 9). However, at the current stage of its develop-
ment, the policy has been deemed too narrow as it relies on the use of ‘white
nationalism’ while excluding other wording with the same or similar effect
(Ibid.). Similarly, the popular platform has adopted a policy that discourages
attempts to organise events targeting minority groups or vulnerable people
and has maintained its ban on organisations that meet hate/violence criteria
(Ibid. pp. 9–10).
The link between transparency and accountability is difficult to miss. The 
openly stated rules and values governing content moderation address, at some 
length, the platforms’ successes and failures in self-regulation in measurable 
terms ( Douek 2019 , p. 12), but the rule of due process guarantees also require 
consideration. An illustrative case in this context concerns the ways that social 
media platforms treat content that violates their own standards when issued by 
governments themselves. Accountability is at stake, especially when a platform 
interferes between a government and its citizens, 10 where consistency and clarity 
are necessary against risks of arbitrariness. 
As online expression has become a ‘borderless experience’ ( Douek 2019 , 
p. 13), the issue of diverging standards and norms of various national jurisdic-
tions has also turned into a real concern for online platforms as international
business corporations. The aim here is not necessarily to reach uniformity or
unanimous agreement across states but to encourage reasoned disagreement
in a Rawlsian sense ( Rawls 2005 ), achieved through decisional transparency,
ideally within a relational approach to dispute resolution among a platform,
its users, and states in some of these instances. It is only through processes
similar to this that it may be possible to limit abuses of online expression, such
as hate speech or misinformation, and gradually move towards shared norms
among users.
10 The recent controversy between Trump and Twitter is a good example. Twitter took action 
by fact-checking some of Trump’s tweets and issued warning labels that they were in viola-
tion of the site’s policies due to their content that glorified violence. In retaliation, Trump 
signed an executive order threatening to narrow legal protection for platforms that would 
censor speech on ideological grounds. Until the end of May 2020, Trump had enjoyed 
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2.3.1 Automated social media content moderation tools 
and accountability 
It is widely acknowledged that the use of AI to moderate online content is cur-
rently limited in its efficiency ( Duarte et al. 2017 ). This is because the use of 
algorithms in language moderation tends to reproduce, if not amplify, bias. 
Often, the broad implication of such bias is to disproportionately censor minority/ 
vulnerable groups. 
From the perspective of accountability, algorithmic content moderation poses 
a challenge. Algorithms are essentially operationalised to identify and classify data 
deemed harmful/illegal. Some algorithms produce accurate results (e.g., in facial 
recognition), but it remains questionable how accurate they are vis-à-vis the iden-
tification of hateful speech, for example. In the case of speech, they consistently 
fail to identify dialects, nuances, and cultural contexts ( Duarte et al. 2017 , pp. 4, 
15).11 With hate speech being notoriously hard to define, automated tools can-
not successfully target this type of speech, as it can be distinguished only with 
great difficulty from satire, news reporting, or political activism, among others. 12 
Despite social media companies’ efforts to moderate online hateful content 
using automated means (combined with human moderation), hate speakers’ pat-
terns of expression are also evolving to bypass detection. 13 Hate speech in itself is 
also not a uniform form of expression; it has several sub-types (anti-Muslim hate 
speech, hate speech against women, etc.) and requires varied automated tools 
according to each type. It can also be used in a large variety of languages where 
no equivalent algorithms are available ( Duarte et al. 2017 , p. 14). 14 
In theory, algorithms constitute enforcement means to apply a country’s laws 
and/or a platform’s terms of service, thus setting the limits of permitted/lawful 
speech. When such tools miss hateful speech or disproportionately target a sub-
type of speech, accountability and transparency (along with efficiency) levels drop 
significantly. Given that the scientific reliability of these tools is also at issue, the 
identification of hate speech must ultimately be treated as a non-binary decision, 
requiring cultural appraisal prior to final assessment of context ( Duarte et al. 
2017 , pp. 17–18). 15 In this sense, the use of automated content tools cannot be 
mandated by law insofar as their exclusive use poses considerable challenges, at 
their present stage of development, to efficiency and transparency. 
11 Duarte et al. (2017 ) explain how natural language processing tools misidentify African Amer-
ican English as non-English. 
12 Duarte et al. (2017 , p. 5) cite a hate speech detection accuracy rate of 70%–80%. 
13 Duarte et al. (2017 , pp. 6, 20) refer to the examples of using triple parentheses on Twitter 
to indicate Jewish origin in a derogatory way or to the use of the names of technology com-
panies (Yahoo, Google, and Skype) as racial/ethnic slurs. 
14 For English, French, Spanish, German, or Chinese, the tools are widely available, while for 
Bengali, Indonesian, or Punjabi, among others, they are less so. 
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Human moderators—also semantically labelled ‘human agency’—consequently
become crucial in automated content moderation. Their role is more widely con-
nected to the discussion on the hotly contested topic of ‘function allocation’ in hate
speech detection. The Council of Europe’s  Study on the Human Rights Dimen-
sions of Automated Data Processing Techniques and Possible Regulatory Implica-
tions ( Wagner 2017 ) has highlighted the concern about the integration of human
rights into internet moderation; it has argued in favour of shared decision-making
between humans and automated tools. In the interest of both human rights protec-
tion and accountability (but also transparency), human decision-making becomes
a constituent element of online speech moderation and by no means redundant in
the digital era. However, given the volume of online content in need of moderation
for the purpose of hate speech detection, it is worth questioning whether human
moderation—reduced to making decisions within seconds, without adequate train-
ing on whether or not a particular post constitutes hate speech—indeed represents
an instance of exercise of human agency ( Wagner 2019 , pp. 11–12). 16 
Faced with the limited impact of the use of AI tools, especially in cases where 
human judgement is needed, platforms have additionally considered effective 
ways to limit the spread of information by reducing the distribution/virality of 
such content and by removing fake accounts. 17 The prioritisation (according to 
virality, among other factors) is often presented as an option in order to avoid the 
more radical alternative of taking down content, 18 with the censoring risks and 
the procedural challenges posed by content removal. In this way, the potential for 
algorithmic bias (particularly with discriminatory impact) is partially offset, while 
‘algorithmic fairness’ is expected to increase. 
2.3.2 Appeals system 
Further to the use of AI tools, also taking the form of indirect means of modera-
tion, such as filtering and prioritisation of content, an appeals system directed at 
decisions to remove content is gradually being considered by some platforms. 
Facebook’s recently formed ‘Oversight Board’ is expected to consider appeals on 
content decisions ( Douek 2019 , p. 1). The body’s role is aligned with the need 
to provide a basis of accountability for decisions to remove content. The board’s 
decision-making is stated to be guided by the best interests of the users’ commu-
nity as opposed to the commercial interests of the company ( Zuckerberg 2018 ). 
16 Wagner (2019 , at 11–12) identifies seven criteria determining a decision: amount of time 
invested by the human operator, required degree of qualification of the human operator, 
degree of liability of the human operator, level of support provided to the human operator to 
fulfil the task, level of adaptation to the system by the operator, the human operator’s access 
to information, and agency (i.e., authority to change the decision). 
17 Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit ( 2019 , p. 18) provides evidence of foreign actor use of Face-
book accounts during the 2016 US election period to target communities of colour through 
the use of fake accounts encouraging racial/religious tensions. 
18 See, e.g., the Google Trust Project ( Persily 2019 , pp. 30–31), which prioritises content 
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The advantages of such a solution are its interpretation as a contribution to a 
more accountable type of governance through a quasi-judicial type of oversight 
and the increasing visibility of community standards and norms that it may offer 
in specific contexts ( Douek 2019 , p. 14). 
A timely appeal, particularly on decisions on content removal or suspension 
of accounts, is an element towards higher levels of accountability. Nonetheless, 
the feasibility of this procedural guarantee is jeopardised, first, by the number of 
appeals that platforms have to process, 19 and second, by the use of algorithmically 
reduced distribution (without removing the content) for expressions that are not 
explicitly ‘sanctionable’. For this latter case, there is little disclosed information 
related to the number of posts or the procedural criteria applied; therefore, any 
type of review on how/why these posts are distributed less widely is precluded in 
the present state of affairs. 
2.4 Online platforms’ accountability in a European context 
In the European context, there is a plurality of approaches, even at the supra-
national level, to the interpretation of and the limits to freedom of expression, 
particularly in connection to online content moderation. The essential human 
rights references to freedom of expression include Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.20 
Based on the above-mentioned normative standards, freedom of expression is a 
right in need of constant balancing and carries duties and responsibilities. Article 
10(2) of the ECHR explicitly states that the right can be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties that are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, for the protec-
tion of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
It is clear from the formulation of the second paragraph of Article 10 that 
free speech is understood as assessed in the light of other competing constitu-
tional rights and interests. Within this frame, the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the pre-digital era has indicated an 
19 Douek (2019 , p. 9) cites data from Facebook, stating that the company received 25 million 
requests for appeal of content in the first quarter of 2019. 
20 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 
5; European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,  OJ C 326, 
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understanding of freedom of expression that has dissociated protected speech 
from social approval. 21 As such, any expression, even when likely not offering a 
significant contribution to public opinion and the exchange of information, is 
protected in principle. 
In the European constitutional review, the main instrument for assessing the 
activities of these platforms appears to be proportionality. Proportionality is 
linked to a broader attempt to balance competing interests. 22 For example, when 
the state intervenes to censor/limit individual speech, the ECHR can require 
the state to take both positive and negative measures and fulfil its obligations to 
protect free speech. 23 With the expansion of the use of the internet, the focus has 
shifted to preventing the potential harm that could be inflicted by online content 
and communications. This became visible in Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and 
Shtekel v. Ukraine, where the ECtHR found that ‘the risk of harm posed by con-
tent and communication on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human 
rights and freedoms . . . is certainly higher than that posed by press’. 24 
In general terms, the EU legal and policy framework for online hate speech 
has placed a duty on intermediaries to remove hate speech, following complaints 
from users. The focus, different from those of the Council of Europe institutions, 
has been more centred on economic activities. The next step has been to require 
IT companies to provide a procedure for such complaints. The prevalent (moral) 
justification for these requirements is that given the companies’ considerable 
power in regulating online content, an obligation to monitor and remove con-
tent appears as a fair counterweight. However, this almost transactional approach 
has not addressed the criticism that in this way, the platforms’ power to interpret 
and enforce both national and European speech laws has also increased. For the 
purposes of the EU law, social media platforms are a priori regarded as ‘hosts’ 
in accordance with Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 25 This implies that 
as intermediaries (i.e., hosts) of content, they cannot be held liable for illegal 
content uploaded by their users (e.g., hate speech, copyright infringement, child 
pornography). 26 Nonetheless, there remains the possibility to extend the same 
modalities of constitutional review of the fair balance of interests and propor-
tionality to social media intermediaries when handling take-down notices that 
21 Handyside v. UK, Appl. N. 5493/72 [1976]; Jersild v. Denmark, Appl. N. 15890/89 
[1994]. 
22 The test of ‘fair balance’ between the public interest and users’ fundamental rights applies 
both to state actors and private intermediaries ( Leersen 2015 ). See also CJEU, C-314/12 
UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verein GmbH (2014). 
23 See, e.g., the findings of the ECtHR in Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, Appl. N. 23144/93, 16 
March 2000, or  Dink v. Turkey, Appl. N. 2668/07, 14 September 2010, neither of which 
applies to the digital space. 
24 ECtHR, Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, Appl. N. 33014/05 [2011]. 
25 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’),  OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, pp. 1–16. 
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result in content removal. Whether this is practically feasible, given the volume of 
notice-and-takedown claims, is a separate yet important consideration. In prac-
tice, this would call for the consideration of both the interests of users and the 
platforms’ freedom to conduct business. 27 
However, European case law is not entirely consistent and coherent regarding 
the contours of this duty of IT intermediaries. The ECtHR has found that com-
pelling a news platform to police user comments in search of defamatory ones 
would have a ‘chilling effect on the freedom of expression on the internet’. 28 
However, in a similar earlier case, the same Court reached the conclusion that the 
national court could uphold a platform’s strict liability for user comments (also in 
the context of forum comments) without violating the ECHR. The main differ-
ence between the two cases is that in the earlier one, the unlawful content consti-
tuted hate speech. The legal argument to justify the diverging outcomes of  Delfi
and MTE posited that given the strong public interest in regulating hate speech 
under European law, it was conceivable to limit freedom of expression, requiring 
a news site to constantly review (and remove, as appropriate) users’ comments. 29 
In an equivalent case before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) about defamatory and hateful comments posted on Facebook, the Lux-
embourg court found that it was lawful for national courts to not only require the 
platform to remove the post but also impose on it the task to monitor and ensure 
that the same or similar hateful comments would not reappear in the future any-
where in the world. 30 The CJEU’s approach therefore appears wider than that 
of the ECtHR, imposing a considerable additional burden on IT platforms for 
present and future purposes of content moderation. The same judgement also 
invoked the possibility that EU member states could require a ‘duty of care’ 
from IT intermediaries to prevent illegal speech/activities. Equally important, 
the judgement also implied that in the future, IT platforms would be required 
to define the limits of free expression more actively, under the persistent threat 
of liability. It can thus be argued that there is an evolving tendency towards an 
27 See Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where the ‘freedom to conduct a 
business in accordance with Community Union Law and national laws and practices is 
recognized’. 
28 MTE v Hungary, Appl. N. 22947/13 EurCtHR 135 (2016, para. 86). The court ruled that 
Hungary failed to adequately balance the right to reputation and the right to freedom of 
expression when it awarded damages to a real estate website for injuries to its business repu-
tation. The Hungarian courts imposed objective liability for unlawful comments made by 
readers on a website, and the ECtHR held that such reasoning unduly placed ‘excessive and 
impracticable forethought capable of undermining freedom of the right to impart informa-
tion on the Internet’. 
29 ECtHR, Delfi v. Estonia, Appl. N. 64569/09, judgement of 16 June 2015, for example, 
paras. 115–116. 
30 CJEU, C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, 3 October 2019 
[preliminary ruling]. The court found no general monitoring obligation on hosting provid-
ers to remove or block equivalent content, which covers only essentially unchanged content 
where the hosting provider does not have to carry out an independent assessment but can 
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enhanced liability regime of IT platforms in Europe, with the willingness to also 
increase the degree of their accountability to their users. 
The Facebook case showcased the intention for a broader reform on EU lia-
bility law for IT platforms that will also affect online hate speech moderation. 
The Copyright Digital Single Market Directive 31 indeed introduced proactive 
content-filtering duties of platforms (Article 17), applicable in the copyright con-
text. Should this approach be extended to hate speech, the use of pre-filtering 
would pose genuine threats to equality and non-discrimination. While giving rise 
to additional accountability concerns about the modalities of filtering, prelimi-
nary findings already suggest that erroneous filtering disproportionately affects 
racial and linguistic minority groups. 32 So far, IT platforms have often opted for 
removing lawful content or have used flawed enforcement tools to avoid liability 
or simply to please advertisers. Such choices, guided primarily by platforms’ inter-
ests (as opposed to users’ interests), have broader consequences. The upcoming 
EU Digital Services Act, set to replace the E-Commerce Directive, is expected to 
update the EU’s liability and safety rules for digital platforms in the near future, 
towards the creation of EU-wide applicable rules against online hate speech and 
disinformation. The spirit of the new piece of regulation moves in the direction 
of shifting more responsibility for content to IT intermediaries, echoing the  Face-
book decision. It is reported to consider specific provisions for automated filtering 
technologies within a more transparent and accountable frame. 
These plans follow up on the European Commission’s 2018 recommendation 
on tackling illegal content online, which stipulates that in cases where hosting 
providers use ‘automated means’ to review content, ‘effective and appropriate 
safeguards’ (e.g., human review) should be used to ensure the well-founded 
nature of the effects of such decisions. 33 
However, on the ground, platforms operate in differentiated terms as private 
entities. EU law and national jurisdictions quickly reach the limits of their influ-
ence on the platforms as private actors in light of the technical features and chal-
lenges of online content moderation. For this reason, governments (and the EU 
in some instances) have opted for soft law approaches, pushing for corporate respon-
sibility while maintaining (largely non-transparent) collaborative links with social 
31 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/ 
EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, pp. 92–125. 
32 See, e.g., Enstrom, E. and Feamster, N. (2017). The limits of filtering: a look at the function-
ality and shortcomings of content detection tools (www.engine.is/the-limits-of-filtering). 
33 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on Measures to Effectively Tackle 
Illegal Content Online (https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id= 
50095). The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers had similarly stated in a 2018 
recommendation: ‘Due to the current limited liability of automated means to assess con-
text, intermediaries should carefully assess the human rights impact of automated content 
management and should ensure human review where appropriate’. Cf. Council of Europe, 
Recommendation CM/Rec (2018) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
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media platforms ( Leersen 2015 ). The 2016 European Commission Code of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,34 the 2018 Code of Prac-
tice on Online Disinformation, the Communication on Tackling Illegal Content 
Online ( European Commission 2017 ) and the Recommendation on Measures to 
Effectively Tackle Illegal Content Online ( European Commission 2018 ) repre-
sent a group of soft law measures designed to enhance users’ safeguards in online 
content moderation. The essence of these recommendations moves to emphasise 
procedural safeguards for users. However, most recommendations have focused 
on specific categories of content (e.g., copyright; De Gregorio 2020, p. 17). In 
parallel, the platforms’ own ‘terms of use’ and ‘community standards’ step in to 
almost replace state legislation as the primary means of regulating their activities. 
In this sense, the evolution and the implications of the continuing use of terms 
of use or community standards provide an additional layer of constitutional 
opacity. The removal of content (and in some cases, the elimination of users’ 
accounts) does not require the state’s control or review but allows autonomous 
content management of digital space on the part of online platforms (De Grego-
rio 2020, p. 11). It has even been argued that through this process, users consent 
to a withdrawal of their fundamental rights in exchange for services ( Mackinnon 
2013 ). The  Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Con-
tent Moderation (2018 ), particularly Article 19 that proposes the creation of 
social media councils to oversee moderation, provide some suggestions on due 
process within content moderation and spell out the rights of users, though with 
legally non-binding force. 
Given the dynamics of this particular regulatory environment, increasing the 
direct accountability of platforms still appears as the most viable solution to strike 
a balance between speech removal and freedom of expression and, more broadly, 
to assist platforms in observing free speech principles. As the ‘public is private and 
the private is public’ ( Leersen 2015 ), private online content powers are unsur-
prisingly taking on more judicial features to be able to regulate public discourse 
at the same time as states are devising means to negotiate their regulatory goals 
with these same private entities, though not always in complete transparency. 
The EU’s approach to this crucial point is the acknowledgement that the mis-
sion of ensuring society’s access to information and content comes with a ‘wider 
responsibility’ ( European Commission 2016 , p. 7). This responsibility amounts 
to not only protecting core values but also increasing transparency and fairness 
for users (Ibid.). Examples of required measures in this direction include ensur-
ing human oversight in automated content decisions, the possibility to contest a 
removal decision within a reasonable time frame or the publication of criteria for 
removal of content. 
In sum, accountability-enhancing measures concern three distinct phases of 
online moderation: notice, decision-making on content removal, and eventual 
34 The Code of Conduct requires platforms to clarify the reporting process for hate speech, 
remove illegal contents within 24 hours of notification, and increase their transparency on 









24 Kyriaki Topidi 
redress (De Gregorio 2020, p. 19). Both before and after publication of content, 
users should have knowledge of the means by which content is prevented from 
circulating or even removed if already in circulation. Justifications of removal 
decisions, albeit brief, would be instrumental to assess alignment with ECHR 
balancing techniques, especially in relation to the grounds, the purpose, and the 
criteria used (proportionality) for removal. As for the phase of redress, the proce-
dural expectation would be to provide the possibility for brief yet justified review 
of a removal decision within a reasonable time frame. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
Across the globe, since the 2016 US presidential election, in more visible ways 
for the public, social media platforms have been used to promote populism, hate 
speech, fake news and misinformation, and as vehicles for governments to inter-
fere with elections (their own and those of other countries) or target and silence 
opponents. Conversely, they have also been the object of contestation in connec-
tion to their moderation policies. The recent advertiser boycott of Facebook by 
a number of corporations based on the platform’s non-intervention to moderate 
Donald Trump’s ‘abusive’ posts illustrates the repercussions of hate moderation 
in the business world (The Guardian 2020 ). 
Within such a complex and contested framework and from a more socio-legal 
perspective, online platforms have carved out a privileged position for themselves 
in public discourse. This is because they not only facilitate expression of opin-
ion but also increasingly contribute to shaping public opinion when users access 
information and the news 35 ( Pew Research Center 2018 ). They also serve as 
means to organise political and social movements (e.g., Arab Spring protests; 
Leersen 2015 ). Given these tremendous powers, their accountability is dispro-
portionately measured for the most against the ‘internal’ aspect of these plat-
forms’ rules. 
Ultimately, online content moderation of expressions of hate has broader impli-
cations than the consideration of legal liability rules and regimes. It concerns the 
responsibility for social cohesion ( O’Brien 2018 , p. 106). Hate speech online 
moderation carries the risk of allowing platforms to prioritise their own corporate 
interests (along with those of authoritarian governments, in some cases) to the 
detriment of individuals and the ethnic/cultural groups to which these individu-
als belong. In this sense, online speech moderation that fails to be efficient creates 
the preconditions for the flourishing of cultural relativism, particularly through 
the proliferation of hateful expressions. Therefore, while the digital space opens 
access to an innovative tool for public debate, it also requires pragmatic (not only 
legal) and active balancing of interests. The alignment of corporate purposes with 
35 According to the  Pew Research Center (2018 ), digital pathways to the news are gaining 
increasing preference by users. For Western Europeans, within their social media activity, 
most users are still exposed to a variety of political views. The ‘echo chamber’ effect is thus 



























Accountability in the globalised age 25 
societal expectations for accountable and transparent means of moderation of 
expression ( O’Brien 2018 , p. 109) stands a better chance to build trust and faith 
in how the entire system works. 
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3 Economic crises and transformation 
to the theoretical model of budget 
process 
A comparative constitutional analysis via 
an example of EU Member States*
Grzegorz Kuca 
3.1 Introduction 
At the start of the 21st century, the world has faced two economic crises. Their 
origins differ, but their range is comparable to the Great Depression of the 1920s 
and 1930s. The economic crisis during the first decade of the 21st century (now 
known as the global financial crisis [GFC]) arose in the US banking system, caus-
ing the high-risk mortgage market to collapse and then infecting other elements 
of the financial market, resulting in a global recession. The crisis during the sec-
ond decade of the 21st century has been caused by COVID-19, and its economic 
consequences are likely to exceed those of the GFC. 
Though the COVID-19 crisis is far from over, and its final economic conse-
quences are not yet known, the actions implemented during it to stabilise global 
economic growth are similar to those applied during the GFC. The macroeco-
nomic policy that has been followed during the first two decades of the 21st 
century diverges from the theoretical model developed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
These changes apply to both fiscal and monetary policy. In the GFC and the 
COVID-19 crisis, unprecedented fiscal expansion has been applied alongside 
unconventional monetary policy, significantly impacting the budget process. 
From the perspective of constitutional law, these economic crises have created a 
sustained threat to social relations. There are at least four reasons to suspect this is 
the case. First, such crises may paralyse parliamentary activity, which is otherwise 
aimed at exercising citizens’ constitutional rights or extending the catalogue of 
these rights, which could pose a threat to economic security of the state. Second, 
economic crises may provide a reason for governments to restrict the execution 
of citizens’ rights, which—in the context of the rule of law—would be impossible 
under normal conditions; they could also serve as a catalyst for these rights to be 
extended. Third, economic crises may be used to pressure constitutional courts 
to rule more favourably or more leniently towards the government and parlia-
ment. Fourth, such crises may lead countries to redefine the role of their central 
* This chapter is an extended version of a paper titled ‘Economic Crisis and Transformation 
to the Theoretical Model of Budget Procedure’, presented at the 10th IACL-AIDC World 
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banks and shape new relations between political (government and parliament) 
and monetary powers (central bank). 
All these factors lead states to change their budget process. In the context of 
public debt and the budget deficit, scholars of constitutional law face several 
significant questions regarding budget process. The main research problem boils 
down to answering this question: do the scope and manner of regulating a bud-
get process provide optimal formal and substantive conditions for overcoming 
the consequences of economic crises consequences? Additional questions follow 
from this (as also posed by  Gherghina 2013 ;  Diamant and Emerik 2014 ;  Zubik 
2015 , pp. 138–139;  Kuca 2015 , pp. 138–145): 
1 Is the government required to include any budget items that cannot be 
altered or rejected by parliament in its budget bill, even in the face of eco-
nomic crisis? 
2 To what extent does passing a deficit budget limit the ability of the govern-
ment or parliament to prepare drafts or pass laws that imply new spending or 
reduce taxes and other public levies? 
3 Would the present rules for assessing constitutionally protected values be 
sufficient if a lawmaker were to limit one such rule to protect the state’s 
economic security? 
4 In the absence of a direct constitutional provision limiting state debt (e.g., 
numerical fiscal rules or a balanced budget rule), could the constitutional 
court declare a law that restricts economic and social rights to be uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that it poses a threat to the state’s economic 
security? 
5 As a result of two financial crises, does the state of public finances enforce 
cooperation between political (government and parliament) and monetary 
powers (central bank)? 
While these questions do not cover all issues that can determine changes in a bud-
get process over the short or long term, they do cover the most signifcant issues. 
3.2 The notion, phases, and course of budget process 
in the EU Member States 
A budget process aims to establish a state’s revenues and expenditures ( Rubin 
2015 ). On the grounds of constitutional law, this is a legislative process requir-
ing the participation of parliament (or, at least, the house of parliament elected 
in general elections). The process is initiated and has its execution guaranteed 
by the government, takes place in precisely defined and restricted time limits, 
and secures the continuity of the state’s financial management in cases of delay 
or failure to adopt a state budget ( Kuca 2018 , p. 42). According to von Hagen 
and Harden: 
The budget process describes how decisions concerning public resources are 
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the preparation and the implementation of the budget. The budget process 
is governed by formal and informal rules of behavior [ sic] and interaction. 
( von Hagen and Harden 1995 , p. 772) 
Thus, ‘a budget process is a system of rules governing the decision-making that 
leads to a budget, from its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its 
execution’ ( Ehrhart et al. 2007 , p. 279). The basic phases of a budget process are 
(1) creation (adoption) and (2) execution. However, a subjective criterion (the 
diversity of the participants in the budget process) gives reason for dividing the 
budget process into three parts: (1) preparation, (2) adoption, and (3) execution 
(Raundla 2010, p. 463). In other instances, budget control is also considered to 
be yet another phase ( Kuca 2018 , p. 112). 
Formally, a budget is a list of revenues and expenses for a certain time period
( von Hagen 1992 ). It has become standard, and even guaranteed by constitutional
provisions, for a state’s budget to be adopted as a statute. However, exceptions can
be noted (Slovenia). According to the Constitutional Court of Slovenia, the bud-
get does not define the rights and obligations of Slovenian citizens, and therefore it
does not have to be adopted as a statute (Case U-I-40/96). When a state’s budget
is adopted as a statute, constitutional lawmakers recognise the significance of finan-
cial management and the necessity of maintaining proper financial management
relationships between legislative power and executive power ( Zubik 2001 , p. 71).
Parliamentary adoption of a budget is typically accompanied by tensions between
the government and the parliament. This situation leads to solutions that can be
approved by parliamentary majority on the one hand, and are best from the state’s
financial management perspective on the other ( Bałaban 2007 , pp. 143–144). It
is worth noting that, according to Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, par-
liament cannot entrust its budget competences to other entities for an indefinite
period of time through unspecified budgetary authorisations. The more financial
responsibility is taken, the more effective must be parliament’s authority to accept,
reject, and control the state budget (Case 2 BvR 987/10). The following argu-
ments oppose issuing a state budget in any form other than a statute:
1 The budget should not be issued by the government, as this approach gives 
the executive power full financial authority and arbitrary influence over the 
state’s financial management policy. 
2 The government can make expenditures, including credit and loans, with-
out the consent of parliament, significantly limiting parliament’s political 
position. 
3 It is against the character of an executive power, which is responsible for 
executing, rather than making, the law. 
4 It significantly changes the responsibility for public revenues, budget defi-
cits, and the direction of the state’s expenditures. 
In the frst phase of a budget process, a budget act is prepared. Doing so is 
the exclusive competence of the minister responsible for budget matters (most 
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commonly known as the fnance minister), who proposes the budget to the gov-
ernment. The government then exercises its right to take legislative action. This 
model is the most common and most widely approved. Across the EU, the gov-
ernment does exercise this legislated authority during the budget process, but it 
is formally the competence of the prime minister in France; the lower house of 
parliament in Ireland; the monarch in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK; 
and the minister responsible for the budget in Cyprus (Article 167(1) of the 
Constitution of Cyprus), Greece (Article 79(3) of the Constitution of Greece), 
Luxembourg, and Malta (Article 103(2) of the Constitution of Malta). In this 
context, it is also worth mentioning that, under the Constitution of Austria, the 
federal government may use its right to submit a bill concerning a budget act, 
but it is not the only entity entitled to do so. If the federal government does 
not submit the bill within the specifed time frame, the right can be exercised by 
members of the National Council (Article 51a(1) of the Constitution of Austria). 
In most countries, work on the budget bill begins long before it is presented 
to parliament and lasts for several months. Preparation of the state budget is 
conducted in accordance with a process specifed in an executive act or other act 
issued by the minister responsible for budget. This act must be updated annually 
due to changes in social and economic situations. Work on a budget bill must be 
completed on time to give certainty that the budget will be adopted before the 
commencement of the next fscal year. 
The second phase of a budget process is adopting the state budget. This com-
petence is exercised by parliament or, in the case of bicameral parliaments, the 
house of parliament elected in general elections. Concerning bicameral parlia-
ments, there are three basic models of relationships between the parliamentary 
houses: (1) a full balance between both houses (Romania and Hungary); (2) 
dominance of one house (France, Germany, and Poland); and (3) deprivation of 
participation by one house (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slove-
nia). Committees play key roles when working on a state budget in a parliament. 
There are two basic models: (1) one specialised committee (Austria, Finland, and 
Slovenia) or (2) one committee considering a budget bill based on reports drawn 
up by formal committees (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The latter 
model presents more advantages, as it ensures prompt and efficient elaboration of 
a budget bill accompanied by proper coordination of the bill’s elements by other 
committees ( Kuca 2018 , p. 303). 
Other significant issues are the admissibility and scope of amendments to a 
budget bill, which should be considered one of the most significant impacting 
a state’s finances ( Gustafson 2003 , p. 20). In the EU Member States, there are 
three basic models of introducing amendments to a budget act ( Stapenhurst 
2008 , p. 56). The first model involves an unlimited right to introduce amend-
ments. Entities entitled to do so may propose both decreasing revenues and 
increasing expenditures (e.g., Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
and Finland). Another model involves a limited right to introduce amendments. 
Amendments should not introduce content entirely unrelated to the basic bill, as 
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37/03, 45/05, 11/08). Therefore, it is generally acceptable to propose amend-
ments whose substantive scope is restricted to what helps the government estab-
lish the bill’s final content, achieving fiscal consolidation and a sustainable fiscal 
position. Restrictions may be (a) the prohibition of increasing the deficit or public 
debt (Croatia, Poland, Romania, and Italy); (b) the prohibition of sums proposed 
by the government (Bulgaria, France, Malta, and Germany); (c) the obligation 
to indicate financing sources (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia); and (d) the order 
of the government’s acceptance (Spain and Germany). In the third model, no 
amendments may be introduced (Cyprus, Ireland, and the UK). Other important 
elements of the process are signing the budget act and ordering its publication 
in a proper, official journal, which makes it law. Entrusting parliament with the 
possibility to introduce amendments of limited subject scope, and ensuring that 
the government determines the amendments’ final content, seems to be the most 
reasonable solution, as it allows the state to reach fiscal consolidation and balance 
its fiscal records ( Wehner 2010a , p. 208). 
In some cases, the head of state is entitled to veto all or part of a budget act. In 
other cases, the head of state is allowed no veto power over a budget act (Poland, 
Article 224(1) of the Constitution of Poland). However, in many states, this issue 
is not settled, which makes it much more difficult to determine whether such 
vetoes are possible. This concerns more than the proceedings necessary for ordi-
nary statutes. A budget process must include a fall-back solution if the budget 
fails to be adopted. The most common, generally approved fall-back solution is 
prorogation. Its basic advantage is that no additional procedural actions must be 
taken to apply it, but its basic disadvantage is that the structures of revenues and 
expenditures in two subsequent budgetary periods are never identical. Therefore, 
it seems that, unlike a provisional budget, the possible application of prorogation 
means there is no need to introduce additional fall-back solutions. 
Some countries have constitutional regulations allowing the dissolution of par-
liament (Croatia, Estonia, and Hungary) or the shortening of parliament’s term 
(Poland) in case the state budget fails to be adopted. This is a voluntary action 
in Croatia, Poland, and Hungary, and obligatory in Estonia. These regulations 
apply to situations when the legislative power is unable to take steps important 
to the state’s financial management, generally due to the lack of a stable parlia-
mentary majority. Tensions between parliament and the government may arise as 
a result of a break-up in the parliamentary majority, which leads to discrepancies 
in positions regarding budget issues. 
The third phase of a budget process is execution of the state budget. In this 
phase, public money is spent, and amendments to the budget act are introduced 
with parliamentary participation. Changes are made to the state budget, with 
the government playing a key role through the minister responsible for budget 
matters. It has recently become acceptable to exceed expenditures approved by 
parliament, what should be reflected in the constitution (Austria and Germany). 
Amendments to a state budget, introduced during its execution, are made in the 
form of a supplementary budget or budgetary amendments. Generally, there are 
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made or the moment (time of the fiscal year) at which they may be brought up. 
However, amendments to a state budget should certainly not become a rule; 
they should be an exception. When amending a state budget during a fiscal year 
becomes a rule (as it did in Italy and Belgium in 1980 and in Germany in 1990), 
the authorising entities cannot be expected to treat the budget act and its limita-
tions as legally binding ( von Hagen 2007 , p. 42). 
Budget control can be performed in the following forms: (1) ex ante (regard-
ing the budget bill’s conformity to national law [and to European regulations 
among EU Member States]); (2) current control (regarding the constitutional-
ity of a budget act); and (3) ex-post control (regarding executing a budget act 
during a given fiscal year). The key role in budget control is played by supreme 
audit institutions (SAIs). Their position, functions, tasks, and competences have 
evolved over the years due to numerous factors, primarily political. From the very 
beginning, the basic task of SAIs has been to exercise control over government 
and administration, specifically for financial issues. In France, court authorities— 
the Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes)—act independently of the government 
and parliament. In Germany, chambers of audit are organised as administrative 
bodies (with a hierarchical structure and clerical dependency) but are outside the 
governmental structure and tend to strengthen their bonds with parliament. In 
the UK, budget control is within the competences of the auditor general, who is 
independent of the government but is responsible to the parliament. 
Budget control is performed by qualified auditors and specialist in various 
fields ( Mazur 2009 , pp. 108–109). Also deserving of mention is the increas-
ing role and significance of independent bodies that monitor a state’s financial 
stability (fiscal councils and parliamentary budget offices) and prepare analyses 
and assessments ( Debrun et al. 2009 ). Developing such institutions should be 
recommended and should provide them with constitutional frames; for instance, 
entrusting them with specified instruments of influence in the budgetary pro-
cess. However, numerous doubts regarding the control of state budget execu-
tion have been raised, as parliaments are generally not bound by SAIs’ critical 
assessments of the execution process. One problem with the budget process is 
that financial oversight may become too technically complex for politicians tasked 
with that oversight and too political for accountants with the necessary technical 
skills (Jacobs 2008, p. 67). This seems to undermine the effort involved in such 
control and questions whether fiscal control has become a myth ( Wehner 2010b , 
p. 129). This should be considered, as even when there are significant differences 
in normative revenues and a state’s expenditures presented in the budget act, this 
does not necessarily indicate refusal to discharge by a government acting along-
side a stable parliamentary majority ( Kuca 2018 , p. 366). 
3.3 Economic crisis and budget process 
Coming to the core part of this study, it must be stated that a state’s financ-
ing of its citizens’ expectations is determined by its budget act, which, in addi-
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claims against the state, outlines the execution of all other financial laws. As out-
lined above, budget acts are passed according to special process, which engages 
both government and parliament. After the economic crises of the 21st century,
this process has strayed considerably from its previous theoretical model, which 
entrusted governments with the power to prepare and execute the state budget 
and parliaments with the power to adopt and control the budget legislation. 
An increasingly significant role is played by the EU, which gives specific 
requirements for budget bills on the one hand and allows control instruments in 
Member States’ governments on the other. Budgets in the EU are planned via 
medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) and within the financial frame-
work of EU funds. EU funds are distributed among Member States based on 
Partnership Agreements, which are draw up individually with each Member 
State. Thus, the budget of an EU Member State is no longer its only instru-
ment for the planned acquisition and disbursement of its public finances. Each 
EU Member State uses EU funds; however, they do so to varying degrees. This 
means that the EU has the option to control conditions of the Member State’s 
public finances as its budget bill is being prepared. EU Member States must par-
ticularly implement into their budget bills the arrangements and policies included 
in the EU’s MTBFs. 
According to Council Directive 2011/85/UE of 8 November 2011, an ele-
ment of the regulatory ‘six-pack’ defining requirements for the budgetary frame-
works of EU Member States, the Member States must establish credible, effective 
MTBFs, providing for a fiscal planning horizon of at least three years, to ensure 
that national fiscal planning follows a multiannual perspective.1 The objectives of 
Council Directive 2011/85/UE were developed by Regulation no. 473/2013 
(part of the regulatory ‘two-pack’), which implemented (in Article 4) a com-
mon budgetary schedule involving an elaboration procedure for both MTBFs 
and annual budgets. These regulations extend the surveillance mechanisms for 
states experiencing financial difficulties and introduce new procedures for the 
surveillance of national budgets ( Armstrong 2014 , pp. 68–69). EU funds are not 
always included in a budget act, though Member States generally design separate 
budgets for their EU funds. Therefore, EU Member States must follow obliga-
tions resulting from the Stability and Growth Pact, inter alia, the obligation to 
avoid an excessive budget deficit. By these measures, the EU participates in its 
1 Significantly, budget process must also follow the European Semester, established by the 
Council (in the form of conclusions) on 17 June 2010, which was based on the Commission 
announcement of 12 May 2010 and was formally confirmed by the six-pack. The European 
Semester aims at wider consideration of the European dimension in the national economic 
strategies of EU Member States—planning and providing sources for the fulfilment of ‘Europe 
2020’ goals in the Member States’ budgets. This process involves three parallel, related paths: 
macroeconomic supervision, subjective coordination, and fiscal supervision. (The first two 
paths concern issues covered by National Reforms Programmes, while the third concerns 
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Member States’ budget economies, significantly impacting the change that is tak-
ing place in the previous budget process model. 
The course of the two 21st-century financial crises also offers examples proving 
that governments assume multiple competences in the passage 2 and amendment 
(flexible performance) 3 of a state budget—competences formerly considered to 
be within the purview of parliaments ( Konrath and Berger 2014 ). They also 
ignore established limits for deficits and public sector debt set in effective EU 
provisions (Article 126 TFEU) and sometimes in their own constitutions (Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Poland). In reaction, the role of the legislature 
is changing ( Posner and Park 2007 ), and parliaments are developing forms of 
cooperation with the government during budget execution. However, these have 
not provided a sufficient balance to government dominance. Therefore, parlia-
mentary competences, such as the right to perform ex post control of budget 
performance or to vote about budget approval, have been deprived of real sig-
nificance ( Wehner 2010b ). According to Schick: 
As legislatures enhance their budget role, one of the challenges facing budget 
architects will be to balance the impulse for independence with the need to 
be fiscally responsible. The future of legislative-governmental relations will 
be strongly influenced by the manner in which this balance is maintained. 
( Schick 2002 , p. 14) 
Thus, it seems essential to develop parliamentary forms of cooperation and 
ongoing monitoring in the state budget execution process, including the char-
acteristic, and increasingly common, participation of parliamentary commissions. 
As Schick underscores, ‘The legislature’s new role in budgeting cannot come 
from government’s weakness. . . . The legislature’s role must be defined more in 
terms of policy, accountability, and performance, and less in terms of control and 
restriction’ ( Schick 2002 , p. 17). It is, therefore, even more significant—given 
2 In particular, there is the obligation to obtain the government’s consent to introduce amend-
ments to the state’s budget bill. Such an obligation is applied, for instance, in Spain. In 
accordance with Article 134(6) of the Constitution of Spain, ‘each non-governmental bill or 
amendment which cause[s] increase in expenditures or decrease in budget incomes, must be 
accepted by the government for its consideration’. 
3 For instance, in accordance with Article 51b(1) of the Constitution of Austria, expenditures 
not included in the federal budget (unplanned expenditures) may be made, as can expendi-
tures that exceed those accepted by the Federal Council (extra expenditures), only on the basis 
of authorisation expressed in the budget act. In case of delay, the following may be established, 
based on federal government regulations issued in consultation with the commission of the 
National Council: (1) unplanned expenditures in an amount not exceeding 1% of the total 
sum of expenditures provided for in the budget act and (2) extra expenditures in an amount 
not exceeding 2% of the total sum of expenditures provided for in the budget act. If the com-
mission of the National Council does not make a decision within two weeks, it is assumed that 
consent is given. See Article 51b(2) of the Constitution of Austria. Excess authority given in 
the state budget is also constitutionally regulated in Germany; see Article 112 of the Constitu-
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that governments are increasingly obtaining the ability to make expenditures 
exceeding their states’ budget acts—to identify what limits the position of parlia-
ment ( Steger 2010 ). Generally, governments’ competences within this scope are 
not based on constitutional provisions, although they should be (as in Austria 
and Germany). As Kopits and Craig write of transparency in the budgeting pro-
cess, this requires ‘ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understand-
able, and internationally comparable information on government activities . . . so 
that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s 
financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities’ ( Kopits 
and Craig 1998 , p. 1). 
In this context, there remains the question of the government’s and ministers’
liability for budget performance. They can be liable for unlawfully exceeding or
failing to make budgeted expenditures; however, they cannot be liable for esti-
mated public revenues turning out to be lower than those established in a budget
act, nor can they be liable for all the money planned for budgetary expenditures
not being disbursed. The problem is that there is a specific sequence of events and
consequences. If a speaker in a parliament overlooks certain flaws in a budget bill
submitted to the parliament, the parliament’s faultiness may increase. The final
budget will be burdened with flaws, and, if so, the question arises: will those who
pass it in good faith remain liable for the budget’s performance? If a parliament
adopts a flawed budget, there is no guarantee that the flaw(s) will be noticed and
corrected at the ongoing control stage (e.g., while controlling the budget act’s
constitutionality). It may even be that the constitutional court itself will avoid con-
trolling the budget act or will not notice its flaws. Because a budget act is divided
into normative and accounting portions, the chosen judicial instruments applied by
the constitutional courts may prove problematic ( Sinkevicius 2003 ;  Granat 2017 ; 
Zubik 2015 ). In this context, a particularly significant issue is controlling the con-
stitutionality of the normative acts related to budget execution, as well as other
(potential) financial plans initiated by the state’s public authorities, which can lead
to questioning of the legal institutions threatening the state’s economic security.
These challenges must be faced by constitutional courts, which—particularly 
in the context of controlling planning norms—must develop new juridical instru-
ments that do not result in an economic interpretation of the law. Such mecha-
nisms could easily be taken out of the context of constitutional rules and values, 
or even contrasted with those rules and values. The independent role of such 
mechanisms would be enormous. They could even be used to demand, for exam-
ple, the closure of some medical healthcare units or public educational units for 
posing a threat to the state’s economic security. This could lead to restrictions 
in citizens’ ability to enjoy their freedoms and rights ( Granat 2017 , p. 22). Such 
mechanisms must, therefore, consider the differences between rules and prin-
ciples. That is it is necessary to determine whether they should be conclusive 
(according to the ‘all or nothing’ rule) or inconclusive (being applied accord-
ing to optimisation). In the latter case, rules indicate an ideal (a goal), and their 
level of performance depends on legal and actual possibilities. Consequently, it 
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they should remain solely a value under constitutional protection, as they are 
sometimes defined by constitutional courts. 4 Budget process must be adjusted to 
account for sequences of events such as this. 
With this in mind, the government is also required to include any budget 
items that cannot be altered or rejected by parliament into its budget bill. This 
process differs between budget incomes and expenditures, and it also depends on 
whether the items are related to increasing or decreasing incomes/expenditures. 5 
A comparative analysis of constitutional instruments suggests a few universal limi-
tations. First, budget incomes are, in the vast majority, based on acts (i.e., legis-
lations regarding taxes or other public levies), which determine a given type of 
income. Parliament may increase or decrease those incomes only by amending an 
act that is already in force. It is necessary to amend an act when budget incomes 
refer to a citizen’s legal situation. Therefore, on the one hand, parliaments are 
not allowed to increase expenditures when amending governmental budget bills, 
and on the other hand, governments are entitled to propose incomes that have 
not been previously determined in acts passed by parliament. Therefore, the 
determination of budget incomes is mainly declaratory, involving estimating the 
effects of executing acts in force within the indicated system of relations. The 
authority of the legislative powers to independently act within that scope is lim-
ited to shaping incomes related to the management of the state’s assets, as well 
as credit marketing. 
Both government and parliament enjoy greater freedom with budget expen-
ditures, certainly in the scope of decreasing expenditures. However, even in this 
case, their competences remain limited. First, the government is obliged to enter 
in a budget bill, and parliament to pass in a state’s budget (budget act), expen-
ditures that expressly result from other acts, international agreements, or other 
sources that result in legal claims from third parties. 6 This is required by both 
4 Comparative analysis shows that Hungarian constitutional lawmakers have already approached 
this issue. In Article 37(4) of the Constitution of Hungary, there are direct control pat-
terns (positive approach) that are the basis for controlling state budget constitutionality. This 
provision states: ‘As long as state debt exceeds hall of the Gross Domestic Product, the Con-
stitutional Court may, within its competence Set out in Article 24(2)(b-e), only review the 
Acts on the State Budget and its implementation, the central tax type, duties, pension and 
healthcare contributions, customs and the central conditions for local taxes for conformity 
with the Fundamental Law or annul the preceding Acts due to violation of the right to life and 
human dignity, the right to the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, and with the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. The Constitutional Court 
shall have the unrestricted right to annul the related Acts for non-compliance with the Fun-
damental Laws procedural requirements for the drafting and publication of such legislation 
( Halász 2011 , p. 491). 
5 It is worth noting that constitutions rarely explicitly state what a nation’s budget (budget act) 
shall contain. Generally, the constitution only determines the form of state budgets. Neverthe-
less, a constitution is the proper place from which to determine what content a state budget 
(budget act) should contain. 
6 Some constitutional lawmakers pay great attention to this issue and decide to enter it into 
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the rule of law and the rule of legal transactions security, which are elements of a 
democratic state ruled by law. 
Second, government is obliged to make, and parliament must accept, neces-
sary expenditures to operate the state bodies and institutions specified in their
constitution. These are provisions that directly refer to the sphere of a state’s
incomes and expenditures, that is, provisions that require consideration of
expenditures from entities that enjoy budgetary autonomy; 7 provisions allow-
ing budgetary deficit (e.g., Article 135 of the Constitution of Spain, Article
220(1) of the Constitution of Poland); or provisions determining the deficit’s
amount by means of an act (e.g., Article 84 of the Constitution of Finland) and
consideration of funds for the remuneration of specified entities (e.g., Article
135 of the Constitution of Spain, Article 220(1) of the Constitution of Poland)
even in crisis situations. Without financial security, these necessary entities
would be unable to operate, which would breach the constitution. Therefore,
a state budget must incorporate the operations of the head of state, prime
minister, governmental administrations, courts, tribunals, and organs of state
control, and also provide funding for the defence of rights and administration.
There should also be provisions that do not refer directly to the state’s incomes
and expenditures but concern finances for performing basic tasks assigned to
the constitutionally required institutions. The absence or significant limitation
of these funds could be considered a breach of the principle of a democratic
state ruled by law.
Thus, in one way, passing a deficit budget limits the ability of the government 
or parliament to prepare drafts or pass laws that imply new spending or reduce 
taxes and other public levies. According to a well-established definition from the 
fields of economy and law, a budget deficit is a surplus of public expenditures 
over public incomes, which is planned in a state budget. Financing public needs 
with a budget deficit is accepted as the economic standard in most contemporary 
states. However, as a result of the 21st-century financial crises in the EU Mem-
ber States, both deficits and public debt increased, similar to its relation to gross 
mentioned, as § 116(2) of the Constitution of Estonia provides that parliament cannot abolish 
or decrease, in a budget bill or in a state budget, any expenditures that result from other acts. 
Another aspect of this issue is regulated by the Finnish constitutional lawmaker, as § 88 of the 
Constitution of Finland states that each person is entitled to levy a claim against the state for 
what lawfully should be granted to him or her, notwithstanding the accepted state budget. 
7 Provisions regarding budgetary autonomy have two basic goals. First, they exempt the minis-
ter in charge of the budget from the obligation to develop a state budget bill within the scope 
of references to bodies and institutions. Consequently, the role of this minister consists of 
entering the proposed projects into a state budget bill. Without proper authorisation, govern-
ments should not modify these proposals. Second, the aim of such regulations is to guarantee 
the independency of specified entities from the government. For instance, the constitutions 
of Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, and Luxembourg contain regulations regarding the 
budgetary independency of specified entities. These concern the competences of the legislative 
powers (Bulgaria, Belgium, Spain), heads of the state (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Luxem-
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domestic product (GDP). When a deficit budget is passed, any decrease in taxes 
or any new expenditures will be followed by an increase in the deficit. 
In accordance with Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU), Member States must avoid excessive budget deficits, and 
the Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and 
the stock of government debt in the Member States. The Commission examines 
Member States’ budgets based on two criteria: (1) whether the ratio of planned 
or actual public deficit to GDP exceeds 3% and (2) whether the ratio of public 
debt to GDP exceeds 60%. These rates are determined by a procedure protocol 
concerning excessive budget deficits, which is an attachment to the TFEU. When 
Member States exceed the specified ratios, EU authorities may implement defi-
cit limiting actions and recommendations, and sanctions may be imposed on a 
Member State that fails to limit its deficit. 
As mentioned above, the question of public debt and budget deficit has been 
recognised in the constitutions of certain EU Member States: Hungary (Article 
37 of the Constitution of 2011); Germany (Articles 109 and 115 of the Consti-
tution of Germany, in the wording of 29 July 2009); Poland (Articles 216(5) and 
220 of the Constitution); and Spain (Article 135, as created by the act amend-
ing Article 135 of the Constitution, 27 September 2011;  Ruiz Robledo 2013 , 
p. 154). In Article 216(5) of the Constitution of Poland, the maximum allow-
able rate of public debt shall not exceed three-fifths of GDP. In other words, the 
ratio of state public debt to GDP should not exceed 60%. Similar debt limits are 
enforced in Spain and Germany; however, these regulations differ in that the 
Spanish and German constitutional lawmakers did not explicitly specify the ratio 
limits, instead referring to the corresponding EU acts (i.e., Article 104 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the TFEU). Thus, 
Germany and Spain essentially constitutionalised these acts. In Germany, accord-
ing to Articles 109(3) and 115(2), public budgets must be balanced ‘without 
revenue from credits’, also known as the ‘debt brake’ (Schuldenbremse). This 
principle is satisfied when the revenue obtained from borrowing funds ‘does not 
exceed 0.35 per cent in relation to the nominal gross domestic product’ ( Delle-
donne 2014 , p. 187). The Constitution of Hungary states, in Article 37, that ‘no 
debt or financial obligation may be assumed which allows state debt to exceed 
half of the Gross Domestic Product’. 
Such constitutional prohibitions of excessive debt first limit the government,
as the entity entitled to contract loans or give state financial guarantees (gov-
ernment, minister of finance, central bank), and second, the parliament, which
cannot pass laws or make amendments that will cause the state to exceed its
constitutional debt limit. If such limits were exceeded, the persons holding
office would transgress the constitution; however, because of doubts concern-
ing the effectiveness of constitutional liability, the actual implementation of
such liability is doubtful. Another view suggests that cases in which the consti-
tutional deficit ratios are exceeded should be followed by proceedings before
the constitutional court, attempting to declare the occurrence legal ( Banaszak
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It must also be considered that debt limits can be exceeded, not only as a 
result of actions made by proper authorities but also for objective reasons not 
dependent on state authorities (e.g., as a result of an economic crisis, which 
causes a decrease in GDP). Therefore, lawmakers should consider relativising 
the legal consequences of exceeding debt limits, particularly because, in certain 
constitutions, such prohibitions are very strict (e.g., ‘one cannot’ [Hungary]; 
‘one mustn’t’ [Poland]; ‘it cannot be allowed’ [Spain]). It seems, therefore, that 
exceeding debt limits, though economically harmful, should not always involve 
legal consequences. 
Hungarian political lawmakers have acted on this suggestion, as the country 
now allows the debt limits to be exceeded solely during a special legal order, to 
the extent required for mitigating the consequences of whatever has caused the 
limit to be exceeded and, if there is a significant and enduring national economic 
recession, to the extent required to redress the state’s economic balance (Article 
36(6) of the Constitution of Hungary). Similarly, in Spain, thresholds of struc-
tural deficit may be exceeded during natural disasters, economic recessions, or 
other sudden, exceptional situations which are out of state’s control and signifi-
cantly harm its financial situation or social and economic sustainability (Article 
135(4) of the Constitution of Spain). Exceptions from the debt rule can be also 
found in Germany (Article 115 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany); they, rather like Spain’s provisions, refer to deviations in the economic 
situation, national disasters, and extraordinary situations. 
It is worth mentioning that, if there are no such regulations indicating accept-
able exceptions (Poland), a threat to the state’s existence is considered a boundary.
Determining such boundaries is entrusted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which
has pointed, in numerous judgements, to the value of counteracting excessive debt
(Case K 40/02). For example, in one case, the Constitutional Tribunal did not have
opportunity to determine the boundaries for applying Article 216(5) of the Con-
stitution of Poland; however, it applied this constitutional norm to determine the
boundaries of the social rights and guarantees stated in the constitution, creating a
premise that could provide reasons for their limitation (Case SK 30/03). Accord-
ing to the Tribunal, ‘in the circumstances of economic recession . . . the state may
be forced to change and deteriorate effective legal regulations, adjusting the scope
of social right performance to economic circumstances’ (Cases K 5/99, P 9/05).
In this context, it must be added that Article 220(1) of the Constitution of 
Poland states that increased expenditures or decreased revenues planned by the 
government (Council of Ministers) cannot cause the Sejm (the lower house of 
Poland’s parliament) to create a higher budget deficit than that proposed in the 
budget bill. That is the parliament cannot establish a higher budget deficit rate 
than the one projected by the Council of Ministers in the budget bill presented 
to the parliament. Thus, the parliament adopting a budget act is bound by the 
Council of Ministers’ decision regarding the budget deficit rate ( Borodo 2013 , 
p. 14). In other words, in the light of the Constitution of Poland, the parliament 
has no influence on the deficit determined in a budget bill; that is, it cannot lower 
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Because of the two 21st-century economic crises, it must be noted that the con-
dition of a state’s public finances is significantly influenced by its central bank’s 
decisions. To eliminate the influence of political powers (parliament, govern-
ment) on monetary power (central bank)—that is using central bank to finance 
the state’s tasks—the central bank’s tasks are subject to the constitutionalisation 
process. A Finnish constitutional lawmaker was the first to recognise this threat 
and, in 1919, he granted constitutional range to Finland’s central bank, stating: 
‘The Bank of Finland shall function under the guarantee and management of Par-
liament and under the supervision of Governors elected by Parliament’ (§ 73(1) 
of the Constitution of Finland of 1919). This was the first step towards establish-
ing a precedent for determining the constitutionality of central banks’ decisions, 
which involves a procedure of appointment and of determining the legal status 
of central bank authorities, its operational aims, and its independence guarantees. 
This process also includes prohibiting the central bank from financing the gov-
ernment, though such financing attempts are rare ( Elster 1994 , p. 68). 
Thus, the role of the central banks depends on answers to three detailed ques-
tions. First, is it possible to return to classic fiscal policy, in which budget deficit 
and public debt are treated as real limitations to decisions made by the public 
authorities responsible for fiscal policy? In answering that question, it must be 
stated that, in the past, there were strong relationships between public debt and 
GDP, generally related to wars. For instance, in the UK in 1822 (after the Napo-
leonic Wars), the ratio of public debt to GDP equalled 194.1%. Lowering this 
ratio to less than 100% took 37 years. In 1945, the ratio of debt to GDP in the 
UK equalled 215.6%. It was reduced by one-half after ten years, and until around 
1985, the ratio of public debt to GDP was less than 40%. An analysis of data 
concerning the nominal amount of public debt and its relationship to the GDP 
shows that decreases in this relationship resulted from faster economic growth, 
cuts in expenditures, higher taxes, debt restructuring, high inflation, and finan-
cial repressions (involving regulations underestimating interest rates or forcing 
financial institutions to invest in government bonds). This data suggests that 
even high ratios of public debt to GDP do not automatically lead to bankruptcy. 
It must, however, be considered that the above examples concerned the state (an 
economic power), and reducing the ratio of public debt to GDP does not place 
any real burden on the economy. However, it must be a long-term process or it 
will have negative economic consequences. 
Second, is it possible to reduce central banks’ balances to their pre-crisis rates? 
Any answer to this question must consider that reducing the balance sums of 
central banks would have to be followed by a radical decrease in public debt, as 
well as the sale of government securities in financial markets. The first solution is 
rather impossible in a shorter time horizon, as a decrease in the public debt would 
have to be followed by an increase in private sector debt. Similarly, the large-scale 
sale of government securities would have to be followed by price reductions and 
increased interest rates. 
Third, is it possible to return to conventional monetary policy, in which infla-
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to this question must consider that, from the late 1980s, inflation has ceased to 
be the world economy’s major problem. There are also no undeniable arguments 
that low inflation results from effective central bank policies, and other points 
may impact this matter. Thus, interest rate policies must consider other factors 
(e.g., the cost of public debt service) which define the interest rate. 
In sum, the macroeconomic policy, for the foreseeable future, will be deter-
mined by the necessity to maintain proper relationships between interest rates, 
inflation, public debt, and the value and structure of central banks’ assets. From 
this viewpoint, it can safely be assumed that it is necessary to create new relations 
between monetary and fiscal powers, particularly since monetary policy, during 
the 21st-century crises, has been forced to respond to situations created by fis-
cal and economic policies ( van der Sluis 2014 , p. 122). It seems that, otherwise, 
there will be no possibility to resolve the world’s major economic and social 
problems within several decades. One theory, the Modern Monetary Theory,
which is controversial and therefore has not yet been put into practice, may be 
applicable to this situation. It is based on the assumption that governments and 
central banks must cooperate in solving major economic problems in contem-
porary society, presenting the opinion that the budget process and central banks 
must be unified (Kelton 2020). 
3.4 Final remarks 
This analysis shows that the budget process now applied in the political prac-
tice of EU Member States is beginning to vary from the established theoretical 
model. The debate over the most adequate roles for the legislative and executive 
powers in the budget process remains largely unresolved. More research must 
be conducted to compare and contrast the effectiveness of legislative oversight. 
Based on the above considerations, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
First, it is necessary to balance the competences of governments and parlia-
ments within the scope of budget process, particularly limiting both parties 
strictly to their competences as determined by their states’ constitutions and acts, 
and also considering the role of the EU and the requirements Member States 
must meet. This process should not be considered as a negative phenomenon 
that must be eliminated; on the contrary, the iterative process has significant 
advantages allowing it to be gradually and carefully developed. However, it must 
be precisely regulated so that any potential doubts or interpretation (compe-
tence) disputes can be avoided, both between parliament and government and 
between Member States and the EU. 
Second, the government must include some budget items in a state’s budget 
bill, and the parliament is not allowed to change or reject those items, even when 
the constitution or budgetary law acts fail to directly address the items. Thus, 
some advice regarding the content of a state budget can reasonably be offered, 
even during economic crises. The absence or significant limitation of such advice 
in a state budget could be considered a potential breach of the principle of a 
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Third, regulating some (essential) mechanisms concerning the protection of a 
state’s economic safety in ordinary acts is inappropriate from a legislative view-
point, as an act concerning budgetary law is equivalent to an annual budget act, 
in which all essential issues may be regulated differently than in ordinary acts 
regarding the budget. Therefore, this significant postulate covers the basic mech-
anisms of constitutional regulations, or at least provides them with a legal status 
higher than that of a budget act (e.g., by giving them the form of an organic 
law). This particularly applies to budgetary rules that determine the content and 
structure of the budgetary process and are subject to a normative approach in 
budgetary law, as well as to state premises for withdrawing, during an economic 
crisis, from the introduced restrictions. 
Fourth, constitutional courts must create jurisdictional instruments that do 
not result in an economic interpretation of the law. Such mechanisms could easily 
be taken out of the context of constitutional rules and values or even contrasted 
with those rules and values. The independent role of these mechanisms would 
be enormous, but this could restrict citizens’ ability to enjoy their freedoms and 
rights. 
Fifth, numerous doubts have been levied against fiscal control because parlia-
ment is generally not bound by SAIs’ critical assessments of state budget exe-
cution. This seems to undermine the effort involved in enacting such control. 
This should be considered, as even when there are significant differences in the 
normative revenues and the states’ expenditures presented in the budget act, 
that does not necessarily indicate refusal to discharge by the government acting 
alongside a stable parliamentary majority. As Santiso notes: 
The functional linkages between parliaments and audit office[s] are critical to 
strengthen fiscal transparency and enforce financial accountability. Improv-
ing transparency and accountability in public finances necessarily requires 
focusing on the overall process of fiscal control as much as on the individual 
organisations in charge of specific aspects of budget oversight. 
( Santiso 2008 , p. 261) 
Sixth, because of the consequences of economic crises, it is necessary to create 
new relationships between political powers (government, parliament) and mon-
etary powers (central bank). Otherwise, it will be difficult to deal with the con-
sequences of economic crises for several decades. This will require implementing 
effective institutional solutions and perhaps even defining a theory to serve as the 
intellectual ground for such solutions. 
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 4 Financial accountability and 
transparency of public sector 
institutions in the Republic 
of Serbia 
Jelena Kostić and Marina Matić Bošković
4.1 Introduction 
Financial accountability in the public sector implies responsible stewardship of 
the use of public money ( Rabrenović 2009 , p. 40). These funds are considered 
revenues that the government collects from taxes, contributions, and other duties 
paid by citizens in order to finance its operations, and funds are given to public 
sector institutions for their use in the performance of certain activities in the 
public interest ( Watson 1997 ). Public funds are not only financial assets but also 
real estate and movable properties. It should be emphasised that financial respon-
sibility involves three key components: planning of public revenues and expen-
ditures, debate in the parliament and approval of the state budget, and spending 
and responsibility for public spending ( White and Hollingsworth 1999 , p. 1). 
These components coincide with the budget cycle phases and indicate the finan-
cial responsibility of public fund users during both the preparation of financial 
plans and the expenditure of allocated funds. Serbian legislation does not define 
financial accountability but defines managerial accountability as an obligation of 
managers at all levels of public fund users to perform all tasks legally, respect-
ing the principles of economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency, and to 
be accountable for their decisions, actions, and results to the institution that 
appointed them or transferred responsibility to them. 1 
Although budget regulations prescribe limits on public spending, these are 
often insufficient. 2 Efficient, economical, and legal public spending implies pub-
lic sector institutions’ actions in accordance with the provisions of various laws 
and bylaws. To prevent the possibility of violating these provisions, an exist-
ing system of internal financial control and external audit embodied in the 
State Audit Institution (SAI) comprises important mechanisms for preventing 
irregularities and improving financial accountability. Internal financial control 
1 Article 2, paragraph 1, point 51(a) of the Law on Budget System of the Republic of Serbia, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 54/2009 . . . 149/2020 defines the notion of 
managerial accountability. 
2 Budget limits for certain expenditures are defined by the Law on Budget of the Republic of 
Serbia and by local government budget decisions, which are adopted annually and changed 
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is ex-ante control whose primary function is to improve financial responsibil-
ity and the prevention of irregularities at the level of the institution where it 
is established. The existence of ex-post control of public spending is an effi-
cient mechanism for the prevention of unintended spending and illegal actions 
of public sector institutions ( Lončar 2011 , p. 543). The SAI also controls the 
functioning of the system of internal financial control in the public sector. The 
recommendations and the suggestions for improvement of the mentioned sys-
tem are contained in the SAI reports, which are publicly available. Publicised 
reports enable citizens to inspect the legality of public sector institutions’ finan-
cial operations. This is one of the possibilities to exercise the principle of trans-
parency of budget spending, which refers to the government’s obligation to be 
accountable for the management of taxpayers’ funds, both in parliament and to 
the citizens. As the main body of representative democracy, parliament has the 
dual duty to approve (on behalf of the citizens) the imposition of revenues and 
to control budget spending in order to ensure the lawful and purposeful use of 
public funds ( Rabrenović and Ćorić Erić 2012 , p. 282). The first role implies 
the adoption of the Law on Budget, and the second refers to the adoption of 
the Law on the Final Account of the budget. Both laws are published in the 
national official gazette, and the whole text is available to citizens, representing 
the practical implementation of the principle of transparency. The mentioned 
principle enables taxpayers to be acquainted with the volume of budget revenues 
and the purpose of spending in all phases of the budget cycle. This offers citizens 
insight into the financial activities of the state and should have a positive effect 
on reducing or preventing tax evasion ( Anđelković 2010 , p. 55). The transpar-
ency of public spending contributes to improving the financial accountability of 
public sector institutions. The government will act more responsibly if citizens 
gain insights into the manner of public spending and if they avail themselves of 
this possibility. The Law on Budget System of the Republic of Serbia defines the 
principle of transparency. According to this law, the mentioned principle implies 
that the tasks and the responsibilities of various state bodies, local authorities, 
and officials in relation to fiscal policy management are clearly defined and that 
the relevant up-to-date financial and non-financial information is provided and 
available to enable effective public scrutiny of fiscal policy and the state of public 
finances. The principle of transparency also implies that those responsible for 
publishing such information do not withhold it, unless its publication would 
cause significant damage to the Republic of Serbia’s national security, defence, 
or international relations. 3 
In this chapter, the research subject is the state of unawareness in the Republic 
of Serbia’s public sector institutions regarding the importance of internal and 
external financial control for improving financial accountability and the transpar-
ency of public spending. Some past studies pointed to the fact that the system 
of internal financial control in the Republic of Serbia’s public sector was not 
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adequately accepted by public fund users.4 Additionally, the Law on the Final 
Account of the Budget had not been adopted and published in the Republic of 
Serbia for 17 years.5 
In this chapter, we start from the hypothesis that the system of financial 
responsibility has not yet been established at full capacity in the Republic of Ser-
bia’s public sector institutions and that, in practice, there is a lack of consistent 
application of the principle of fiscal transparency. To confirm this assumption 
and provide possible recommendations for improving the existing situation, in 
the second and third section of this chapter, we analyse the content of the audit 
report on the financial statements of budget fund users and the final report on 
the final account of the Republic of Serbia, prepared by the SAI over the last 
four years.6 Before the assessment, we review the role and the legal regulation 
of internal financial control in the Republic of Serbia’s public sector. Using the 
dogmatic-legal method in the fourth section of the chapter, we highlight the 
legal complexity of the roles of the SAI and other institutions that are important 
for improving financial responsibility and the transparency of public spending. 
4.2 The role of internal financial control in the public sector 
Internal financial control is the first level of control over public spending. The 
basis for its establishment was first defined by the Law on Budget System7 that 
4 For more information, see Šuput ( 2013 , p. 260). The author analysed the state of internal 
financial control in the public sector of the Republic of Serbia, based on the analysis of SAI’s 
Audit Reports on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for the 2008, 
2009, and 2010 fiscal years. 
5 However, the Law on the Final Account of the Budget had been adopted retroactively in 
December 2019 for every year and published in the national official gazette. Bearing in mind 
the legal definition of the principle of fiscal transparency, the subsequent adoption of a law and 
its publication do not constitute a realisation of that principle. 
6 Bearing in mind that our conclusions in this chapter are based on the analysis of available 
reports on financial statements of budget fund users and the final report on the final account of 
the Republic of Serbia, prepared by the SAI for the last four years, in some parts of this chapter 
we use the term  budget fund users when we refer to the SAI reports. The term  public fund users
has a much broader sense than  budget fund users. According to Article 2, paragraph 1, point 
5 of the Law on Budget System of the Republic of Serbia, the term  public fund users implies 
direct and indirect users of budget funds, users of funds of organisations for obligatory social 
insurance and public companies established by the Republic of Serbia and local authorities, 
legal entities established by these public enterprises, legal entities over which the Republic of 
Serbia or local self-government has direct or indirect control over more than 50% of the capital 
or more than 50% of the votes in the board of directors, other legal entities in which public 
funds account for more than 50% of total revenues generated in the previous business year, 
and public agencies and organisations that apply the regulation on public agencies. 
7 Articles 81 and 82 of the Law on Budget System ( Official Gazette of the Republic of Ser-
bia, Nos. 54/2009, 73/2010, 101/2011, 93/2012, 62/2013, 63/2013–corrigendum, 
102/2013, 142/2014, 68/2015–other law, 103/2015, 99/2016, 113/2017, 95/2018, 
31/2019, and 72/2019) do not regulate financial management and control and internal 
audit in detail. These provisions only describe the main elements of internal financial control 
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defines the elements of internal financial control in the public sector, which are 
regulated in more detail by the Rulebook on Joint Criteria for Organizing and 
Standards and Methodological Instructions for Proceeding and Reporting of 
Internal Audit in the Public Sector and the Rulebook on Joint Criteria and Stan-
dards for Establishing, Functioning and Reporting on the System of Financial 
Management and Control in the Public Sector. The adoption of these regula-
tions was a major step forward in strengthening financial responsibility in the 
public sector and is the basis for the realisation of one of the economic condi-
tions of the European Union for the admission of new members ( Šuput 2012 , 
pp. 247–248).8 In the very beginning of the establishment of internal financial 
control in the public sector of the Republic of Serbia, according to the Euro-
pean Commission’s progress report on Serbia, it was emphasised that internal 
audit could not reach its full potential if the financial management and control 
system in public sector institutions was not developed ( Šuput 2012 , p. 249). If 
we analyse the SAI’s reports on the audit of the final account of the budget of 
the Republic of Serbia over the past four years and the reports on the audit of 
the financial reports of direct users of budget funds in 2019, it seems that the 
financial management and control system in the public sector is not fully imple-
mented. Given the powers of internal audit and the fact that it is established 
among some budget fund users much earlier than financial management and 
control, a reasonable question arises on whether it exercises its powers in an 
adequate manner. 9 
Internal audit is an advisory activity that exists to improve an organisation’s 
operations and to help the organisation accomplish its objectives by systematic 
and disciplined evaluations and implementations of risk management, control, and 
management of the organisation. Its goal is to check the adequacy and efficiency 
of the management and control system in relation to the operations’ compliance 
with laws, internal acts, and contracts, as well as the reliability and completeness 
of financial and other information. Examining regularity and legality (by internal 
audit) means determining whether the laws and other regulations related to pub-
lic expenditures, public revenues, and financial obligations have been complied 
with, and whether the regulations related to asset management and economic 
affairs have been applied. The findings and the opinions presented in the audit 
report should serve as instructions for further action of the audited entity in 
order to prevent further irregularities ( Šuput 2012 , p. 160). This is important to 
improve the financial management and control system at the level of each public 
sector institution and to establish a professional and efficient organisational unit 
8 Analytical Report Accompanying the Document, Communication from the Commission 
in the European Parliament and the Council, Commission Opinion on Serbia’s Applica-
tion for Membership in the European Union (http://ec.auropa.eu//englargement/pdf/ 
kez_documents/2011/prackage/sr_analytical_report_2011_en.pdf.1.10.2012). 
9 According to Article 9, paragraph 1, points 5 and 6 of the Law on State Audit Institution, 
assessment of the functioning of internal financial control in the public sector is one of the 
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for internal audit. Therefore, if the financial management and control system is 
not established or not sufficiently developed at the level of a certain institution, 
the question of the expertise or efficiency of internal audit could be raised. 
According to the provisions of the Rulebook governing the field of internal 
audit, the audit should have been established in one of the ways prescribed by 
the Rulebook’s provisions for all public fund users. Direct users of budget funds 
that have indirect users, ministries, and users that have over 250 employees, in 
accordance with the provisions of national regulations, should establish an inde-
pendent organisational unit for internal audit. 10 In the case of indirect users, 
they establish an internal audit by organising a special, functionally independent 
organisational unit or by forming a joint unit on the proposal of two or more 
users of budget funds, with the consent of the Central Harmonization Unit. 11 If 
the internal audit of indirect users of budget funds has not been established in any 
of the above-mentioned ways, the internal audit function for them is performed 
via the internal audit of their direct users. 12 
4.3 Assessment of the financial management and control 
system according to the reports of the State Audit 
Institution 
Having in mind the SAI’s reports on the audit of the final account of the Republic 
of Serbia’s budget for the period 2015–2019, there seems to be a need to increase 
the public sector’s awareness of the necessity to establish a system of internal finan-
cial control, despite the fact that it should have been established in 2007. 
According to the SAI’s  Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of 
the Republic of Serbia for 2016 , internal audit had been established in all minis-
tries but had not been established for most indirect users of budget funds in the 
manner prescribed by the Rulebook. Even with those for whom the internal audit 
system had been established, it was assessed that it did not function in the manner 
prescribed by the Law on Budget System and the Rulebook, which regulated its 
work with 16 audit entities.13 Financial management and control system in the 
observed period was not fully established in 19 audit entities, while in three it was 
not established at all.14 
The Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget for 2017 contained 
almost the same findings as those of the 2016 audit. Similar statements were 
made regarding the functioning of financial management and control. The report 
10 Articles 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Rulebook on Joint Criteria for Organizing and Stan-
dards and Methodological Instructions for Proceeding and Reporting of Internal Audit in 
the Public Sector. 
11 Article 3 of the Rulebook. 
12 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Rulebook. 
13 SAI’s Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2016 , 
No. 400–534/2017.03/31, the State Audit Institution of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 
29 December 2017, p. 11. 
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stated that they had not been fully established in accordance with the relevant 
regulations and that this prevented the realisation of the goal for which the sys-
tem of internal financial control had been established among budget fund users. 15 
According to the SAI’s  Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the 
Republic of Serbia for 2018 , internal audit had not been established and organ-
ised by budget fund users in a way that would ensure full application of regula-
tions, rules, and procedures, as well as the achievement of other goals, in line with 
the Law on Budget System and the Rulebook on Joint Criteria for Organizing 
and Standards and Methodological Instructions for Proceeding and Reporting 
of Internal Audit in the Public Sector, as established with budget fund users. 16 
Although the report stated that the establishment of internal audit of indirect 
budget users would depend on the real possibilities of financing—that is on the 
volume of funds at their disposal and the limitation of the possibility of increasing 
the number of employees—we could not agree with that statement. The obliga-
tion to establish internal audit among public fund users was introduced in 2007, 
when the Rulebook regulating this area was adopted, and the validity of the ban 
on employment in the public sector took effect in 2013, when the decree on the 
procedure for obtaining consent for new and additional employment of public 
fund users was adopted.17 If it is a newly established institution, where it really is 
an obstacle due to the ban on employment, it is also possible to establish internal 
audit at the level of the institution, and for indirect users, internal audit could 
be performed by the organisational unit for internal audit of their direct user. 18 
Additionally, in 2018, the SAI’s Audit Report on the Final Account of the 
Budget of the Republic of Serbia recorded an inadequate financial management 
and control system for most budget fund users. 19 Although the obligation to 
15 Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2017 , No. 
400–575/2018–03/36, the State Audit Institution of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 14 
December 2018, pp. 23 and 43. 
16 That has been prescribed by Article 82 of the Law on Budget System of the Republic of Serbia 
(quoted according to the  Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic 
of Serbia for 2018 , No. 400–200/2019–03/16, Belgrade, 20 September 2019, p. 13). 
17 Decree on the Procedure for Obtaining Consent for New Employment and Additional 
Employment in the Public Sector Institutions, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 
113/2013, 21/2014, 66/2014, 118/2014, 22/2015, 59/2015, 62/2019, and 50/2020. 
18 Article 3, paragraph 1, point 2 of the Rulebook on Joint Criteria and Standards for Estab-
lishing, Functioning and Reporting on the System of Financial Management and Control in 
the Public Sector prescribes that internal audit can also be established by organising a joint 
internal audit unit on the proposal of two or more users of public funds, with the prior con-
sent of the Central Harmonization Unit of the Ministry of Finance. According to the same 
article, paragraph 2, if there are no conditions for organising an internal audit unit, internal 
audit activities may also be performed by an internal auditor employed by public fund users. 
Article 3, paragraph 1, point 2 of the above-mentioned Rulebook also prescribes the possibil-
ity for the internal audit of the indirect user of budget funds, to be performed by the unit for 
internal audit of the direct user of budget funds. 
19 Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2017 , No. 
400–575/2018–03/36, the State Audit Institution of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 14 















52 Jelena Kostić and Marina Matić Bošković 
establish financial management and control system has been enforced since 2007, 
it is unusual that even after so many years, it is recommended that the Ministry 
of Finance should continue to familiarise managers and employees in budgetary 
institutions with the internal financial control system in the public sector. This 
also indicates that the internal financial control system in the public sector has not 
taken root in the Republic of Serbia, even after 13 years. 
Somewhat more detailed insight into the shortcomings concerning the func-
tioning of the internal financial control system in the public sector can be gained 
from the analysis of the content of the SAI’s audit reports on budget fund users’ 
financial statements. The mentioned reports show that some direct users of bud-
get funds have not yet established internal audit although, according to the pro-
visions of the Rulebook that guarantees its functioning, they have been obliged 
to establish a fully functionally independent internal audit unit since 2007. 20 
The obligation to establish internal audit for some budget fund users seems to 
be understood as a formality than a necessity. This is evidenced by the fact that 
in some internal audit units, the position of internal auditor was systematised for 
one year but was filled only two years later. 21 
The financial management and control system in the Republic of Serbia is 
not established according to legislation. 22 The existing procedures have not been 
updated, and there is no business risk assessment. Additionally, in some institu-
tions, the manager for financial management and control has been appointed 
only recently, which means that internal financial control in the public sector 
institution is still in the beginning of establishing the process. 23 
For some budget fund users, although part of the business processes is regu-
lated by internal acts, there are no written procedures to verify the legality and 
the documentation of transactions, and there is neither any reporting at the inter-
nal level nor a mechanism for monitoring financial management and control. 24 
Based on the Audit Report on the Final Account of the Budget of the Republic 
of Serbia for the last five years and the Report on the Audit of Financial State-
ments and Regularity of Business Operations of direct users of budget funds 
20 Report on the Audit of Financial Report and Regularity of Business Operations in the Min-
istry of Youth and Sport of the Republic of Serbia for 2018, No. 400–213/2019–03/12, 
Belgrade, 2 December 2019, p. 29. 
21 Report on the Audit of Financial Report and Regularity of Business Operations in the 
Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Serbia for 2017, No. 400–658/2018–03/29, 
Belgrade, 27 August 2018, p. 10 and Report on the Audit of Parts of the Financial Report 
and Regularity of Business Operations in the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social 
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia for 2016, No. 400–2033/2017–03/26, 21 December 
2017, p. 21. 
22 Article 3 of the Rulebook on Joint Criteria and Standards for Establishing, Functioning and 
Reporting of the System of Financial Management and Control in the Public Sector. 
23 Report on the Audit of Financial Report of the Ministry of Defence, No. 400–2015/2019– 
03/13, Belgrade, 19 August 2019, p. 19. 
24 Report on the Audit of Financial Report and Regularity of Business Operations in the Min-
istry of Youth and Sport of the Republic of Serbia for 2018, No. 400–213/2019–03/12, 2 
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of the Republic of Serbia for 2019, it can be concluded that internal audit has 
been established, but financial management and control system is only in the 
beginning of establishing its process. However, the question of the effectiveness 
of the internal audit established among the budget fund users can also be reason-
ably raised. 
According to the provisions of the Rulebook on Joint Criteria for Organiz-
ing and Standards and Methodological Instructions for Proceeding and Report-
ing of Internal Audit in the Public Sector, the basic task of internal audit is to 
assess financial management and control systems in relation to risk identification; 
risk assessment and risk management by managers at all levels of an institution; 
assessment of business operations’ compliance with laws; internal acts and con-
tracts; reliability and completeness of financial and other information; efficiency; 
effectiveness and economy of business operations; protection of funds and data 
(information); and execution of tasks and achievement of goals. 25 Therefore, the 
question of whether internal audit performed its tasks in accordance with the 
Rulebook, which regulates its operations, can also be raised. Additionally, it is 
noticeable that financial management and control seems to be understood more 
as a formality than a real need. Perhaps such an attitude stems from the fact that 
the regulations governing the functioning of internal audit and financial manage-
ment and control in the public sector do not explicitly state that public fund users 
are ‘obliged’ to establish such systems. The regulations only prescribe they be 
‘established’. Probably, the legislators thought that in practice, it would be recog-
nised that the systems’ establishment would be in the interest of employees and 
managers in public sector institutions as well as in the public interest. Therefore, 
the national regulation should enforce public fund users’ obligation to establish 
internal financial control and should impose adequate sanctions in case they fail 
to do so. 
4.4 The role of the State Audit Institution and 
Budget Inspection 
The executive branch of the government’s accountability to parliament for spend-
ing budget funds is a key element of modern democratic systems ( Rabrenović
and Ćorić Erić 2012 , p. 282). This control is exercised by parliament through 
the SAI. 
External audit of budget funds performed by the SAIs, such as the SAI of the 
Republic of Serbia, is an important mechanism for controlling public spending. 
In accordance with international standards, these institutions are independent 
bodies that audit the legality and purposefulness of public spending and form an 
indispensable part of the institutional control of public spending in all modern 
democracies ( Rabrenović and Ćorić Erić 2012 , p. 282;  Šuput 2015 , p. 322). 26 
25 Article 10 of the Rulebook. 
26 International standards refer to the INTOSAI standards issued by the International Organi-
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In the Republic of Serbia, the SAI belongs to a constitutional category. The 
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia define it as the highest 
state body for the audit of public funds in the Republic of Serbia and as an inde-
pendent institution subject to the supervision of the National Assembly, to which 
it is responsible for its work. 27 The SAI’s objective is ‘to help the nation spend 
wisely’ ( Dobre 2012 , p. 698), which means that it should ensure that deliveries 
of public goods and services maintain proper accounts ( Norton and Smith 2018 , 
p. 924). 
To enable the independence of the SAI’s institution, according to the law gov-
erning its work, the acts by which it exercises its competence may not be con-
tested before courts and other state bodies. 28 According to the same provision, 
the SAI of the Republic of Serbia may provide expert assistance to the National 
Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and other state bodies on 
certain significant measures and important projects in a way that does not dimin-
ish its independence; and the SAI may offer advice and opinions to public fund 
users on issues in the field of public finances. 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the National Assem-
bly, on the proposal of the government, adopts the final account of the Republic 
of Serbia by a special law. 29 The external audit report on the revision of the annual 
report on budget execution is an obligatory part of the above-mentioned law. 30 
Bearing this in mind, a legal scholar may ask why the SAI of the Republic of Ser-
bia has not pointed out the problem related to the non-submission of the draft 
Law on the Final Account of the Budget to the National Assembly for its adop-
tion or non-adoption. Although it should be adopted each year, the Law on the 
Final Account of the Budget has not been adopted over the period 2002–2019. 
This means that the provisions of the Law on Budget System have been violated 
for 17 years by the key state institutions and that none of the independent insti-
tutions that should handle transparent and legal spending of public funds has 
shown a timely reaction. 31 Therefore, we argue that the SAI should be able to 
react in such situations and warn the representatives of the highest executive and 
legislative institutions about the illegality and irregularity of their actions. Fur-
thermore, according to INTOSAI standards, the state audit institution of each 
country should be responsible for public sector monitoring, which also entails 
providing information that highlights both good government and inefficient 
administrative structures ( González et al. 2008 , p. 503). 
Public spending is mainly financed by public revenues collected from taxes 
and other duties paid by citizens. Therefore, it is in the citizens’ interest to gain 
27 Article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia,  Official Gazette, No. 98/2006. 
28 Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Law on the State Audit Institution. 
29 Article 99, paragraph 1, point 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 
30 Article 79 of the Law on Budget System. 
31 The Final Accounts of the Republic of Serbia have been adopted by the Law on the Financial 
Account of the Budget for each year and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
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insights into the manner and scope of public spending. In addition, public insti-
tutions are obliged to enable citizens to exercise their right to access information. 
The possibility of exercising control over the legality of budget execution by 
means of an independent audit for each state is one of the essential issues of fis-
cal policy. Establishing a good and efficient mechanism of subsequent control 
over the spending of budget funds is the best method of preventive action by 
the most responsible officials ( Lončar 2011 , p. 543). If there is any doubt about 
the independence of the SAI, the question arises regarding its ability to perform 
its specified function. Therefore, the employees and the management of the SAI 
should contribute to strengthening public trust in its work. 
In addition to the external control embodied in the SAI of the Republic of 
Serbia, the traditional concept of control by the Budget Inspection has been 
retained. This form of control in the Republic of Serbia dates back to the 19th 
century (or more precisely, 1 July 1829), when the Law on Main Control was 
passed, which regulated the issue of state budget control and several bylaws that 
accompanied the implementation of the said law. Until 1869, the Main Control 
was responsible to the State Council, which was the supreme legislative commit-
tee, but it also included certain judicial functions. From 1868 it was under the 
patronage of the government, and the members of that body were appointed like 
other state officials ( Tošović 2013 , p. 55). 32 There is no difference in relation to 
the present solution. The Budget Inspection remains under the patronage of the 
executive power (i.e., the government), considering that it is part of the Ministry 
of Finance, while at the level of autonomous territories and local self-government 
units, it is responsible to the executive body for its work. Today, budget con-
trol implies a set of control measures and methods applied to provide protec-
tion against illegal and irrational spending of budget funds, that is, to harmonise 
budget spending with the adopted budget policy and economic policy goals. 
To prevent a budget deficit and achieve financial stability, public revenues must 
be spent efficiently and rationally in accordance with the adopted budget, and 
control over public expenditures must be independent ( An elković 2010 , p. 88). 
However, regarding the Budget Inspection, it is not possible to assess a greater 
degree of independence, bearing in mind that it comprises civil servants employed 
in the Ministry of Finance or civil servants employed in the autonomous terri-
tories and local self-government units. The works of the Budget Inspection and 
the SAI differ. After the completion of the inspection, the Budget Inspection 
compiles a report on the inspection control and proposes measures for elimi-
nating the established illegalities and irregularities in budget fund expenditures. 
By a decision, it orders the subject of the budget control to take measures for 
eliminating such irregularities and returning illegal payments to the budget fund, 
32 Article 16 of the Law on the General Control,  Serbian Gazette, No. 103, 10 May 1892. 
Article 1 of the aforementioned law specified that the body was the State Accounting Court 
and that it was empowered to review and audit all state accounts and other accounts that were 
under the state supervision. Article 15 stated that the body was authorised to audit, review, 
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and an administrative dispute may be initiated against that decision.33 As can be 
concluded, the Budget Inspection has administrative and legal powers, which the 
SAI lacks. Since it is an administrative body, it cannot impose penalties but only 
order the undertaking of certain activities at the level of the subject of inspection. 
The SAI prepares an audit report that contains opinions and recommendations 
for eliminating illegalities and irregularities. 
Although there is a high possibility that in the procedure of controlling busi-
ness books, reports, records, and other documentation prepared by public fund 
users, the SAI and the Budget Inspection will find evidence indicating the com-
mission of a certain criminal act, the Decree on Labour, Authorizations and Bud-
get Inspection does not prescribe the obligation to report criminal acts. The 
manner of filing a criminal report is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code. 
In accordance with it, state bodies, other bodies, and legal and natural persons 
should report criminal acts whose perpetrators are prosecuted ex officio and 
which have been committed or discovered in another way, under the conditions 
provided by law or other regulation. 34 Therefore, state bodies are obliged to 
report criminal acts, which are prosecuted ex officio, and which they have found 
out while exercising their powers. 35 However, there is no information that any 
of these institutions has acted in accordance with Article 281 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
The SAI of the Republic of Serbia and the Budget Inspection were established 
to ensure financial discipline in the public sector. Detecting criminal offences is 
not the primary focus of their activities. However, combating crime in accor-
dance with the current trends in the field of criminal policy requires a joint action 
of society as a whole, not only the police and judicial authorities ( Matić Bošković
and Kostić 2019 , pp. 255–279). 36 With their knowledge, they can contribute 
not only to the detection of criminal acts but also the acquisition of the evidence 
necessary for the initiation of criminal proceedings and the issuance of the final 
judgement ( Matić 2013 , pp. 123–154;  Šuput 2014 , pp. 331–346). 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have started from the hypotheses that the system of financial 
responsibility has not yet been established at full capacity in the public sector 
institutions of the Republic of Serbia and that in practice, it lacks a consistent 
33 Article 87 of the Law on Budget System. 
34 Article 10 of the Regulations on the Work, Authorizations and Characteristics of the Budget 
Inspection, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 93/2017. 
35 Article 281 of the Criminal Procedural Code,  The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
Nos. 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013, 55/2014, and 35/2019. 
36 The State Audit Institution can encourage input from citizens and civil organisations as well. 
For example, fraud hotlines are used by the UK National Audit Office to encourage the pub-
lic and whistle-blowers to provide information on suspected irregularities in the management 
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application of the principle of fiscal transparency. Both hypotheses have been 
confirmed. 
According to the reports of the SAI of the Republic of Serbia, which have been 
reviewed in this chapter, it seems that some budget users have just started to 
establish financial management and control and that most users have established 
internal audit. However, the concern is raised on whether the concept of internal 
financial control has been accepted according to its purpose, bearing in mind that 
one of the main internal audit activities is to check the financial management and 
control system’s adequacy and efficiency in relation to the compliance of public 
sector institutions and their operations with laws, internal acts, and contracts 
as well as the reliability and completeness of financial and other information. 
We could not identify that legislation has been implemented in practice accord-
ing to the definition. It could mean that the role of internal audit has not been 
adequately understood. 
Bearing in mind that internal financial control has not yet been established at 
full capacity in the Republic of Serbia, the question should be considered whether 
there is a need for amendments of the legislation to ensure consistency and miti-
gate legal gaps. Instead of two Rulebooks, the organisation and functioning of 
internal audit and financial management and control could be regulated by a 
law which could prescribe the sanctions for its non-establishment. The proposed 
approach will lead to the improvement of the legality, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of business operations among public fund users. 
The state institutions are accountable to both parliament and the citizens for 
the management of taxpayers’ funds. Transparency is a very important part of 
such accountability, bearing in mind that citizens contribute to public revenues. 
The SAI’s role is highly relevant for strengthening the transparency of financial 
operations. Considering the SAI’s lack of reaction when the Final Account of the 
Republic of Serbia has not been adopted for 17 years, the SAI should be encour-
aged to react in such a situation. This will contribute to increasing the citizens’ 
confidence in the work of public sector institutions. It is one of the main tasks of 
the SAI, which the SAI failed to implement. 
In addition to the establishment of the SAI of the Republic of Serbia, the tra-
ditional concept of public spending control embodied in the Budget Inspection 
has been retained. However, the SAI has a greater degree of independence than 
the Budget Inspection, which is accountable to the government or the executive 
body of the autonomous territory and local self-government units for its work. 
In contrast to the Budget Inspection, the SAI is not authorised to issue decisions 
that require certain behaviours of public fund users but is authorised to file mis-
demeanour and criminal charges in case the business operations of public fund 
users fail to comply with relevant national legislation. 
Despite the three parallel systems of financial control in Serbia, further actions 
should be taken to improve financial accountability and transparency in the 
public sector. The Republic of Serbia should improve the system of training of 
managers and employees in the public sector to increase their awareness of the 
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of knowledge about their own responsibility for efficient, economical, and legal 
financial management and use of public funds. In contrast to the Budget Inspec-
tion, which also represents a form of external financial control, the SAI has a 
higher level of independence in its actions. According to its role, the SAI should 
act for the benefit and on behalf of the citizens. Although the SAI is responsible 
to parliament for its activities, the highest state institutions should be warned in 
cases of regulation violations. Its advisory role should be in the service of all citi-
zens (taxpayers) but not in the service of state institutions. To raise awareness of 
the SAI’s role, not only additional training programmes should be organised but 
also conferences and round table discussions with representatives of other state 
institutions and the non-governmental sector. 
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 5 Disciplinary liability of judges 
The Polish case 
Piotr Mikuli and Maciej Pach 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on those normative solutions in the Polish law that relate 
to the procedures applied to hold judges accountable under the concept of dis-
ciplinary liability. First of all, it discusses the measures practised in Poland after 
several legal modifications that the Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced dur-
ing the years 2015–2020. It is argued that the new measures concerning judges’ 
disciplinary liability fail to achieve greater judicial transparency and are actually 
inconsistent with the national constitution and European Union (EU) and inter-
national standards. Under the guise of formulating more just rules for individual 
judicial accountability, Polish authorities aim to subjugate the entire judicial sys-
tem, which must be perceived in light of the systematic breach of the rule of law 
( Sadurski 2019 ). 
Referring to the introduction to this volume, it must be emphasised that the 
concept of accountability may be perceived very broadly (in relation to the judi-
ciary, see Shetreet 2013 ;  Tushnet 2013 ;  Piana 2010 ;  Yusulf 2010 ). Disciplinary 
responsibility is one of the various mechanisms to keep the judiciary accountable. 
Obviously, the notion of accountability when referring to the judicial power also 
comprises several mechanisms, not only relating to judges as such (internal and 
external assessment [evaluation] and periodic reporting by the judiciary) but also 
to functions of institutions beyond the scope of the dispensation of justice (e.g., 
courts reporting on financial issues). In this context, E. Meyer and T. Bustamante 
denote judicial accountability as ‘the set of mechanisms aimed at making judges 
and courts personally or institutionally responsible for behaviours and decisions 
contrary to constitutional or legal standards’ ( Meyer and Bustamante 2020 ). 
The titular disciplinary liability, in turn, means the use of certain measures to 
hold judges accountable for unlawful acts (that are not common offences) or 
to judicial ethics that are not subject to appeal in judiciary due course. At the 
same time, enforcing accountability may result in certain sanctions and penalties, 
including removal from office. 
Regardless of which system of government is adopted in a contemporary 
democratic state ruled by law, in both parliamentary and presidential regimes, 





64 Piotr Mikuli and Maciej Pach 
necessary to implement the rule of law. Today’s democratic states have developed 
a number of safeguards to guarantee both the judiciary’s independence and the 
high level of competence of those who have to exercise judicial power. Such guar-
antees are stipulated not only by the provisions of the constitution and of judicial 
procedures but also by the political elite and society’s legal and political culture 
as a whole. In this context, both the Venice Commission’s opinions and the juris-
prudence of international courts show the adoption of two different standards in 
terms of the legal requirements for judicial appointments and precisely the issue 
of judges’ responsibility. Generally, in this approach, regulations that are for-
mally insufficient to ensure an objective assessment of the functioning of political 
power and those concerning the influence of political power on the formation 
of the judiciary’s personal substrate are accepted in the so-called countries of old 
democracies. It is so because of the extra-legal and political standards that sanc-
tion the judiciary’s separation. In contrast, in the so-called countries of young 
democracies, importance is attached to several legal safeguards for this separation 
due to the inadequate legal culture that has to be developed over generations. Of 
course, this approach is understandable to a certain extent, but it has many dis-
advantages. Apart from the very criterion of the division into stabilised/old and 
new democracies, the problem is that in Western countries that attach importance 
to the standards of the rule of law, a significant increase in populist sentiment can 
also be observed in recent years. In countries where an erosion of democracy is 
witnessed, such as in Poland and Hungary, the existing standards protecting the 
judiciary’s independence have been disregarded relatively easily. Therefore, an 
issue of concern is that in countries with no formal safeguards, it will be so much 
easier to bring about a pathological politicisation of the judiciary without making 
a ‘jump on the courts’. In this context, the importance of formal safeguards is 
appreciated, and they can certainly make it significantly more difficult for populist 
politicians to take over the courts in a hostile manner. Legal solutions that have 
been in place for many years also contribute to developing appropriate attitudes 
of respect for the law and a suitable political culture. Regardless of this finding, 
there is no doubt that to maintain the courts’ principles of independence, democ-
racy, and separation of powers, social-political consensus on these fundamental 
values is important. Without this, any legal and formal solutions may fall apart 
like a house of cards due to a populist revolution. 
The disciplinary liability of judges is one of those institutions that can be used 
exceptionally easily to undermine the essence of the judiciary’s independence and 
to provoke repressions, the ‘chilling effect’ violating the right to a fair trial. 
However, there is not the slightest doubt that the rules for holding judges 
liable to disciplinary action, as well as the question of waiving judicial immu-
nity, must be extremely precise and structured in such a way as to eliminate, as 
far as possible, any irregularities and pathologies that may arise in practice (see 
Kosař 2016 ). Therefore, many models of judges’ accountability can be imagined, 
including the broad aspect of the notion of disciplinary liability as such. However, 
the basic premise of these mechanisms is to strive for objectivity in the assess-
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procedures (procedural fairness) and to safeguard, as much as possible, against 
the discretionary treatment of a judge’s misconduct so that the institution of 
disciplinary responsibility does not develop into a mechanism that tramples on 
judicial independence. In the latter context, it is necessary to create such a defi-
nition of the tort and disciplinary misconduct, which cannot interfere with the 
judgement sphere under any circumstances. Of course, the latter may be assessed 
directly by a higher court in the event of an appeal/revocation by the parties, or 
indirectly when the assessment system for the promotion of judges takes account 
of the number of judgements, handed down by the candidate concerned, that 
were amended or overturned by higher courts. 
5.2 Models of disciplinary liability of judges and 
the Polish solutions 
It is challenging to make a simple classification of the models of disciplinary 
responsibility because various legal solutions in this respect may overlap with 
other types of personal responsibility of judges (e.g., involving complaints lodged 
by the public or the parties to the proceedings) and may also be strictly connected 
to separate procedures aimed at the judges’ removal from office (see  Kosař and 
Spáč 2018 ). It should also be emphasised that the understanding and treatment 
of the institution of disciplinary responsibility may vary. For example, in the 
Polish tradition, disciplinary responsibility is explained not only by defining the 
material scope of this responsibility (as done at the outset of this chapter) but 
also by referring to individuals entitled to assess a person’s guilt in committing 
a disciplinary tort. The point is that these individuals must be engaged in the 
same profession as the guilty person. In this way, the disciplinary accountability 
is internal: a certain ‘court of equals’. In the case of public trust professions, the 
internal disciplinary responsibility is the rule (the responsibility of teachers, pro-
fessors, officials, attorneys), with the possibility of challenging the final decision 
in court. In the case of judges’ disciplinary responsibility, the problem is that 
from beginning to end, the disciplinary delicacy in this regard should be decided 
by judges, without external control, which may be subject to some criticism. Of 
course, the disadvantages of such a solution can be countered here by ensuring 
the judiciary’s necessary independence. 
Referring to different models of holding judges liable for disciplinary action, 
in general terms, it may be pointed out that the bodies competent to decide in 
such cases may comprise certain types of disciplinary courts, often created as a 
composition of the ordinary courts (e.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
in Austria). Another solution is to entrust these tasks to the high councils of the 
judiciary or their internal bodies. The model based on the judicial council con-
cept seems to be quite attractive, especially in the council’s diverse membership. 
In such a system, it is possible to imagine creating a mechanism where lay mem-
bers (i.e., people who do not come directly from the judicial community alone) 
can be involved in handing down the guilty verdict on disciplinary responsibility. 
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procedures regarding complaints against courts. In this regard, a particular role 
may be played by special offices linked to judicial authorities (e.g., in England 
and Wales) or ombudsmen (in Sweden and Finland). 
5.3 Scope of disciplinary liability of judges and disciplinary 
penalties in Poland after the changes provided under 
the PiS administration 
As stated above, the principles of independence of courts and judges create an 
indispensable standard of each democratic state ruled by law. The 1997 Polish 
Constitution expresses both in Article 173 and Article 178, para. 1, and includes 
numerous provisions guaranteeing respect thereof. However, it does not mean 
that judges remain unpunished in the exercise of their office. To ensure the cor-
rect functioning of the judiciary and an appropriate social image of judges, the 
Act of 27 July 2001–Law on Common Courts Organisation (Journal of Laws 
of 2020, item 365, as amended; hereinafter LCCO), since its very beginning, 
included provisions enforcing criminal responsibility (by regulating the proce-
dure of immunity waiving) and disciplinary liability for misconduct in office. 
According to the LCCO: 
A judge is liable to disciplinary actions for misconduct, including an obvious 
and gross violation of legal provisions and impairment of the authority of the 
office (disciplinary misconduct). 
(Art. 107, § 1) 
A judge is also liable to disciplinary actions for their conduct before the 
accession to the post if, due to such conduct, they failed to fulfil their respec-
tive duties at the state office held at that time or appeared to be unworthy of 
holding a judicial post. 
(Art. 107, § 2) 
In the literature, disciplinary misconduct is also conceptualised by a notion of a 
disciplinary tort, defned as follows: ‘A disciplinary tort is an illegal act for which 
fault can be attributed to a perpetrator, of more than a negligible social harmful-
ness’ ( Laskowski 2019 , p. 168). It is worth stressing that the above-quoted gen-
eral provisions of the LCCO have not been amended in the course of almost two 
decades. It seems justifed to notice that an excessively detailed legal defnition 
of disciplinary misconduct may improperly correspond to disciplinary liability 
aims. Instead, general, unclear provisions could raise judges’ fears that disciplin-
ary proceedings can be initiated against them, and such fears could weaken their 
independence in adjudicating. However, a suffcient means to counteract this 
threat was provided by the case law of the Supreme Court (SC), interpreting the 
statutory wordings (e.g., the notion of ‘an obvious and gross violation of legal 
provisions’) uniformly and strictly (see  Sawiński 2013 ; LEX, thesis no. 25 and 
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judges could have predicted what kinds of actions may be qualifed as grounds 
for disciplinary liability. 
The initial wording of Article 107 of the LCCO had been in force from 1 
October 2001 to 14 February 2020; § 1 was amended only by the Act of 20 
December 2019 amending the Act–Law on the Common Courts 1 Organisation, 
the Act on the Supreme Court, and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2020, 
item 190). Currently, this provision is much more detailed, stating: 
A judge is liable to disciplinary actions for disciplinary misconducts, includ-
ing 1) an apparent and gross violation of legal provisions, 2) actions or 
abandonments that can disable or relevantly obstruct the functioning of a 
judiciary organ/body, 3) actions that question the office status of a judge, 
the effectiveness of the appointment of a judge or the legitimacy of the con-
stitutional organ of the Republic of Poland, 4) public activities incompatible 
with the principles of independence of the courts and judges, 5) impairment 
of the authority of the office. 
Points 1 and 5 repeat the previous statutory regulation. Point 4 is identical to 
Article 178, para. 3 of the Polish Constitution, which forbids judges from per-
forming public activities incompatible with the principles of independence of 
courts and judges. Nevertheless, taking into account the uninterrupted smear 
campaign against the judiciary, led by PiS since 2015, points 3 and 4 of the 
amended § 1 raise crucial doubts. One of the decisive stages of this campaign 
was changing the system of electing the members of the National Council of 
Judiciary (NCJ). 
The Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of 
Judiciary and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 3) abolished 
the model established in 1990, according to which the judicial self-government 
elected 15 judge-members of the NCJ2 (Śledzińska-Simon 2018 ). Currently, 
they are elected by the Sejm (first chamber of the parliament). This kind of solu-
tion must be assessed as incompatible with Article 187, para. 1 of the Polish 
Constitution, which in this provision limits the Sejm’s appointment function to 
the election of four deputies of the NCJ, and inconsistent with Article 186 para. 
1, which states that the NCJ ‘shall safeguard the independence of courts and 
judges’ (see Mikuli 2017 ). Although Article 187, para. 1, point 2 literally does 
not regulate who elects judges of the NCJ, Article 186, para. 1 must be taken 
into consideration in its interpretation. If the politicians directly nominate the 
majority of the NCJ members, the NCJ’s function of safeguarding the judiciary’s 
1 Common courts refer to courts of general jurisdiction and comprise district courts ( sądy 
rejonowe), provincial courts ( sądy okręgowe), and appellate courts ( sądy apelacyjne). These 
courts decide (among other things) cases concerning criminal, civil, family, and juvenile law; 
commercial law; and labour and social security laws—except for cases vested in other special 
courts. 
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independence may easily be questioned. Meanwhile, the NCJ is the only author-
ity with the power to submit to the President of the Republic of Poland a motion 
aiming at a judge’s appointment (Art. 179). The discussed changes of the NCJ 
model were introduced with a violation of the constitutional four-year term of 
office of the previous judicial members of the NCJ. For this reason (and many 
others), the Act amending the Act on the NCJ is perceived as unconstitutional 
by the majority of scholars. However, in the judgement of 25 March 2019 (file 
reference: K 12/18), the Constitutional Tribunal did not share this point of 
view. It must be mentioned that, at this time, it had already been captured by PiS 
( Koncewicz 2019 ;  Sadurski 2019 ), and a person who was illegally elected to the 
tribunal (Justyn Piskorski) was the ‘judge-rapporteur’ in this case. 
The status of judges appointed by the President of the Republic on the motion 
of the ‘new’ NCJ was a subject of many preliminary references directed to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (see, e.g., the SC’s three decisions of 
30 August 2018; file references III PO 7/18, III PO 8/18, III PO 9/18). Just 
after the discussed 2019 amendments to the LCCO were passed and before they 
entered into force, on the motion of the first president of the SC of that time, a 
resolution of the Civil, Criminal, and Labour and Social Security Chambers of 
the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020 (file reference: BSA I-4110–1/20) was 
adopted. It aimed to solve the issue raised on the grounds of the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure concerning the unlawful bench composition. According to this resolution: 
A court formation is unduly appointed within the meaning of Article 439(1) 
(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a court formation is unlawful 
within the meaning of Article 379(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure also 
where the court formation includes a person appointed to the office of a 
judge of the Supreme Court on the application of the National Council for 
the Judiciary formed following the Act of 8 December 2017 amending the 
Act on the National Council for the Judiciary and certain other Acts (Journal 
of Laws of 2018, item 3). 
This resolution was later quashed by the Constitutional Tribunal (see the judge-
ment of 20 April 2020, fle reference: U 2/20), although the majority of aca-
demia argued that the tribunal acted beyond its competence, as it cannot assess 
the constitutionality of the SC’s resolutions. It is also worth noting that the 
intellectual justifcation for this judgement, which remains at an extremely low 
level, was based on a caricatured reading of both the principles of the Polish Con-
stitution and the EU law, which may be perceived as a further degradation of the 
Polish system of constitutional review. 
The Polish judges’ long-lasting resistance against the so-called reform of the 
judiciary, which in fact means unconstitutional legislative changes, violating the 
EU law at the same time, resulted in an expansion of the disciplinary liability 
conditions mentioned in Article 107, § 1 of the LCCO. Such clauses as ‘actions 
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judiciary organ/body’ and ‘actions that question the office status of a judge, 
the effectiveness of the appointment of a judge or the legitimacy of the constitu-
tional organ of the Republic of Poland’ were added to the statutory catalogue. 
It would seem that these regulations were supposed to create a chilling effect on 
the judges to discourage them from taking advantage of legal procedures to verify 
the status of judges appointed on the motion of the ‘new’ NCJ ( Laskowski 2019 , 
pp. 178–180). For instance, currently, a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), suggesting some legal drawbacks of an 
act of appointment of a judge, can be treated as ‘an action that can relevantly 
obstruct the functioning of a judiciary organ’ (e.g., because of the length of 
time between the preliminary reference and the preliminary ruling of the CJEU) 
or as ‘an action that questions the effectiveness of the appointment of a judge’ 
and trigger disciplinary liability or at least, an investigation to be conducted by 
the disciplinary commissioner. The disciplinary commissioner for common court 
judges and two deputy disciplinary commissioners for common court judges, 
appointed by the minister of justice, are now equipped with a specific statutory 
basis for taking steps of that kind. Moreover, according to the mentioned Act of 
20 December 2019 that amended the LCCO, a judgement of a disciplinary court 
stating an act of commission of a disciplinary tort in one of the two new forms 
obliges the court to punish the judge with the most severe penalties, that is, a 
transfer to another place of service or dismissal from the office of a judge. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the LCCO provisions pertaining to the disci-
plinary penalties in the time of the PiS administration should be assessed in the 
aggregate context of political power activities towards the judiciary after 2015 
and the critical reaction of the judicial self-government. For more than 15 years, 
the statutory catalogue of disciplinary penalties has encompassed the following: 
• an admonition, 
• a reprimand, 
• deprivation from the function held, 
• a transfer to another place of service, 
• a dismissal from the office of a judge. 
(Art. 109, § 1 of the LCCO) 
The Act of 30 November 2016 amending the Act–Law on the Common Courts 
Organisation and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 2103) added 
a new sort of penalty: ‘lowering the basic salary of a judge by fve to twenty per 
cent for a period from six months up to two years’ (new Art. 109, § 1, Point 2a 
of the LCCO). The Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court (Journal of 
Laws of 2018, item 5; hereinafter the 2017 Act on the SC) increased the upper 
limit of the allowed reduction to 50%. Another change was provided by the men-
tioned Act of 20 December 2019 amending the LCCO. A new penalty appeared 
in the LCCO: a fnancial penalty in the amount of one month’s income increased 
by judicial income extras. Both of these new penalties can be adjudicated for all 
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linked with questioning the judicial nominations. It is said to be ‘in principle’ 
because for the new kinds of disciplinary torts, these penalties can also come into 
play but only in less grave cases (the new § 1a in Art. 109 of the LCCO). 
In light of the current legal status, after the changes provided under the PiS 
administration, the catalogue of disciplinary torts and the disciplinary penalties 
concerning the SC judges are almost identical as in the case of judges of common 
courts (see Art. 72, § 1 and Art. 75, § 1 of the 2017 Act on the SC). The only 
and minor difference is that there is no such penalty as a transfer to another seat 
of service in the SC judges’ case. Furthermore, for ‘actions or abandonments that 
can disable or relevantly obstruct the functioning of a judiciary organ/body’, 
‘actions questioning the status of a judge, the effectiveness of the appointment of 
a judge or the legitimacy of the constitutional organ of the Republic of Poland’, 
or ‘public activities incompatible with the principles of independence of the courts 
and judges’, the only penalty that can be imposed on an SC judge is dismissal 
from office. In contrast, an alternative penalty in the form of a transfer to another 
place of service is imposed on common court judges. An exception to this rule 
is made for less grave cases, which allows the disciplinary court to adjudicate the 
reduction of income, financial penalty, or dismissal from the function held. 
Due to the lack of different regulations on the matter of disciplinary torts 
and disciplinary penalties in the Act of 25 July 2002–Law on the Administrative 
Courts Organisation (Journal of Law of 2019, item 2167, as amended; herein-
after LACO), the provisions regarding the SC and the common courts shall also 
apply to the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) judges and to the Voivodship 
Administrative Court (VAC) 3 judges, as appropriate (Art. 49, § 1 and Art. 29, 
§ 1 of the LACO). Therefore, the above remarks pertain to both the VAC judges 
and the SAC judges. 
The discussed Act of 20 December 2019 that amended the LCCO and the Act 
on the SC established disciplinary torts referring to military judges—the same as 
referring to common court judges—concerning questioning judges’ status (see 
Art. 37, § 2 of the Act of 21 August 1997–the Law on the Military Courts 
Organisation [Journal of Laws of 2019, item 2216, as amended]; hereinafter 
LMCO). Similarly, new disciplinary penalties for military judges, added after 
2015, are identical (see Art. 39, § 1, Points 2a and 2b of the LMCO), with a 
minor difference—allowing the reduction in a judge’s basic salary by 5% to 20%, 
not 50%. 
To sum up, the changes in the provisions that regulate the subject of disci-
plinary liability and disciplinary penalties are illustrations of coercive legislation 
against judges ( Kardas 2020 ). If this analysis is limited to the new provisions’ 
wording, perhaps it would not entitle the authors to make such alarming remarks. 
However, a proper interpretation of these provisions must be put in the con-
text of the current situation of the Polish judiciary, which, after 2015, involves 
permanent attacks on judges from the side of the legislative and the executive 
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branches. Piotr Kardas rightly argues that disciplinary proceedings against judges 
‘have become an important aspect of the conflict about the rule of law and the 
primacy of law over politics’ (Kardas 2020, p. 152). The new mechanisms must 
be perceived as part of a package of legal changes to the judiciary; the system 
was created to ensure that judges would be subservient to the political will of the 
authorities ( Gajda-Roszczynialska and Markiewicz 2020 ). It must be noted that 
in recent years, the Disciplinary Commissioner for Common Court Judges and 
two Deputy Disciplinary Commissioners initiated investigations, in many cases 
linked to the activities of judges in judicial associations and even worse, some-
times also concerning decisions made by judges during the courts’ proceedings 
( Mikuli 2019 ).  Gajda-Roszczynialska and Markiewicz (2020 ) are right in stating 
that although disciplinary proceedings are by no means the only forms of repres-
sion that affect judges, they may create an instrument for breaking the rule of 
law in Poland. 
5.4 Current jurisdiction of disciplinary courts 
and of disciplinary commissioners 
The crucial element of the ‘reform’ of disciplinary proceedings introduced by 
the PiS parliamentary majority was the establishment of a new chamber in the 
SC, namely the Disciplinary Chamber (DC). In the overwhelming opinion of 
academia, the new chamber is perceived as a bogus court, as it has a special 
systemic and independent status within the SC,4 which is not envisaged by the 
constitution; moreover, it is fully composed of judges appointed by the politi-
cally captured NCJ ( Zoll and Wortham 2019 , p. 895). For these and many 
other reasons, at the end of 2019, the SC adjudicated that the DC was not a 
court in light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 45 of the 
Polish Constitution (see the SC judgement of 5 December 2019, III PO 7/18). 
In this judgement, the SC took into account the judgement of 19 Novem-
ber 2019. Replying to preliminary references regarding the independence of 
judges of its DC,5 the CJEU ruled that the Polish SC, as the referring court, 
should assess whether the DC was in fact independent. In its judgement, the 
CJEU set the criteria for this assessment, also quoting its previous case law 
(see Krajewski and Ziółkowski 2019 ). Furthermore, on 8 April 2020, when 
the European Commission–initiated infringement procedure against Poland was 
underway (C-791/19), the CJEU ordered an interim measure obliging Poland 
4 The chamber is in fact an extraordinary, separate court only formally linked to the rest of the 
SC. The judges in this chamber are paid a 40% higher salary, and proceedings benches (apart 
from judges) comprise lay judges elected by the Senate. 
5 These refer to the joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18. See InfoCuria ‘Judge-
ment of the Court (Grand Chamber)’ (19 November 2019) < http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?docid=220770&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&m 
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to immediately suspend the application of the national provisions on the powers 
of the DC of the SC concerning judicial disciplinary cases. 6 
As far as the jurisdiction in the SC judges’ disciplinary cases is concerned, 
according to Article 73, § 1 of the 2017 Act, in the first instance, the SC adju-
dicates by a bench composed of two judges of the DC and one lay judge of the 
SC. In turn, in the second instance, the SC adjudicates by a bench consisting of 
three judges of the DC and two lay judges of the SC. In light of the previous 
statutory provisions, in the first instance, the SC adjudicated by a bench com-
prising three judges of the SC, and in the second instance, by a bench consisting 
of seven judges of the SC. The new act maintains previously existing regulations 
regarding the disciplinary commissioner of the SC and his/her deputy. Both are 
still elected for a four-year term by the board of the SC (Art. 74 of the 2017 Act 
on the SC). However, compared with the 2002 Act, the new provisions have a 
different regulation on the issue of the authorities entitled to request the disci-
plinary commissioner of the SC to initiate an investigation. The competences of 
the first president of the SC, the board of the SC, and the disciplinary commis-
sioner of the SC’s own initiative, remain intact. Nevertheless, currently, the list 
of entitled authorities is expanded, as it also comprises the president of the DC 
of the SC, the public prosecutor general, and the national public prosecutor. 
Considering that the public prosecutor general is at the same time the minister 
of justice and that the national public prosecutor is the deputy minister, the evo-
lution of the provisions cannot be perceived in other way than permitting the 
executive’s pressure on the judicial power. 
After conducting an investigation, the disciplinary commissioner of the SC 
may either initiate disciplinary proceedings against the SC judge or refuse to do 
so if there are no grounds for such an action (Art. 76, §§ 2 and 4 of the 2017 
Act on the SC). The disciplinary commissioner has to inform the President of 
the Republic of Poland and all the authorities entitled to request the launch of 
the investigation about the refusal in initiating disciplinary proceedings. These 
authorities may appeal to the first instance’s disciplinary court (Art. 76, § 4 in 
fine). They can take advantage of the same competence when the disciplinary 
commissioner of the SC discontinues the disciplinary proceedings due to the 
lack of grounds for submitting a case for examination. Once again, it should be 
emphasised that the disciplinary court of the first instance is currently the DC 
of the SC, created from scratch under the PiS administration, with judges hav-
ing strong personal ties with Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro. Moreover, if 
the disciplinary court quashes the decision of the disciplinary commissioner of 
the SC, the guidelines provided by this court are binding for the commissioner 
(Art. 76, § 6). 
6 At the time of writing, the CJEU judgement of April 2020 has been obeyed only partially, as 
the DC still operates in judicial immunity cases. Apart from its role in disciplinary procedures, 
this organ is also entitled to waive judicial immunity. Discretional waiving of the immunity also 
plays an important role in persecuting judges who dare to criticise the governmental actions 







Disciplinary liability of judges 73 
According to Article 110, § 1 of the LCCO, disciplinary cases against judges of 
common courts shall be heard in two instances. In the first instance, adjudication 
is generally handled by disciplinary courts at appeal courts by a bench of three 
judges. In exceptional situations enumerated in the provision, the SC adjudicates 
by a bench of two judges of the DC and one lay judge of the SC.7 In the second 
instance, the jurisdiction belongs to the SC acting as a bench of two judges of the 
DC and one lay judge of the SC. Thus, the final judgement in disciplinary cases 
against judges is supposed to be adopted by the chamber of the SC, which was 
created from scratch under the PiS government and is accused of strong politici-
sation, shaped entirely on the motion of the ‘new’ NCJ. 
Another sign of the politicisation of disciplinary proceedings against judges 
can be observed on the grounds of the new Article 110a, § 1 of the LCCO, 
added by the 2017 Act on the SC. According to this provision, the minister of 
justice has the competence to entrust the duties of a disciplinary court judge in 
an appeal court, for a six-year term of office (Art. 110a, § 3), to a common court 
judge with at least ten years of experience as a judge. Thus, in disciplinary cases 
in appeal courts, only judges entrusted by a politician (a minister) may handle 
disciplinary cases. The obligatory consultation with the NCJ has not changed 
much because, as noted above, the NCJ has been packed with the politicians’ 
nominees. Moreover, the NCJ’s opinion does not bind the minister of justice 
in any way. Another factor that raises doubts from the perspective of the court’s 
independence is that the presidents of disciplinary courts are appointed by the 
president of the DC of the SC (Art. 110b, § 1). 
The crucial new authorities, introduced to the LCCO by the 2017 Act on the 
SC, are the disciplinary commissioner for common court judges and two deputy 
disciplinary commissioners for common court judges, appointed by the minister 
of justice for a four-year term of office (Art. 112, § 3 of the LCCO). They act 
as prosecutors before disciplinary courts ( Kardas 2020 , pp. 93–102). Apart from 
them, prosecutors in disciplinary cases against judges can also serve as deputy dis-
ciplinary commissioners at appeal courts and deputy disciplinary commissioners 
at regional courts (Art. 112, § 1). According to Article 112, § 2: 
In cases of appeal court judges and presidents and vice-presidents of appeal 
courts and regional courts, the following persons may act as prosecutors 
before disciplinary courts: the Disciplinary Commissioner for Common 
Court Judges and Deputy Disciplinary Commissioners for Common Court 
Judges. In cases of other regional court judges and presidents and vice-
presidents of district courts, the person authorised to act as a prosecutor 
shall be a deputy disciplinary commissioner at an appeal court, and in cases of 
other district court judges and trainee judges, this shall be a deputy disciplin-
ary commissioner at a regional court. 
7 Before the 2017 Act on the SC entered into force, also amending Art. 110 of the LCCO, the 
jurisdiction in disciplinary cases against judges belonged in the first instance to appeal courts 
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However, the ‘central’ commissioners are allowed to ‘take over the case con-
ducted by a deputy disciplinary commissioner’ operating at a regional court or 
at an appeal court and to ‘hand over the case to that commissioner’ (Art. 112a, 
§§ 1a and 3). A deputy disciplinary commissioner at an appeal court and a deputy 
disciplinary commissioner at a regional court are appointed by the disciplinary 
commissioner for common court judges (Art. 112, §§ 6 and 7). 
After the Act of 20 December 2019 amending the LCCO entered into force, 
general assemblies of judges of appeal court areas and court circuits, as appropri-
ate, have been deprived of their powers to submit to the ‘central’ commissioner 
candidatures for the office of a deputy commissioner at an appeal court and at a 
regional court. It proves that the powers of the central commissioner, who is nom-
inated by the minister of justice, have been strengthened at the expense of judicial 
self-government bodies. Furthermore, the establishment of the institutions of the 
disciplinary commissioner for common court judges and both deputies already 
manifests centralisation and politicisation of the disciplinary commissioner func-
tion. Although the institution of the central disciplinary commissioner was estab-
lished earlier, the commissioner was appointed by the NCJ among candidatures 
submitted by the general assemblies of judges of appeal court areas. In turn, 
deputies of the central commissioner were elected by judicial self-government 
representation in appeal court areas and court circuits. Currently, the central 
commissioner (and his/her deputies) is (are) discretionally appointed by the min-
ister of justice, and in turn, the central commissioner freely nominates deputy 
disciplinary commissioners at appeal courts and regional courts. 
It should be emphasised that the central disciplinary commissioner (currently 
Justice Piotr Schab), as well as both of his deputies (Justices Michał Lasota and 
Przemysław Radzik)—owing their nominations to Minister of Justice Ziobro— 
are extraordinarily diligent in launching disciplinary proceedings against judges 
who have criticised the controversial changes in the judiciary field. According 
to the latest report of the Association of Polish Judges (Iustitia), describing 
the period from 2015 to the end of 2019, the disciplinary commissioners initi-
ated investigations or disciplinary proceedings in cases against 31 judges (see 
Ko cierzy ski 2020, pp. 11–74). Sometimes, the disciplinary commissioners 
violated the provisions in their jurisdictions. These occurred when they initi-
ated investigations independently, ignoring the fact that the initial jurisdiction 
belonged to the deputy disciplinary commissioner at the appeal court or the 
regional court. The LCCO provisions allow the central disciplinary commission-
ers to take over a case but only under the condition that the ‘local’ disciplinary 
commissioner initiated it, thus not from the beginning. One example of such vio-
lations was the case of three judges who referred to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling, citing the so-called judiciary reform’s nonconformity with EU law (see 
Mazur 2019 , pp. 46–49). 
Another proof of the politicisation of disciplinary proceedings in Poland is 
provided by Article 112b of the LCCO, introduced by the 2017 Act on SC. It 
allows the minister of justice to appoint ‘the Disciplinary Commissioner of the 
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of justice decides to do so, actions in the case taken by any other commissioner 
are excluded (§ 1). Such a disciplinary commissioner ad hoc is appointed from 
among common court judges or the SC judges; in some cases, it is also possible 
to appoint a prosecutor for this office (§ 2). The commissioner ‘may initiate 
proceedings upon the request of the Minister of Justice or join pending proceed-
ings’ (§ 3). The commissioner’s appointment ‘shall be equivalent to a request 
for initiating investigation proceedings or disciplinary proceedings’ (§ 4). Accord-
ing to Article 112b, § 5, the minister is entitled to reappoint a commissioner 
ad hoc even if the previous appointment has expired, since ‘a ruling refusing to 
initiate disciplinary proceedings, discontinuing disciplinary proceedings or clos-
ing disciplinary proceedings becomes final’. This provision has not been applied 
until now, but it can easily be used as a tool to create a chilling effect among 
judges, as they have to take into account the fact that the minister of justice can 
even appoint a commissioner ad hoc several times in a row, to resume investiga-
tions and disciplinary proceedings against independent judges who contest the 
unconstitutional ‘judiciary reform’, for instance. By any means, the LCCO does 
not limit the will of the minister, whose political interest may often contradict the 
interest of the independent judiciary.
The 2017 Act on the SC inducted the disciplinary commissioner of the minis-
ter of justice in the LMCO with powers similar to those known from the LCCO’s 
analogous offices of disciplinary commissioners, who were introduced ad hoc 
into the SC. The disposition of Article 76, §§ 8–11 of the 2017 Act on the SC 
entitles the President of the Republic of Poland or the minister of justice (if the 
president did not appoint a disciplinary commissioner) to appoint the extraordi-
nary disciplinary commissioner to handle a specific case relating to a judge of the 
SC. Such an appointment means that the disciplinary commissioner of the SC 
and deputies are excluded from taking action in this specific case. After the Act of 
20 December 2019 amending the LCCO and other acts entered into force, the 
President of the Republic of Poland is now allowed to appoint an extraordinary 
disciplinary commissioner also in cases of administrative court judges (the new 
§ 5 in Art. 48 of the LACO). These are blatant expressions of politicisation of 
disciplinary proceedings against the SC judges and administrative court judges. 
In light of Article 114, § 1, sentence 1 of the LCCO, the authorities enti-
tled to request the disciplinary commissioner to initiate an investigation include 
the minister of justice, the president of the appeal court or the president of the 
regional court, the board of the appeal court or the board of the regional court, 
and the NCJ. The commissioners can also act on their own initiative. A statutory 
condition that must be fulfilled to initiate an investigation is ‘establishing the 
circumstances necessary to state that the criteria of disciplinary misconduct were 
satisfied’. After the investigation, if there are grounds for disciplinary proceed-
ings, the disciplinary commissioner is entitled to initiate such proceedings and to 
‘draw up the disciplinary charges in writing’ (§ 3). According to § 7, sentence 
1, ‘When serving charges, the disciplinary commissioner shall request that the 
President of the Supreme Court heading the Disciplinary Chamber designate a 
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for disciplinary proceedings, ‘the disciplinary commissioner shall issue a decision 
refusing to initiate proceedings’. However, the minister of justice ‘may file an 
objection within 30 days. Filing an objection shall be equivalent to an obliga-
tion to initiate disciplinary proceedings and any instructions of the Minister of 
Justice regarding further proceedings shall be binding on the disciplinary com-
missioner’ (§ 9). These new powers of the minister were established in the LCCO 
by the amendment introduced by the 2017 Act on the SC and constitute another 
example of a potentially coercive regulation against judges who criticise the con-
troversial changes in the judiciary. A government official has an opportunity to 
oblige the disciplinary commissioner to initiate disciplinary proceedings even if 
the commissioner does not find it justified. 
In the current legal status, the disciplinary jurisdiction for military judges is
shaped analogous to that for common court judges. According to Article 39a of
the LMCO, in the first instance, disciplinary cases are adjudicated by a bench of
three judges at regional military courts. In cases strictly enumerated in the LMCO,
the disciplinary jurisdiction belongs to the SC sitting as a bench of two judges of the
DC and one lay judge of the SC (and in some cases specific to the SC, as a bench
of one judge of the DC). In the second instance, disciplinary cases are adjudicated,
in principle, by the SC as a bench of two judges of the DC and one lay judge of the
SC (in exceptional cases—the SC by a bench of three judges of the SC).
The 2017 Act on the SC added Article 39b to the LMCO, which stipulates 
that the minister of justice, having consulted the NCJ, ‘shall entrust the duties of 
a disciplinary court judge at a regional military court to a judge with at least 10 
years of experience as a judge’ (§ 1). Such a position has a six-year term of office 
(§ 3). Thus, in this area, a full analogy to the LCCO regulations exists. 
The LMCO’s regulation on the disciplinary commissioner position is not as 
complicated as that of the LCCO. The deputies of the disciplinary commissioner, 
acting at regional military courts, are not established. The only commissioners 
are the disciplinary commissioner for military court judges and the deputy dis-
ciplinary commissioners for military court judges, who are prosecutors before 
disciplinary courts. The amendment to LMCO introduced by the 2017 Act on 
the SC also politicised these offices. Currently, the disciplinary commissioner for 
military court judges and the commissioner’s deputy are appointed for a four-
year term of office by the minister of justice, after consultation with the minister 
of national defence and the NCJ (Art. 40, § 2 of the LMCO). According to the 
previous legal status, they were appointed by the NCJ from among the candi-
dates submitted by the Assembly of Military Court Judges—an organ of judicial 
self-government. 
Until now, disciplinary proceedings in administrative court cases seem to be 
the most immune to politicisation. The jurisdiction in these cases belongs entirely 
to the SAC (Art. 48, § 1 of the LACO). In the first instance, the SAC adjudicates 
by a bench of three judges, and in the second instance by a bench of seven judges. 
The prosecutors’ role is played by the disciplinary commissioner of the SAC and 
the commissioner’s deputy, elected by the board of the SAC for a four-year term 
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the Republic of Poland’s new powers to appoint the extraordinary disciplinary 
commissioner, which results in excluding the jurisdiction of the disciplinary com-
missioners acting within the SAC. 
5.5 Final remarks 
To sum up the preceding discussion and after a review of the arrangements for 
disciplinary liability, the following findings are presented: 
1 The provisions amending the laws relating to the judiciary, specifically the 
principles and the scope of judges’ disciplinary responsibility, in the intention 
of politicians, aimed at politicising the courts, undermining the principle of 
separation of powers. In light of political practice and the PiS politicians’ 
statements, there can be no doubt about the ruling party’s intentions in this 
regard. 
2 The legal solutions discussed in this text must be considered against the 
background of other reforms and changes that involve taking political con-
trol over independent institutions and bodies. Thus, the PiS majority’s mea-
sures must be perceived as symptoms of the law system’s decay. The law 
becomes a tool of political repression. As known, one of the most important 
phenomena of the current form of authoritarianism is that legal institutions 
or procedures are not abolished but abused, transformed as bodies/organs 
ready to rubberstamp decisions already made by those who gained political 
power ( Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008 ). 
3 Any legal solution must be assessed against its operation’s general context, 
including political practice (this is a general statement about any constitu-
tional system). Without this, a pure assessment of textual provisions will 
lead to wrong conclusions. The assessment of the solutions presented with-
out taking ‘law in action’ (i.e., political practice) would not be so negative. 
Entrusting the SC with the power to decide on judges’ disciplinary matters 
would finally fall under the judicial concept, referring to autonomy account-
ability issues. Some may even argue that it may be undesirable, not because 
of the threat of politicisation but because all judicial disciplinary matters have 
been closed within ‘the judicial bubble’. Meanwhile, in Poland’s case, the 
creation of the DC of the SC, staffed in violation of the constitution by law-
yers connected with the ruling party, was nothing else than establishing an 
external, political machine of harassment and intimidation. 
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 6 Transparency and accountability 
versus secrecy in intelligence 
operations 
An Italian case study *
Arianna Vedaschi 
6.1 Introduction 
Transparency is a key principle of democracies. A system in which citizens are 
not informed promptly and correctly about public authorities’ decisions and 
actions cannot be defined as democratic ( Bobbio 1984 ). Besides, the principle 
of accountability is closely dependent on transparency; only if transparency is 
ensured can those who committed crimes (or any other kind of unlawful act)— 
including public officials—be held accountable for their conduct. 
The concepts of transparency and accountability, as currently understood, became
known through the works of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant. For  Rousseau (1762 ),
transparency had to be considered a way to prevent public servants from committing
fraud and other wrongdoings against the state. Along the same line,  Bentham (1791 ) 
argued (even more openly than Rousseau) that if the Government and its officials
were not obliged to be transparent regarding their choices and activities, they would
very likely become influenced by external forces—or worse, corrupted—rather than
driven by the intent to enhance the public good. Kant (1795 ) even conceived the
idea of transparency (as opposed to secrecy) as one of the main mechanisms to ensure
accountability of governmental bodies and to stave off war and anarchy.
These theories contributed to shaping the contemporary concepts of transpar-
ency and accountability, to the point that they can be said to be two mutually rein-
forcing principles ( Bobbio 1984 ). Only together, as two faces of the same coin, can
they enable citizens to be aware of what public powers do and to have a voice about
their actions, influencing decision-making and having the opportunity to hold
decision makers to account. Due to transparency, public powers become ‘visible’
( Cassese 2018 ) to all citizens, emerging from ‘obscurity’ ( Sandulli 2007 ). At the
same time, transparency and accountability are two tools from which public powers
themselves draw their legitimisation in society ( Habermas 1962 ). In fact, transpar-
ency and accountability allow the public sector to earn and maintain public trust.
However, even a democracy has some grey areas where full transparency can-
not be guaranteed, for the sake of competing values or public interests that also 
deserve protection, of which national security is the most important. Citizens 
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expect their governments to keep them safe from threats to their security; to do 
so, in some cases, governments may need to hide some information ( Schoen-
feld 2010 ). Therefore, to protect  salus rei publicae, democracies can legitimately 
resort to secrecy. Nonetheless, to avoid (possible) abuses perpetrated behind the 
cloak of secrecy, strict guarantees must be provided, despite any exceptional cir-
cumstances. In other words, to be consistent with basic democratic values, any 
legal system must deem transparency as the rule and secrecy (or more generally, 
lack of transparency) as a limited exception ( Vedaschi 2018a ). 
Intelligence activities exemplify the challenging balance between transparency 
(and, consequently, accountability) and the need to not reveal classified informa-
tion, whose disclosure may jeopardise national security. 
This chapter discusses the tricky relation between transparency and secrecy,
focusing on the Italian intelligence services. The first section takes a diachronic
perspective and analyses the evolution of intelligence from ancient times to the con-
temporary age, particularly dwelling on the history of Italian intelligence. The sec-
tion explains how intelligence services are organised in Italy, after the entry into
force of Law no. 124/2007, which—as modified by subsequent acts—currently
regulates the Italian intelligence system. The chapter then addresses the relationship
between Italian intelligence agencies and state powers (legislative, executive, and
judiciary). Particular attention is paid to the mechanisms (as oversight of state secret
privilege) that trigger significant tensions between transparency and accountability
on the one hand, and secret agencies’ need to work covertly to safeguard national
security on the other. The next section examines how the intelligence system and
the corresponding oversight mechanisms work in practice when major threats, such
as international terrorism, must be tackled. Some brief concluding remarks follow.
6.2 The history of intelligence: a brief overview 
The concept of intelligence refers to activities aimed at obtaining useful informa-
tion to defend state security. Given the fact that such information needs to be 
shielded, insofar as its disclosure to potential enemies could harm security ( Steele 
2002 , p. 129), intelligence activity has a strong link to secrecy. 
There are at least two dimensions of security: internal and external. They are 
two sides of the same coin (i.e., national security).1 Ensuring internal security 
means that threats  within the state (e.g., domestic terrorism) must be monitored 
and prevented. In contrast, external security is safeguarded by operations seeking 
to contain threats from outside (e.g., war, international terrorism). 
A brief historical overview is useful to show that protecting state security by 
obtaining information about (potential) enemies is a key goal that has been 
1 Regarding the Italian Constitution, some scholars argue that there are two distinct constitu-
tional foundations to legitimise the action of secret services in internal and external security 
( Massera 1990 , p. 336). According to this theory, Art. 54 of the Italian Constitution, enshrin-
ing the duty of Italian citizens to be loyal to the Republic, grounds internal security activities, 
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pursued by public authorities since ancient times, long before the modern state 
came into existence ( Mosca et al. 2008 , p. 20). 2 
6.2.1 Intelligence from early history to the Restoration: 
a comparative perspective 
In the 18th century  BC, Hammurabi, the most famous king of the first Babylo-
nian dynasty, used to ask some of his subjects to sneak among the soldiers of his 
enemies’ armies in order to obtain information about their war strategies. Start-
ing from the 16th century  BC, the Egyptians took the same approach.3 These 
tactics can be called proto-espionage. 
The Persians brought in an innovation, in the form of a better organised infor-
mative apparatus, to be exploited during hostilities, while the Greeks elaborated 
on the first theories of military intelligence and tactics. 
It is well known that espionage as a pivotal war element was promoted by 
the Chinese general Sun Tzu, who lived between 600 and 500 BC. Espionage 
techniques were also widely used by the Carthaginian general Hannibal, who led 
the First Punic War against the Roman Republic ( Sheldon 1986 , p. 53). Further-
more, the idea of  salus rei publicae, which must prevail over any individual needs 
if endangered by any internal or external threat, owes its existence to Ancient 
Rome. In his work De Legibus (IV), written in 52 BC, Cicero argued that ‘ salus 
rei publicae suprema lex esto’. 
Going ahead through history, the Middle Ages did not grant espionage and 
informative activities the same importance as they had in the past, since conflicts 
were often characterised by the lack of information about the enemy’s strategies 
( Vedaschi 2007 , p. 13). 
In the 13th century  ad , when Genghis Khan launched the Mongol invasion 
and conquered many territories of Eurasia, he spread the use of espionage and, 
at the same time, exploited fake information to gain advantage over his enemies. 
Genghis Khan and his empire contributed to boosting information-sharing as a 
tool to build political alliances; he forged a close relationship with the Republic 
of Venice, and the exchange of information between the two parties was crucial 
for destroying the military bases of other maritime Republics, particularly Genoa. 
The Republic of Venice quickly implemented the techniques learned from its 
relations with the Mongol Empire. In subsequent years, Venice created a proto-
intelligence, assigning espionage tasks to several officials. This approach was rep-
licated by other states of the Italian peninsula. 
Against this background, intelligence gained momentum, and several works 
began to discuss this topic, including Machiavelli’s The Art of War ( 1519 ). Con-
sequently, an increasing number of officials became interested in this matter, 
2 The formal date for the birth of the modern state is 1648, when the peace of Westphalia put 
an end to the Thirty Years’ War.
3 Even the Holy Bible refers to spies sent by Moses to Canaan in order to assess whether there 













Transparency, accountability, secrecy 83 
gathering sensitive information for security purposes and improving their exper-
tise in internal and external security. For example, Sir Walsingham, an English dip-
lomat during the reign of Elizabeth I, laid the basis for developing cryptography 
( Archer 1993 , p. 41). Some years later, in France, Cardinal Richelieu contributed 
to the establishment of a well-functioning spy service ( Mosca et al. 2008 , p. 21). 
In England, the first intelligence department was created in 1653 by Sir Thur-
loe, Cromwell’s secretary of state in the Commonwealth ( Peacock 2020 , p. 8). 
To improve the work of this department, which played a key role in discovering 
plots against Cromwell and his regime, Sir Thurloe hired an expert in cryptology 
to be in charge of breaking secret codes. 4 
During the Restoration, secret services evolved further, attributed to General 
von Clausewitz, who considered them an essential part of any war strategy, so the 
attention was mainly focused on military intelligence. 
6.2.2 Intelligence from the 19th century onwards: focus on Italy 
Starting from the 19th century, the UK and the US established full-fledged intel-
ligence branches, that is, bodies with their own autonomous standing but whose 
activities are performed within the institutional framework. These were quickly 
followed by other countries in the comparative scenario, one of which is Italy, the 
focus of this chapter. 
In Italy, intelligence activities started in the 1850s. At that time, some provi-
sions governed them, but these rules were really fragmented and heterogeneous. 
Additionally, the regulation of intelligence was often left to secondary sources 
of law issued by the executive (if not to the orders of the Ministry of Defence). 
The first secret agency 5 was created in 1854, when Italy had not been unified 
yet under the reign of the Savoy dynasty. It was established within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and had no autonomy from it. A year later, another body was set 
up, performing informative functions within the military forces. 
These bodies were still operational when the First World War broke out in 
1914. By the time Italy joined the war in 1915, it was immediately evident that 
the informative system needed to be strengthened and improved. Therefore, a 
special investigative body dedicated to counterespionage activities was rapidly 
put in place. 
During the Fascist regime (1922–1943), the military intelligence service was 
further enhanced. In particular, Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM, or the Mili-
tary Information Service) was organised in several departments and special units. 
SIM was an integrated service operating for land, air, and naval armed forces. 
In 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War, SIM was split into two 
branches: Servizio Informazioni (SI, or the Information Service), working for the 
Italian armed forces, and Servizio Informazioni Difensive (SID, or the Defensive 
4 They dismantled the Sealed Knot (i.e., a royalist secret society) due to this information. 













   
 
  
84 Arianna Vedaschi 
Information Service), the informative body of the Italian Social Republic (the 
so-called Repubblica di Salò).6 
At the end of the war in 1945, SI was replaced by Servizio Informazioni delle 
Forze Armate (SIFAR, or the Information Service of the Italian Armed Forces), 
whereas SID was still operating. Additionally, Servizio Informazioni Operative 
e Situazioni (SIOS, or the Service for Operative Information and Situations) 
was created, tasked with acquiring information about foreign countries that were 
considered potential enemies. They all answered directly to the Capo di Stato 
Maggiore della Difesa (Chief of Defence), the chief general officer of the Italian 
armed forces, who reported to the Ministry of Defence. 
No amendments to the organisation of the Italian intelligence services were 
made in the immediate aftermath of 1948, when the Republican Constitution 
entered into force. 7 Only in 1965 did the Decree of the President of the Republic 
no. 1477/19658 merge SIFAR and SID, under the name of SID, carrying out 
functions that earlier pertained to both. This new body reported to the minister 
of defence. 
Since SIOS coexisted with the ‘new’ SID, many of their activities were dupli-
cated, causing uncertainty and inefficiency. A reform in this field, aimed at unify-
ing the existing bodies and simplifying such intricate regulation, emerged as an 
imperative need. This scenario was exactly the rationale behind the adoption of 
Law no. 801/1977 by the Italian Parliament. Importantly, this law is the first 
primary source regulating intelligence services in Italy, overriding previous sec-
ondary regulations. 
In addition to the above-mentioned necessity to have a comprehensive legislative
reform enacted as early as possible, due to the complexity of the earlier intelligence
framework, some other reasons, entirely political in nature, led to the enactment of
Law no. 801/1977. Specifically, during the 1960s, some Italian intelligence agents
became embroiled in the so-called  Solo plan scandal.9 At that time, Italy was under
6 Repubblica di Salò was named after the small town (Salò, in Northern Italy) where Benito 
Mussolini—following the armistice of 8 September 1943—established the headquarters of a 
Fascist state, comprising some of the Italian territories that were still under the Nazi military 
occupation. The Italian Social Republic was de facto controlled by the Germans, to the point 
that it was commonly identified as a ‘puppet state’. 
7 The only relevant innovation regarding secret services and intelligence matters was that in 
1948, Divisione Affari Generali and Riservati (Division for General and Confidential Affairs) 
was established within the Interior Ministry; in 1974, it was dissolved and replaced by an Anti-
Terrorism Inspectorate. 
8 In the Italian legal system, although this act is formally issued by the President of the Repub-
lic, its substantive content is determined by the executive branch, and within the hierarchy 
of sources, it has secondary rank (see Art. 87 of the Italian Constitution). Therefore, these 
changes were substantively enacted by the Government, which, by its own act, decided that 
secret services answered to one of its ministers. 
9 The Solo plan refers to a planned military coup, led by Giovanni De Lorenzo, commander-in-
chief of the Carabinieri and previously of the SIFAR. It was based on assessments, made by De 
Lorenzo and other former SIFAR officials, regarding the subversive nature of some political 
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the threat of political terrorism, 10 while on the international scene, the Cold War
caused a situation of persisting tension. All these factors—and the related political
debate—contributed to pushing the Italian legislature towards a new regulation of
intelligence, which tried to take democratic principles, including transparency and
accountability, into greater consideration ( Anzon 1991 , p. 1).
The main feature of Law no. 801/1977 is the key role of the Italian Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers (PCM).11 According to Article 1, the PCM 
was ‘responsible overall’ 12 for security intelligence policies and had to coordinate 
the activities. In particular, the 1977 Law established two secret agencies: Ser-
vizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI, or the Service for Mili-
tary Information and Security) 13 and Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza 
Democratica (SISDE, or the Service for Democratic Information and Security). 14 
The former dealt with military issues and reported to the minister of defence, 15 
while the latter, answering to the interior minister, addressed all those situations 
that threatened the democratic order of the state and its institutions. 16 In both 
cases, the minister of defence (with regard to SISMI) and the interior minister 
(with regard to SISDE) acted on the basis of (detailed) guidelines issued by the 
PCM ( Labriola 1978 , p. 46). 17 
Within this framework, the PCM was supported in his or her activities by a
body named Comitato Esecutivo per i Servizi di Informazione e di Sicurezza
(CESIS, or the Executive Committee for Information and Security Services). 18 
It had to provide the PCM with all useful elements to coordinate the secret
services, and it was tasked with processing and analysing all the information
retrieved by SISMI and SISDE. Additionally, it coordinated the relation-
ship with foreign intelligence agencies. CESIS was chaired by the PCM, who
appointed its members.19 
10 In Italy, the 1970s are known as the ‘leaden years’. The country was characterised by out-
bursts of political violence from both left-wing and right-wing extremist groups. 
11 The PCM is the head of the Italian Government. In Italy, the executive power is vested in 
the PCM and the Council of Ministers (Art. 95, Italian Constitution). In giving the PCM 
a pivotal role in the intelligence system, Law no. 801/1977 implemented two judgements 
of the Italian Constitutional Court (nos. 82/1976 and 86/1977), pointing out the PCM’s 
primary responsibility for national security matters, due to the PCM’s institutional status. 
12 The translation from Italian to English is made by the author. 
13 Art. 4 of Law no. 801/1977. 
14 Art. 6 of Law no. 801/1977. 
15 The minister of defence had to appoint the SISMI director and other high officials. 
16 The interior minister was vested with the power to appoint the SISDE director and other 
high officials. Both the interior minister (for SISDE) and the minister of defence (for SISMI) 
had to ask for the preventive opinion of the Interministerial Committee for Information and 
Security. 
17 In this regard, this Italian scholar argued that the activity of the two ministers was hierarchi-
cally subordinated to the PCM. 
18 Art. 3 of Law no. 801/1977. 
19 The composition of CESIS could vary, being determined by the PCM. Anyway, pursuant to 
Art. 3 of Law no. 801/1977, it was mandatory to include the heads of SISMI and SISDE 
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Another crucial body was Comitato Interministeriale per le Informazioni e 
la Sicurezza (CIIS, or the Interministerial Committee for Information and 
Security).20 Comprising several ministers of the Italian Republic,21 it had the 
primary function of counselling the PCM regarding general goals to be pur-
sued through the activity of the intelligence system. Similar to CESIS, CIIS was 
headed by the PCM. Formally, CESIS and CIIS were separate bodies with unam-
biguously different tasks, and both answered to the PCM. 
Finally, political oversight of Italian intelligence activities was carried out by 
Comitato Parlamentare di Controllo (COPACO, or the Parliamentary Over-
sight Committee).22 It consisted of eight members of the Houses of the Ital-
ian Parliament,23 four deputies and four senators, who elected the chair among 
themselves. They were appointed by the presidents of the two Houses ‘based 
on proportionality requirements’. 24 COPACO had to monitor the intelligence 
system and check that all bodies acted in compliance with Law no. 801/1977. 
Furthermore, it was empowered to request the PCM and CIIS for information 
about intelligence activities, submit proposals about the forthcoming actions of 
secret services and make observations on matters dealing with intelligence. How-
ever, when COPACO required information from the PCM, the latter, invoking 
state secrecy, could reject the request, even based on a flimsy explanation of the 
reasons on which secrecy was grounded. 
From a more general perspective, the PCM played a critical role regarding state 
secrecy. Although the PCM was not the only authority empowered to assert it— 
since high officials of intelligence agencies could do so as well—he or she was the 
only one who could confirm the existence of a state secret, in case the privilege 
was invoked by a public official acting as a defendant or a witness during criminal 
proceedings. 25 Nonetheless, among other limits, secrecy could never shield acts 
against the ‘constitutional order’. 26 Such a limit would then be reiterated by the 
current legislation and, as Section 6.5 will show, was at the core of the  Abu Omar
case ( Pace 2014 , p. 7;  Vedaschi 2013a , p. 163). 
20 Art. 2 of Law no. 801/1977. 
21 These included the minister for foreign affairs, the interior minister, the minister of justice, 
the minister of defence, and the minister of economics and finance. Other ministers who are 
not included in this list—as well as the heads of SISMI and SISDE, several public authorities 
and intelligence experts—could occasionally join CIIS meetings, but they did not enjoy vot-
ing rights. 
22 Art. 11 of Law no. 801/1977. 
23 Italy has a bicameral Parliament, comprising two Houses (the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate of the Republic). 
24 Art. 11, para. 2 of Law no. 801/1977. The translation from Italian to English was made by 
the author. 
25 When a witness or a defendant invoked state secrecy to shield any information requested 
during criminal proceedings, the judge was obliged to suspend the process and ask the PCM 
whether (or not) he or she confirmed secrecy. The PCM had 60 days to answer. 
26 Art. 12 of Law no. 801/1977. The same prohibition was reiterated by Art. 39 of Law no. 
124/2004 (see Section 6.4.2). According to some scholars, this is a logical (rather than a 
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6.3 The current intelligence legal framework 
The described legal framework, provided by Law no. 801/1977, was reformed in
2007, when the 1977 legislation was repealed by Law no. 124/2007, 27 address-
ing intelligence agencies and the use of state secrecy. This law remains in force, as
amended in 2012.28 Specifically, Law no. 133/2012 enhanced the use of technol-
ogy in information-gathering techniques and, above all, strengthened the oversight
of intelligence operations performed by Comitato Parlamentare per la Sicurezza
della Repubblica (COPASIR, or the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of
the Republic, discussed below), which replaced COPACO ( Franchini 2014 , p. 1).
The 2007 legislative reform occurred for many reasons ( Giupponi and Fabbrini 
2010 , p. 443). First, a change in the international scenario, after the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, progressively entailed the need for a stronger role of secret services 
and a quicker exchange of secret information ( Pisano 2003 , p. 263). Second, 
from 2003 onwards, Italian SISMI officials became involved in the  Abu Omar
case,29 joining an extraordinary rendition operation coordinated by the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA); consequently, some judicial investigations were 
conducted, bringing criminal proceedings concerning unlawful actions allegedly 
committed by them. These events pushed forward the demands for better over-
sight and the consequent accountability of secret agencies, as well as an indepen-
dent review of the use of state secrecy. Third, between 1977 and 2007, the Italian 
Constitutional Court had addressed the issue of state secrecy in several judge-
ments ( Vedaschi 2013b , p. 98), always emphasising the PCM’s role in secrecy 
issues and, more generally, his or her ‘leadership’ in secret services. 30 
6.3.1 Law no. 124/2007: main features 
The 2007 legislative reform enhanced the PCM’s status as the head of the Italian 
intelligence system and created the Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza 
della Repubblica (CISR, or the Interministerial Committee for the Security of the 
Republic)31 to provide advice to other bodies, make proposals, and set priorities 
in the field of security. Among other relevant novelties, the following can be listed:
a set of functional guarantees granted to intelligence agents,32 the consolidation 
27 Indeed, several reform projects had already been presented from 1977 onwards. Among 
them, it is worth mentioning the one presented in 1993 by the then PCM, Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi, to merge the two secret services into one agency divided into two branches (one 
dealing with internal threats and the other with external threats). This project was dropped 
because it came at the end of the parliamentary term. From 1993 to 2007, at least 60 further 
projects were presented, but they never succeeded. 
28 See Section 6.4.1. 
29 See Section 6.5.2. 
30 See Judgement no. 110/1998 and Ord. no. 404/2005. 
31 A security committee within the executive branch. 
32 This means that they can be exempted from criminal conviction for some unlawful activities 
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and improvement of oversight mechanisms on intelligence operations, and some 
procedural rules regarding the use of secrecy in criminal proceedings. 
However, the so-called double track system has been preserved, insofar as 
external and internal intelligence agencies are still separate but with their names 
changed; they are now called Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI, 
or the Agency for Internal Information and Security) and Agenzia Informazioni 
e Sicurezza Esterna (AISE, or the Agency for External Information and Secu-
rity). While AISI addresses internal threats, AISE is focused on external ones, 
and Article 7, para. 4 of Law no. 124/2007 prevents them from interfering 
with each other’s activities. Thus, it seems that a merely ‘geographical’ crite-
rion distinguishes between AISI’s and AISE’s tasks, yet scholars (e.g., Bonetti 
2008 , p. 264) note that this territorial differentiation entails functional implica-
tions, since AISI is more inclined to address terrorism and domestic criminalities, 
whereas AISE specialises in military issues. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of 
international terrorism, along with the evolution of the traditional concept of war 
( Vedaschi 2007 ), it is difficult to keep a strict distinction based on the territorial 
reach of the threat or on its nature. 
It is useful to separately examine each of the mentioned new features brought 
by Law no. 124/2007. The PCM’s role was emphasised by the reform. Indisput-
ably, the head of the Italian Government already held a key position within the 
intelligence system. At any rate, the 2007 law stipulates that the PCM is vested 
with the ‘oversight of and overall responsibility for security intelligence policy 
in the interests and defence of the Republic and its underlying democratic insti-
tutions as established by the Constitution’.33 Furthermore, the PCM decides on 
the budget of secret services and issues regulations on matters regarding them. As 
for state secrecy, the PCM is in charge of applying and confirming the state secret 
privilege in criminal proceedings, being the only one empowered to do so. The 
PCM also appoints a number of high officials of the secret services. Notably, the 
PCM can delegate his or her functions to the delegated authority, whose appoint-
ment is not mandatory, but the PCM can only designate ministers without a 
portfolio 34 or undersecretaries of state. 35 When the PCM appoints a delegated 
authority, 36 the opinion of the Council of Ministers is not required. 37 
33 Art. 1, para. 1(a) of Law no. 124/2007. The official English translation of Law no. 124/2007 
is available at www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english/law-no-124-2007.html . 
34 In the Italian legal system, they are ministers of the Italian Government with no spending 
power. 
35 In Italy, undersecretaries of state are appointed by a decree of the President of the Republic, 
on the PCM’s proposal, in agreement with the concerned minister. 
36 After Law no. 124/2007 took effect, six PCMs decided to appoint delegated authorities, 
as follows: Silvio Berlusconi appointed Gianni Letta; Mario Monti appointed Gianni De 
Gennaro; Enrico Letta appointed Marco Minniti, who was appointed again during the 
administration led by Matteo Renzi; Paolo Gentiloni appointed Luciano Pizzetti; Giuseppe 
Conte, in both the administrations he led, has decided not to appoint a delegated authority. 
The current PCM, Mario Draghi, appointed Franco Gabrielli. 
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The PCM (or the delegated authority) is supported by the Dipartimento delle 
Informazioni per la Sicurezza (DIS, or the Security Intelligence Department), 
whose head he or she appoints.38 DIS coordinates the activities of AISE and 
AISI, reports the information gathered by the two agencies to the PCM, and 
promotes meetings between AISE and AISI to ensure the exchange of informa-
tion between them. Hence, DIS has relevant connecting functions, acting as a 
link between the PCM and secret services on one hand, and between AISE and 
AISI on the other. 
As mentioned, Law no. 124/2007 set up another body, still within the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers but outside DIS: CISR, headed by
the PCM and comprising the delegated authority (if appointed) and several
ministers.39 CISR performs a number of tasks, including to ‘advise, make
proposals and take decisions regarding the lines and general goals of security
intelligence policy’.40 
Another relevant new feature of the 2007 legislative reform is embodied by 
functional guarantees. According to Article 17 of Law no. 124/2007, in some 
narrowly tailored circumstances, members of AISE and AISI 41 are exempted 
from judicial investigation and prosecution for their conduct in the performance 
of their duties when their actions would qualify as crimes pursuant to the law 
( Pisa 2007 , p. 1431). In other words, functional guarantees are very limited 
exceptions to the general rule of accountability before criminal courts and de 
facto provide secret agents with partial immunity from ordinary jurisdiction ( Pra-
duroux 2015 , p. 282). 
Functional guarantees aim at balancing two competing interests. On one hand, 
intelligence services need room to discharge their duties; on the other hand, 
it must be ensured that intelligence agents carry out their activities within the 
bounds of the law and are accountable for their actions. To apply functional guar-
antees, four (cumulative) requirements must be met. First, unlawful acts must 
have been authorised by the PCM. Importantly, generic authorisations to com-
mit criminal offences do not justify them, since ad hoc authorisation is request-
ed.42 Second, the commission of crimes must be ‘indispensable’ to accomplish 
an operation and proportionate to the goal pursued. 43 Third, the conduct must 
result from a careful and objective ‘weighing of the public and private interest 
38 The PCM also has to appoint the heads of AISE and AISI. 
39 Specifically, the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, defence, finance, and economic 
development. 
40 Art. 5, para. 1 of Law no. 124/2007. 
41 They can also apply to citizens who are not involved in intelligence agencies if they are coop-
erating with intelligence agents and their cooperation is essential for attaining the pursued 
goal. 
42 In ordinary circumstances, the authorisation is granted by the PCM or when appointed, 
by the delegated authority. However, in extraordinary cases of ‘absolute urgency’, it can be 
provided by the director of AISE or AISI, but the PCM (or the delegated authority) has to 
ratify it within 10 days (otherwise, they have to inform the judicial authority without delay). 
Art. 18, paras. 4–6 of Law no. 124/2007. 
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involved’. Fourth, criminal acts must ‘cause the minimum damage possible to 
affected interests’. 44 
When all the above-mentioned conditions occur, functional guarantees can be 
invoked by persons under investigation and defendants at any stage of criminal 
proceedings, from preliminary investigations up to the trial. The judge (or the 
public prosecutor) has to ask the PCM whether he or she confirms the existence 
of an ad hoc authorisation. On one hand, if the PCM confirms that the operation 
has been authorised and all other requirements are fulfilled, the judicial process 
(or the investigation) must be dismissed. On the other hand, if the PCM says that 
there has been no authorisation or that the conduct by the intelligence official(s) 
has exceeded the limits set by the authorisation, the criminal proceedings go 
ahead. If the judiciary and the PCM disagree on the authorisation—and hence on 
the existence of functional guarantees—the Constitutional Court can be called 
on to adjudicate the dispute,45 referred to as ‘conflict of allocation of powers’. 46 
Nevertheless, Law no. 124/2007 prescribes that functional guarantees can-
not be applied to some serious offences ( Marenghi et al. 2007 , p. 716). These 
include ‘crimes endangering or injuring the life, physical integrity, personal dig-
nity, personal freedom, moral freedom, health or safety of one or more persons’; 47 
crimes against state institutions or against political rights of citizens or against the 
administration of justice; and terrorism and Mafia-style crimes. These limits aim 
to ensure that constitutional principles and rights guarantees are not breached, 
even where ‘special rules’ govern a highly sensitive activity (as intelligence is). 
Regarding oversight functions, according to Law no. 124/2007, there are 
two mechanisms.48 On one hand, political oversight of secret services’ activities 
is handled (at least at the first stage) by COPASIR, which replaced COPACO (as 
mentioned). On the other hand, the Constitutional Court rules on disputes that 
may arise between the PCM and the judiciary when secrecy is invoked in criminal 
proceedings (judicial oversight). It must be borne in mind that no other Italian 
judge is empowered to scrutinise these matters. 
44 Art. 17, para. 6 of Law no. 124/2006. 
45 Art. 19, para. 8 of Law no. 124/2007. 
46 The tasks of the Constitutional Court are listed by Art. 134 of the Italian Constitution, 
according to which it can rule on: 
‘– controversies on the constitutional legitimacy of laws and enactments having force of law 
issued by the State and Regions; 
– conflicts arising from allocation of powers of the State and those powers allocated to State 
and Regions, and between Regions; 
– charges brought against the President of the Republic, according to the provisions of the 
Constitution’ (translation by the Italian Senate). 
47 Art. 17, para. 2 of Law no. 124/2007. 
48 A couple of scholars ( Giupponi and Fabbrini 2010 , p. 454) also include internal administra-
tive review as one of the oversight mechanisms. These tasks are carried out by the Inspection 
Office, set up within DIS. This office has to check that ‘security intelligence activities comply 
with Acts of Parliament and with governmental Regulations, as well as with the directives and 
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Both oversight mechanisms (on the activity of intelligence services and the use 
of state secrecy in criminal cases) are examined in detail in the next section, as 
they shed light on the challenging relation between the intelligence system and 
state powers. Section 6.5 then discusses how intelligence agencies work and state 
secrecy is resorted to in times of international terrorism. 
6.4 The Italian intelligence system and its interactions 
with state powers 
In the current framework, Italian intelligence services interact—in varying degrees 
and at different stages—with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
These interactions form the focal point of oversight mechanisms, political and 
judicial. In particular, political oversight focuses on the relation between intel-
ligence and the legislative power. In contrast, judicial oversight may be triggered 
when state secrecy is resorted to in criminal proceedings to shield intelligence 
activities. This perspective shows how secrecy may work as an element of ten-
sion between intelligence services and the judiciary on one hand, and the latter 
and the PCM on the other hand. Acting as the sole reviewer of state secrets, the 
Constitutional Court 49 is called on to resolve these disputes. 
6.4.1 Political oversight of secret services’ activities 
Political oversight is handled by a parliamentary committee, that is, COPASIR. 
Pursuant to Article 30 of Law no. 124/2007, this body consists of five deputies 
and five senators, appointed by the president of each House of Parliament within 
20 days of the opening of every Parliament. The committee’s composition is 
proportional to the number of parliamentary groups, 50 so equal representation 
of both majority and opposition groups should be ensured. It is chaired by a 
member of the political opposition.51 
COPASIR’s general function is to ‘constantly and systematically verify that the 
Security Intelligence System’s activities are carried out in observance both of 
the Constitution and of the law and in the defence and exclusive interests 
of the Republic and its institutions’.52 To discharge its duties, it can resort to 
several tools. First, it examines the report on the intelligence services’ activities 
that the PCM has to submit every six months. Second, COPASIR has to be 
informed within 30 days when intelligence agencies have performed operations 
49 In the Italian legal system, the Constitutional Court is not part of the judiciary, given its 
constitutional adjudication functions. 
50 In Italy, parliamentary groups can be defined as the transposition of political parties within 
the Parliament. 
51 The president is elected by absolute majority and secret ballot. If no candidate attains the 
absolute majority at the first ballot, a second will be held between the two candidates who 
have obtained the highest number of votes. The president of the COPASIR represents the 
whole body and convenes its meeting. 
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in which unlawful actions have been authorised by the PCM (see Section 6.3.1). 
The PCM is also obliged to keep COPASIR informed when asked to confirm 
state secrecy in criminal proceedings, and must also disclose his or her final deci-
sion (i.e., whether to confirm secrecy). Third, COPASIR can require copies of 
sensitive documents from the PCM, who can refuse to disclose them by resort-
ing to state secrecy. However, if COPASIR does not agree on the invocation of 
secrecy, it can bring the matter before the Houses of Parliament, which may pass 
a motion of no confidence in the PCM and its Government. At any rate, in the 
event of a vote of no confidence, classified documents will still not be disclosed ex 
post. Hence, the PCM remains the sole keeper of state secrecy ( Vedaschi 2018a , 
p. 910), even when he or she and the Government are forced to resign. Fourth, 
COPASIR can decide to hold hearings, asking the PCM, other ministers, heads 
of intelligence agencies, and individuals who are not involved in the intelligence 
system to provide information that might be useful for its oversight. 
Along with the listed tools, and closely related to its oversight role, COPASIR 
has further tasks (i.e., advisory, reporting, and warning functions). As for COPA-
SIR’s advisory role, the PCM has to ask for its opinion before adopting any 
regulations dealing with the organisation of intelligence and prior to appointing 
the heads of DIS, AISI, and AISE. However, its opinion is not legally binding. 
Regarding its reporting duties, COPASIR has to present an annual report to 
the Houses of Parliament to keep them informed of the activities carried out by 
the intelligence services in that period. COPASIR also plays a warning role; in 
performing its other functions, when it discovers irregular conduct by any of the 
bodies of the intelligence system, it should inform the PCM and the presidents 
of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate. After the reform enacted through 
Law no. 133/2012, its power in this regard has been strengthened, as it can ask 
the PCM not only to consider the matter but also to order internal inquiries, 
whose findings have to be transmitted to COPASIR itself. Finally, it can review 
the budget related to the operations of the intelligence agencies by accessing the 
DIS archives. 
This overview shows that the primary raison d’être of this parliamentary com-
mittee is to create a link between intelligence activities and the Parliament (and 
ultimately, citizens the Parliament represents). Given that most intelligence activ-
ities are secret by nature, it would be unacceptable in a democratic country to 
carry them out entirely outside of democratic institutions. Therefore, COPA-
SIR’s functions are vital to ensure transparency and political accountability. The 
former is sought by provisions requiring that intelligence operations be disclosed 
to COPASIR, and even if not in detail, they may be reported to the Parliament. 
The latter should be guaranteed as COPASIR may refer issues to the Houses 
of Parliament, which may pass a motion of no confidence. From a political per-
spective, irregular conduct of intelligence bodies may lead to broken confidence 
between the Parliament (rather, its majority) and the Government. 
At least in theory, COPASIR is essential to keep democracy alive in the sensi-
tive field of intelligence, necessarily characterised by covert operations and confi-
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6.4.2 Judicial oversight and the use of state secrecy in criminal 
proceedings 
The other oversight mechanism may be performed by the Italian Constitutional 
Court. According to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (c.c.p.) 53 and Law 
no. 124/2007,54 public officials 55 taking part in criminal proceedings as defen-
dants or witnesses are obliged not to answer questions by the public prosecutor 
(during investigations) or by the judge (during the process) about facts or infor-
mation shielded by state secrecy. Nevertheless, when a defendant or a witness 
invokes state secret privilege to avoid answering questions, the public prosecutor 
or the judge (depending on the stage of the criminal proceedings) cannot take 
this claim for granted. However, they must suspend any activity aimed at obtain-
ing such information and ask the PCM to confirm whether (or not) the matter of 
concern is really a state secret. 
At that point, the situation is in the hands of the PCM (not of the Government 
as a whole), who has 30 days to examine the issue and decide whether (or not) 
state secrecy should be confirmed. If the PCM does not give any answer within 
this period (or provides an explicitly negative answer), the defendant or the wit-
ness is obliged to refer the matter to judicial authorities, since no secrecy is con-
sidered to exist. Within 30 days, if the PCM confirms the existence of the state 
secret privilege, the PCM must submit a document to the judge (or the prosecu-
tor), explaining the reasons behind his or her decision, so the public prosecutor 
or the judge are prevented from obtaining and using, directly or indirectly, the 
information shielded by the privilege. Hence, there are two alternatives. First, if 
this material is essential to the criminal investigation (or process), the case must 
be dismissed ‘due to the existence of a state secret’. 56 Second, if there are distinct 
and autonomous elements that are in no way related to the classified material, the 
criminal trial can move forward by relying on them. 57 
This overview of the approach to secrecy in the Italian legal system—in partic-
ular, during criminal proceedings—highlights the central position of the execu-
tive branch, specifically of the PCM, in secrecy matters. However, in some cases, 
the judge or the prosecutor does not agree with the PCM on the invocation 
of secrecy; for example, arguing that the PCM has not confirmed secrecy in 
compliance with the law. In other circumstances, the PCM does not agree
with the judge or the prosecutor, claiming that they are using the materials 
53 Art. 202. 
54 Art. 41. 
55 Members of secret agencies qualify as public officials in the meaning of Art. 357 of the Italian 
Criminal Code (c.c.). 
56 Art. 41, para. 3 of Law no. 124/2007. 
57 In this regard, the Constitutional Court states that ‘the assertion of the state secrecy’ by the
PCM may not ‘forbid prosecutors from investigating crimes relating to the reported crime’ but
may only ‘prevent the prosecutors from acquiring and using any elements or evidence shielded
by secrecy’. Nonetheless, in practice, this is often very difficult for judges and prosecutors. See
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that are supposed to be classified as evidence. The Italian Constitutional Court is 
called on to decide on these disputes (called conflicts of allocation of powers).58 
Since Law no. 124/2007 states that no state secret can be invoked against the 
Constitutional Court, 59 this court has a very important role, being the only one 
empowered to scrutinise the assertion of secrecy from a substantive point of view. 
When the Constitutional Court assesses the legitimacy of secrecy invocation, it 
must take into account the limits of secrecy. The most important one is enshrined 
in Article 39, para. 11 of Law no. 124/2007. According to this provision, under 
no circumstance can acts endangering the ‘constitutional order’ or other serious 
crimes60 be concealed by secrecy. In other words, defendants and witnesses cannot 
invoke state secrecy in criminal proceedings to hide the fact that they committed 
crimes against the constitutional order. Ideally, if any defendant or witness does 
so, the PCM should not confirm secrecy; ultimately, should the PCM confirm 
secrecy to shield these acts, the Constitutional Court should declare his or her 
assertion unlawful, since Article 39, para. 11 of Law no. 124/2007 is breached. 
In cases where the Constitutional Court decides that secrecy has been neither 
correctly invoked nor confirmed by the PCM, its judgement allows the judge or 
the prosecutor to use the concerned material as evidence. Therefore, the prosecu-
tor can investigate, and the judge can base his or her decision on this information. 
In the opposite circumstance—that is, when the Constitutional Court ascertains 
that secrecy has been correctly resorted to—its word is final. Judges and prosecu-
tors must abstain from any further inquiry or evaluation on that material, and the 
criminal proceedings can continue only if there are further pieces of evidence. 
In this legal framework, the Constitutional Court is vested with significant 
powers. Although its oversight role is performed only when a conflict of alloca-
tion of powers arises between the PCM and the judiciary, it can be considered 
the ‘last bulwark’ of transparency and accountability of intelligence services. To
what extent this role is effectively performed in practice will be clearer through 
the analysis in the next section of a recent Italian case dealing with secrecy, intel-
ligence, and national security threats. 
6.5 Intelligence agencies ‘in action’ in times 
of international terrorism 
The examined legal framework, governing intelligence agencies and the use of 
state secrecy in Italy, needs to be viewed from a practical perspective. How do 
intelligence services operate in times of international terrorism? Do oversight 
mechanisms work in practice? Is the tension between secrecy on one hand, and 
transparency and accountability on the other hand, increased by jihadist terror-
ism? The Abu Omar case, concerning the extraordinary rendition of a suspected 
58 See note 46. 
59 Art. 40, para. 8. 
60 Ravaging (Art. 285 c.c.), Mafia-related crimes (Arts. 416-bis, 413-ter c.c.), and slaughter 
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terrorist, sheds light on these questions, and its analysis is essential for investigat-
ing intelligence services from an ‘operative’ viewpoint. Before addressing it, some 
contextual information on the ‘new’ terrorist threat is needed. 
6.5.1 International terrorism and the metamorphosis 
of security threats 
As mentioned, the outbreak of international terrorism in 2001 and attacks perpe-
trated in Europe in the following years (Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005) 61 
were among the factors contributing to the emphasis on the need for a legislative 
reform of intelligence services. International terrorism since 2001 is different 
from that which occurred before ( Walker 2011 , p. 5), but one of the main fea-
tures of this new phenomenon is its ongoing metamorphosis. 
The terrorism that many European countries had already experienced before 
2001 (e.g., Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany, political terrorism in Italy, Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna in Spain, Irish Republican Army in the UK) had some traits that 
differentiated it from international terrorism. For example, ‘old’ terrorism was 
prevalently domestic because it lacked a transnational reach and it had a political, 
or at least an ideological, purpose (e.g., independence). In contrast, international 
terrorism aims at destruction (at least apparently and at the first stage) without a 
well-defined goal. It can unleash its violence at any moment, in whatever place, 
against anybody, and without a clear reason. 
However, international terrorism itself evolved over the years. In the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks, it was essentially identified with Al-Qaeda (and other related 
terrorist cells). It worked as an extremist group whose main targets were the US 
and the Western world in general ( Baines and O’Shaughnessy 2016 , p. 172). 
Al-Qaeda primarily involved its members in its activities, and it did not seek 
to include people who were geographically and culturally distant from Islamic 
extremism, nor was its goal to build a state ( Vedaschi 2020 , p. 302). The situa-
tion changed in 2014, when Al-Adnani delivered a speech self-proclaiming the 
Islamic Caliphate a state, led by Al-Baghdadi ( Vedaschi 2016a , p. 1). Radicalisa-
tion efforts—also exploiting new technologies—increased in order to attract as 
many people as possible from other countries, religions, and cultures to embrace 
extremist ideologies. Afterwards, the Islamic State was militarily defeated and lost 
all of its territories, so its state ambitions were disrupted; nonetheless, recruiting 
strategies are still being implemented as the terrorists hope to ‘come back’ by 
keeping the allegiance of its ‘citizens’ alive. 
Against this background, from 2001 to the present, security threats have 
been dramatically transformed; consequently, approaches to tackling them have 
changed too. A number of measures have been enacted, limiting—where not 
breaching—human rights that constitutions and supranational tools guarantee 
61 This ‘escalation of violence’ continued in the following years in Paris (2015), Berlin (2016), 
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( Roach et al. 2005 ). Some of them, namely targeted killings and extraordinary 
renditions, violate the right to life and the right not to be tortured ( Vedaschi 
2018b , p. 89). The former practice consists of killing suspected terrorists, tar-
geted overseas, usually by means of airstrikes ( O’Connell 2012 , p. 263). The 
latter involves the abduction of individuals suspected of having links with terror-
ism in order to bring them to territories where they are tortured to induce them 
to reveal useful information to fight terrorism ( Satterthwaite 2013 , p. 589). In 
both cases, targets are identified by relying on secret intelligence files, and covert 
operations are carried out, with the cooperation of the intelligence services of 
multiple countries.62 
6.5.2 Extraordinary renditions, state secrecy, and the Italian 
Constitutional Court 
The Abu Omar case, involving extraordinary rendition, is well known. Nasr 
Osama Mustafa Hassan (aka Abu Omar) was an Egyptian-born imam with refu-
gee status in Italy. In 2003, while he was under investigation due to alleged ties 
to a terrorist cell, he was abducted in Milan by CIA and SISMI agents and ren-
dered to Egypt, where he was detained incommunicado and tortured ( Amnesty 
International 2006 ). 
After an investigation led by the Public Prosecutor of Milan, in 2009, the 
Tribunal of Milan (Judgement no. 12428/2009) convicted 23 US officials in 
absentia for Abu Omar’s kidnapping (the other three US citizens were acquitted 
because of diplomatic immunity). Five Italian intelligence agents invoked the 
state secret privilege, and the PCM confirmed it, so the tribunal was forced to 
dismiss charges against them ( Vedaschi 2013b , p. 95). 
A long and complex judiciary path began ( Vedaschi 2017 , p. 166), in which 
the PCM’s decision to confirm state secrecy—shielding actions of SISMI 
officers—was repeatedly challenged by Italian judicial and prosecuting authori-
ties at different stages of the criminal proceedings, giving rise to conflicts of allo-
cation of powers before the Constitutional Court. 63 However, the latter always 
decided in the PCM’s favour. As a result, a ‘curtain of secrecy’ 64 was dropped 
on the events. Due to the Constitutional Court’s approach, even the Court of 
Cassation (i.e., the court of last instance in the Italian legal system) was forced 
to acquit Italian agents due to the existence of the state secret (Judgement no. 
20447/2014). 
The Constitutional Court issued two decisions (Judgements nos. 106/2009 
and 24/2014) in which it argued in favour of the head of the executive branch. 
62 Both targeted killings and extraordinary renditions are led by the US ( Scheppele 2005 , 
p. 285), but other democratic countries cooperate with them. 
63 See note 46. 
64 This was evocatively stated by the Court of Appeals of Milan, when in 2010 (Judgement 
no. 3688/2010), after the first ruling of the Constitutional Court, it was forced to dismiss 
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In its 2009 ruling, the Constitutional Court recalled its previous case law, dating 
back to the 1970s,65 where it emphasised the link between state secrecy and  salus 
rei publicae. Although the court remarked on its own role as the sole reviewer of 
state secrecy, it stressed the PCM’s significant powers in this domain, paving the 
way for the following steps of its reasoning, based on a restrictive interpretation 
of the concept of constitutional order, to allow a wide use of state secrecy. As 
mentioned, the state secret privilege cannot be claimed on acts against the consti-
tutional order. The Constitutional Court affirmed that this concept identified the 
acts aimed to ‘overthrow the democratic system or the institutions of the Italian 
Republic’ and to dismantle ‘the overall democratic structure of the institutions’. 
Although SISMI officers cooperated with the US in an operation—Abu Omar’s 
rendition—whose outcome was the kidnapping aimed to torture the target, defi-
nitely infringing human rights and, ultimately, the fundamental value of human 
dignity, they did not try to subvert state institutions; therefore, in the court’s 
view, their acts did not breach the constitutional order. 
This reading of constitutional order is far too narrow. In the Italian constitu-
tional framework, constitutional order is a wider concept, embracing all those 
rights and values on which democracy rests. Hence, this concept includes (but is 
not limited to) the restrictive meaning given by the court, which pertains to the 
idea of the constitutional system, referring to state institutions and their recipro-
cal relation (i.e., the form of Government). By conflating the constitutional order 
with the constitutional system, the court de facto avoided ruling on the issue, 
showing self-restraint and deference to the PCM. 
The arguments in favour of transparency and accountability for human right 
violations fared no better in 2014, when a further conflict of allocation of pow-
ers arose between the PCM and the judiciary. In its Decision no. 24/2014, the 
Constitutional Court followed three main steps. First, it reiterated its 2009 rea-
soning, holding that the exclusive power to decide on secrecy issues was vested in 
the PCM. Second, it addressed a point raised by the Court of Cassation, which 
had called on the Constitutional Court to resolve the dispute. The Court of Cas-
sation claimed that secrecy had been invoked too late; the defendants resorted 
to it only after the investigative stage of the criminal proceedings ended. More-
over, the facts were already known by civil society. 66 According to the Constitu-
tional Court, these elements were irrelevant and did not affect the lawfulness of 
the PCM’s decision. Third, the Constitutional Court reacted to a further argu-
ment of the Court of Cassation. The latter maintained that the Italian officials’ 
actions had been performed outside of their official capacity; thus, they could not 
be shielded by the state secret privilege. The Constitutional Court argued that 
this hypothesis was not realistic because if the agents had acted in their personal 
65 Judgements nos. 82/1976 and 86/1977. 
66 This was due to reports on extraordinary renditions, widely circulated by institutions and 
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capacity, the PCM would have taken measures against them, but nothing like that 
happened ( Vedaschi 2013a , p. 163). 
With its 2014 judgement, the Constitutional Court put an end to the  Abu 
Omar case at the national level.67 The only form of relief for Abu Omar and his 
wife came in 2016 from the European Court of Human Rights, which, of course, 
could only grant them compensation, being unable to effectively punish the Ital-
ian agents ( Vedaschi 2016b ). 
By showing self-restraint and limiting its scrutiny to a mere formal and pro-
cedural assessment, the Constitutional Court gave up its role as the reviewer of 
state secrecy, leaving it to the PCM’s high-handedness (potentially leading to 
abuses). This stance might ultimately trigger the erosion of basic principles of 
democracy, such as transparency and accountability, and lead to unpunished vio-
lations of human rights. 
Moreover, in  Abu Omar, political oversight was not initiated, since COPASIR 
did not bring the matter before the Parliament. Indeed, this oversight mecha-
nism, when triggered, is weak in practice. In fact, in a parliamentary system such 
as Italy’s, there is a political continuum between the majority of the Parliament 
and the executive branch (and its head), so the former will hardly vote against 
the latter on national security matters. Additionally, in the unlikely event of a 
vote of no confidence, the PCM’s decision to keep the material classified cannot 
be changed. Furthermore, national security is a field where political forces (the 
majority and the opposition) traditionally share the same positions, so the biparti-
san composition of COPASIR 68 might not be enough to ensure effective checks. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined Italian intelligence agencies’ history, current frame-
work, and practical issues in times of international terrorism. A few relevant 
points arise from the analysis. 
The overview of the historical development of Italian intelligence services 
shows that the Italian legislature, from the origins of the regulation of intelli-
gence up to 2012 (when the 2007 law was slightly amended), has been striving to 
enhance transparency and accountability in this sensitive field. This effort stems 
from at least two features. First, from 1977 onwards, intelligence services and 
their activities have been regulated by legislative acts, which means that many 
more guarantees are ensured, compared with secondary sources, which governed 
these issues before 1977. Second, due to the 2007 legislative reform, at least in 
principle, oversight is now better framed. In particular, the Constitutional Court 
is endowed with significant review powers. 
However, some flaws persist in this framework. As explained, the political over-
sight performed by COPASIR is weak in practice. The Constitutional Court, 
67 The Court of Cassation was forced to dismiss the case against the Italian agents. 
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called on to decide on the use of secrecy in a case of extraordinary rendition, took 
a deferential approach and blatantly limited its scrutiny to formal and procedural 
issues. 
These drawbacks can hardly be overcome by means of further legislative 
reforms. On one side, the weaknesses of the COPASIR oversight function 
depend on the intrinsic nature of the Italian parliamentary system (i.e., the politi-
cal continuum between the executive branch and the majority of the Parliament) 
and on political dynamics (i.e., the above-mentioned alignment, at least tradi-
tionally, between the majority and the opposition parties on national security 
matters). On the other side, the Constitutional Court has chosen to embrace a 
self-restrained attitude, albeit it has highly significant review powers (pursuant 
to the legal framework). Therefore, two contrasting trends can be detected: the 
2007 legislative reform’s commitment to better safeguarding of transparency and 
accountability when intelligence is in action, opposed by the self-restraint of the 
Constitutional Court when called on to resolve disputes on the assertion of state 
secret privilege. 
Nonetheless, this court’s stance must be interpreted in the light of the historical-
political context of the world under ongoing terrorist threats. In this scenario, 
many sensitive interests need protection. Specifically, relations with foreign secret 
services are crucial, and perhaps the need to preserve them was part of the ratio-
nale that led the Constitutional Court to decide in favour of the PCM. However, 
it must not be forgotten that human dignity, the right to life, and the right not to 
be tortured stand on the other side. They are at the core of democracy and should 
thus prevail over national security, which should not overstep transparency and 
accountability when the above-mentioned values and rights are concerned. 
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7 Non-judicial legal 
accountability 




This chapter provides a formal description of structure and functions of the 
Chilean Office of the Comptroller-General as an institution of non-judicial legal 
accountability that mediates between the demands of legality and the need for 
expeditious and expert administration in Latin America. Since the emergence 
of the administrative state, there has been contention about the desirability of 
imposing legal, and particularly judicial, constraints on public bureaucracies. To
an important extent, the debate has politically revolved around whether com-
mentators display enthusiasm or distrust with respect to ever-expanding adminis-
trative powers. The debate is also linked with conflicting preferences for legal or 
political forms of accountability of the executive branch. 
Going beyond traditional court-centred approaches, this debate on the inter-
actions between law and administration has been recently enriched by a growing 
interest in mapping and researching a broader range of accountability bodies, 
encompassing a continuously expanding accountability landscape. Remarkably, 
this literature includes a number of non-judicial institutions of legal accountabil-
ity and administrative justice (Gellhorn 1966a;  Cane 2010 ;  Adler 2010 ;  Tush-
net 2020 ). These studies, which cover a variety of institutions of administrative 
justice, have enabled researchers to engage fruitfully in comparative institutional 
analysis of judicial and non-judicial forms of accountability in order to assess 
their influence on the administrative process ( Hertogh 2001 ;  King 2012 , ch. 
3; Doyle and O’Brien 2020 ;  Asimow et al. 2020 ). Furthermore, some recent 
studies have focused on the development of practices, measures, and processes 
of legal accountability within administrative agencies, which could be labelled as 
internal administrative law ( Mashaw 1983 ;  Parrillo 2017 ). Arguably, these insti-
tutional arrangements and practices could offer additional channels to promote 
traditional legal values, such as consistency, predictability, and reasoned argument 
in administrative decision-making ( Metzger and Stack 2017 ). Departing from 
the exclusive emphasis on external control of bureaucracies, these studies argue 
that robust democratic governments in modern societies require a mix of outside-
in and inside-out accountability arrangements ( Shapiro and Wright 2011 ). Cer-
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sources of legitimation for the growth of the modern administrative state. How-
ever, it is sometimes overlooked that this task has been complemented by a com-
bination of further internal and external institutional arrangements ( Vermeule 
2017 ). 
This debate somehow echoes Guillermo O’Donnell’s distinction between 
vertical and horizontal accountability in the Latin American context. Since the 
return to democracy in the 1990s, the Latin American debate on accountabil-
ity institutions has been largely influenced by O’Donnell’s work on horizontal 
accountability. What is important for this study is his emphasis on the relevance of 
nonjudicial institutions of accountability, which should operate alongside tradi-
tional branches of government. O’Donnell argues that horizontal accountability 
comprises traditional bodies such as courts, legislatures, and executive bodies, 
yet it also particularly extends to an array of monitoring individuals and agen-
cies, such as, ombudspersons, accounting offices, comptrollers, Conseils d’ Etat 
(Councils of State), fiscalías (prosecutors), and the like ( O’Donnell 1999 , p. 39; 
2013 , p. 45). Interestingly, O’Donnell asserts that the latter institutions might 
perform better than the traditional machinery in relation to the accountability 
needs of Latin American countries. In fact, he claims that ‘these agencies, unlike 
the older ones, were invented not so much having in mind overall balances of 
power but rather specific, but still quite general, risks of encroachment and/or 
corruption’ ( O’Donnell 2013 , p. 45). In terms of process, traditional branches 
act reactively and intermittently, whereas mandated agencies proceed in a proac-
tive and continuous manner. Additionally, the former’s interventions are costly 
and trigger highly visible conflicts, while specialised accountability bodies focus 
largely on prevention and deterrence. In terms of expertise, moreover, traditional 
branches are seen as partisan in political conflicts and appear to be a deficient 
accountability device, whereas new accountability agencies act upon professional 
criteria and possess ‘capabilities to examine complex issues of policy’ ( O’Donnell 
2013 ). In sum, O’Donnell states that benefits can be expected from the opera-
tion of agencies of horizontal accountability since they work in a more flexible, 
efficient, and expert manner. 
In O’Donnell’s view, specialised accountability agencies are not necessarily 
court substitutes. They should operate within a broad network of agencies that 
oversee executive action at different levels and with different purposes. Some 
agencies, for instance, should aim to collect and disseminate information, while 
other bodies can use that information and take action against agencies that 
have contravened legal boundaries. O’Donnell claims that effective horizontal 
accountability requires ‘a whole network of state agencies, culminating in high 
courts, committed to preserving and eventually enforcing horizontal account-
ability, if necessary against the highest powers of the state’ ( O’Donnell 2013 , 
p. 47). As a result, designers of non-judicial legal accountability frameworks need 
to pay special attention to coordination issues in order to avoid excessive overlap 
and unforeseen loopholes. 
The importance of O’Donnell’s ideas lies in his emphasis on non-traditional 
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originality. He detected the absence of discussion on such agencies in the region, 
provided a definition for them, and pointed out some contributions that they 
could make to democratic governance and the rule of law. His insights coincided 
with the broader phenomenon of new interest in legal accountability institutions 
once democracy had returned to most of the countries of the region. Yet, not 
enough attention has been paid at either the theoretical or descriptive level to the 
nonjudicial agencies of accountability ( Ackerman 2011 ). Given the explicit stress 
placed on these agencies by the influential work of O’Donnell, this may appear 
surprising. Moreover, these agencies also seem significant at the institutional 
design level. Indeed, as David Landau has stated while discussing the Colombian 
case, ‘The proliferation of an array of institutions and actors other than courts 
and designed to temper or improve democracy may be one of the most important 
recent developments in constitutional design’ ( Landau 2013 ). 
In this chapter, I argue that the Chilean comptroller-general is an illuminating 
case of non-judicial legal accountability. Mark Bovens’ narrow notion of account-
ability as a specific social relation will guide the following discussion. He defines 
accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences’ ( Bovens 
2007 ). Paraphrasing Boven’s concept of accountability, I understand non-judicial 
legal accountability as a form of accountability in which executive officers have 
an obligation to explain and justify their conduct according to broadly legal stan-
dards to a non-judicial forum that can pose questions and pass judgements. 
Drawing on the previous brief conceptual discussion, this chapter examines 
the current distinctive institutional features and the role played by the Office of 
the Comptroller-General as a non-judicial institutional agent for legal account-
ability in Chile. The Office of the Comptroller-General is a relatively opaque and 
unknown institution, even for contemporary Chilean legal and political commen-
tators. Political and legal observers often overlook bureaucratic or administrative 
institutions and processes, tending to focus on more visible institutions such as 
legislatures, presidents, or high courts. Moreover, the sui generis character of 
the comptroller-general conspires against making insightful comparisons with 
counterpart bodies elsewhere. Through a detailed formal account, the core of 
this chapter reveals a hierarchical and monocratic institution whose institutional 
features are secured by quite rigid rules; it is an organisation with a high degree 
of formal independence and a variety of accountability powers. Additionally, the 
office’s distinctive legal powers are explained in this chapter. These powers com-
prise an ex-ante, internal legality review of administrative decision-making and 
a dispute resolution power consisting of the issuance of binding legal opinions 
interpreting administrative legality. Such legal powers may illustrate the flexibility, 
informality, executive-oriented interpretation, and internal and non-adversarial 
nature that characterise non-judicial forms of legality. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section offers an overview
of the constitutional and legal sources that govern the Office of the Comptroller-
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This section describes the organisational structure of the office, emphasising its
single-headed and hierarchical structure and the dominant role of the office head,
and highlights the importance and the reputation of its main internal bureaucracy.
The second and core section points out the hybrid nature of this office as it com-
bines financial oversight and legal accountability functions. It also examines the
main features of the two central legal powers of this non-judicial institution: its dis-
tinctive and prominent ex-ante legality review power and its softer power to issue
interpretive statements on the legality of administrative actions.
7.2 Constitutional and legal framework 
7.2.1 Constitutional regulation 
The basic provisions governing the Office of the Comptroller-General are 
enshrined in the Chilean Constitution. In contrast to other non-judicial account-
ability agencies in Latin America, this is not a recent feature of Chilean constitu-
tional law. 1 Indeed, the agency was granted its constitutional status in 1943, 15 
years after it was founded in 1927. The current constitution, enacted in 1980, 
introduced a new, complete chapter governing the Office of the Comptroller-
General. These provisions regulate the main tasks of the institution, the appoint-
ment and prerogatives of the office head, and the procedure of ex-ante legality 
review of administrative action ( toma de razón procedure). 
The constitution also mentions the Office of the Comptroller-General elsewhere,
such as in the provisions regulating the impeachment procedure against the office
holder (Arts. 52[2c], 53), the review of secondary legislation enacted by the presi-
dent (called ‘decrees with force of law’, Art. 64), and the review of unauthorised
payment or expenditure decrees in cases of emergency (Art. 32 n. 20). Finally, the
constitution establishes that any further detailed regulation of the internal organ-
isation, procedures and powers of the agency requires a supermajority law (Art.
99[4]). This means that legislation regarding the agency should be approved by
a majority of four-sevenths of the elected senators and deputies, respectively (Art.
66[2]). Furthermore, to make changes to the legal framework of the office, the
Constitutional Tribunal shall conduct a mandatory ex-ante review (Art. 93 n.1). As
can be expected, it is rather cumbersome to pass new legislation in this area.
7.2.2 Organisational structure 
7.2.2.1 Hierarchical arrangements 
The office is a single-headed institution presided by the comptroller-general 
of the republic (Art. 2 Organic Law). In this sense, it is comparable to some 
1 For instance, the influential Brazilian Public Prosecution was created in 1934 as an auditing 
and oversight institution but was only granted constitutional status in 1988. See Sadek and 
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ombudspersons and comptroller-general offices elsewhere. It departs from the 
collegiate model of institutions, such as the French Conseil d’Etat. Below the 
office holder, the institution’s arrangements follow a hierarchical pattern. The sec-
ond highest authority in the office is the deputy comptroller-general, who is a 
subordinate official appointed by the comptroller-general and must replace the 
latter during his or her absence (Arts. 2, 4, 27). The law requires both authori-
ties to hold a law degree (Art. 2), and the comptroller-general particularly needs 
legal experience of at least ten years (Art. 98 Constitution). Moreover, under the 
office’s Organic Law, both authorities are entitled to the rights and the tenure 
secured for judges by the laws of the country (Art. 4). In other words, the two 
highest officers of the institution are isolated against political pressure from the 
other branches of government. 
The single-headed character of the office entails a strong reliance on the per-
sonal traits of its chief authority. This organisational feature is usually associ-
ated with the need for institutional energy and increased levels of activity. 2 
This assumedly ‘active virtue’ of the institution, shared by the tribune model 
of ombudspersons, seems to suggest a more vigorous approach to the office’s 
supervisory functions. However, it may also invite administrative lethargy and, 
even worse, personalism or a personality cult (Gellhorn 1966b, pp. 48–50). 
Various specialised departments have been established under the comptroller-
general and his or her deputy. These units are subordinate to the comptroller-
general, as the law defines them as dependent on the latter (Art. 2.6), and their 
holders and all employees of the office remain in their posts as long as they have 
the exclusive confidence of the comptroller-general (Art. 3.2). In other words, the 
office head has the power to appoint, promote, or remove any officer within the 
institution, with independence from any external authority. This feature imprints 
in the organisation its characteristic hierarchical nature. Although some depart-
ments are mentioned in the Organic Law, the comptroller-general has the broad 
discretion to create new units, rearrange the existing ones, and define their tasks 
and operative conditions (Arts. 2.2, 2.7 and 5.4). 
Additionally, the operation of the office is geographically decentralised 
through local offices in every region of the country. Currently, 17 regional 
offices exist. These have no autonomy and must strictly follow the precedents 
set at the central level. If any novel question of law arises, they should refer it 
to the relevant department at the central level. Regional comptrollers are not 
required to have legal training. Thus, although most of them currently hold law 
degrees, some have other professional backgrounds, such as public management 
or accountancy. 3 
A two-tier Court of Accounts is also embedded in the office. The dep-
uty comptroller-general heads the Court of Accounts of First Instance and 
hears indictments against public functionaries who have misused public funds 
2 The classical locus is Federalist 70. See Hamilton et al. (2009 ). 
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(Art. 107). A department head or a regional office head acts as the prosecutor (Art.
107 bis). The affected party can appeal first-instance decisions to the Court of 
Accounts of Second Instance, composed of the comptroller-general and two 
external ad hoc judges.4 Despite being within the Office of the Comptroller-
General, this two-tier tribunal is viewed by commentators as pertaining to the 
judiciary and subordinate to the Supreme Court ( Silva Bascuñán 1997 , p. 215). 
The main reason for this is characteristically formalist, as it is argued that the 
institution performs a typically adjudicatory function. 
The number of employees in the institution reached 2,103 in 2018 (1,992 in 
2016), with 68.2% holding a professional degree. Although the institution pos-
sesses a characteristic multidisciplinary nature, lawyers constitute almost a quarter 
of the office’s professional staff. In 2014, the office had 1,375 professional staff, 
of which 23% were lawyers (321 officers). Public managers constituted the sec-
ond largest group at 17.5%, while business managers followed in third place with 
7.7% (Comptroller General Annual Report 2015). Other professions represented 
in the office include architects, civil engineers, and accountants. The distribu-
tion of these professions varies according to the different departments and sub-
departments in the institution. 
7.2.2.2 The office head 
Both the executive and the legislative branches of the government participate in 
the appointment of the comptroller-general as the office head. According to Arti-
cle 99 of the constitution, the President of the Republic appoints the office head, 
with agreement from the Senate if supported by three-fifths of its active mem-
bers. A constitutional amendment in 2005 increased the quorum for this deci-
sion, which used to require only a simple majority. The current provision forces 
the president to seek inter-party and inter-branch agreement before appointing 
the comptroller-general. It has recently been the case that the office is presided 
by a candidate favoured by the opposition parties. 
Until recently, it was suggested that a political convention stipulated that the 
appointment of the comptroller-general should be based on seniority ( Silva Bas-
cuñán 1997 , p. 196). Between 1952 and 1997, comptrollers-general were largely 
appointed according to this convention. In fact, with the exception of Sergio 
Fernández’s appointment for three months in 1978 during the Pinochet dicta-
torship, all office holders during this period were serving as deputy comptrollers-
general when appointed as office heads.5 The rule was broken in 2002, when 
the president decided not to appoint a deputy comptroller-general but the head 
of the Legality Review Department, Gustavo Sciolla. Thus, even in this case, a 
senior officer was promoted to the highest post in the office. Nonetheless, the 
4 The ad hoc judges are recommended by the comptroller-general and appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic for a four-year term (Art. 118). 
5 They include five comptrollers-general: Enrique Bahamonde (1952), Enrique Silva Cimma 
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convention has been totally discarded for the last two appointments, as outsiders 
have been selected to lead the institution. 
The 2005 Constitutional Reform also reduced the office holder’s tenure to 
a non-renewable eight-year period. Before the amendment, the comptroller-
general served until he or she reached 75 years of age. However, the current time 
frame is in line with the historical record, which shows that office holders have 
generally remained in the post for approximately eight years each. The eight-
year period is also apparently designed to detach the comptroller-general’s tenure 
from the presidential period, which spans four years without the right to run for 
re-election. 
According to the constitution, the comptroller-general is required to have held 
a law degree for at least ten years. Since the establishment of the office, most of 
the office holders have been lawyers and more specifically, administrative law 
experts. Indeed, several have pursued careers as scholars as well as attorneys. 
Although some have attempted to pursue political careers after their service in 
the office, comptrollers-general have been viewed generally as apolitical, bureau-
cratic authorities. The constitution also states that to be appointed as the office 
head, the candidate should be over 40 years old and hold the right to vote. 
The constitution stipulates strict removal rules. The office holder can be 
removed only by impeachment, commenced in the Chamber of Deputies for 
notorious dereliction of duties (Art. 52.2.c) and decided by the majority of the 
active members of the Senate (Art. 53.1). These provisions that regulate pro-
ceedings and charges are the same ones that apply to the members of the superior 
courts of justice, including Supreme Court justices. At the inception of the office, 
the president had the power to remove the comptroller-general as the latter was 
regarded as a dependent officer. However, the protections favouring this officer 
were strengthened in 1943 when the institution was granted constitutional sta-
tus. Impeachment proceedings against a comptroller-general have taken place 
only once, resulting in Agustín Vigorena’s removal in 1945 (Faúndez 2007a, ch. 
5; De la Cruz 2019 , pp. 40–43). 6 This exceptional case suggests that these provi-
sions have secured strong protection against attacks from the political branches 
of the government. 
Therefore, the comptroller-general enjoys a high degree of independence 
from the president and the congress. The constitution also provides functional 
mechanisms to resolve disputes between the comptroller-general’s office and the 
judiciary. According to current rules, it is for the Senate to resolve jurisdictional 
disputes between the office and the higher court of justice (Art. 53.3), while 
disputes between the office and the lower courts have to be adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 93 n. 12). In the few cases that have arisen thus 
far, the position of the comptroller-general has always been upheld by either the 
Senate or the Constitutional Tribunal ( Ferrada 2018 , p. 329). 
6 Impeachment proceedings against judges have been exceptional as well. There have been 
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Current constitutional and legal provisions do not secure budget indepen-
dence for the office. This means that the executive and the legislature have to 
set the budget allocated to the office every year. However, between 1959 and 
1977, the comptroller-general enjoyed a budget protected by law. These rules 
ensured the office a budget of 0.42% of the Annual National Expenditures Bud-
get. These protections were eliminated by the Pinochet government amid neolib-
eral reforms, reducing the size of the state and following a series of clashes with 
the office. 
7.3 Mandate and powers 
7.3.1 Multitasking 
Generally, the comptroller-general’s offices operate in a number of jurisdictions, 
performing auditing tasks ( Daintith and Page 1999 , pp. 194–195;  Prosser 2014 , 
pp. 51–57). They are usually members of the commonwealth model of finan-
cial oversight institutions, as opposed to the court model ( Santiso 2009 ). Their 
main aim is to ensure financial regularity in governmental activities. Operating 
within political accountability networks, these institutions also channel informa-
tion to the legislature in order to facilitate political scrutiny of executive actions. 
However, as will be seen, the Chilean Office of the Comptroller-General departs 
from this model, since it is entrusted with the additional mission of ensuring the 
administrative agencies’ compliance with legal standards (a similar case is found 
in Israel’s State Comptroller ; Navot 2014 , pp. 175–180). In other words, in 
contrast to its counterparts elsewhere, the Chilean agency is not only a supreme 
audit institution but also a legal accountability body. 
7.3.2 Ex-ante legality review 
7.3.2.1 Basic provisions 
The legality review ( toma de razón) is the most characteristic power of the Chil-
ean comptroller-general. This is the only power of the office that is regulated in 
some detail in the constitution. It is a process of scrutinising executive rules or 
decisions based on abstract legality before their promulgation. Here, abstract 
means that the scrutiny does not depend on concrete litigation or controversy 
involving the administrative action at stake (I adapt the terminology of  Stone 
Sweet 1992 , p. 226). It is currently enshrined in Article 99 of the constitution, 
which provides that in exercising its function of legal control, the Office of the 
Comptroller-General will check on decrees and administrative resolutions in the 
cases provided by legislation. 
In brief, the formal mechanics of this checking procedure are as follows. Once 
an administrative department has adopted a written decision, the relevant author-
ity should submit it to the Office of the Comptroller-General for legal review. 
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should review and approve (or reject) the proposed executive action. If the 
comptroller-general considers it compliant with the law, he or she will uphold 
the decree or the resolution and return the accompanying file to the relevant 
agency, enabling it to officially promulgate the rule or the decision. However, if 
the comptroller-general concludes that the rule is unlawful, he or she will turn 
it down, and the administrative agency will be unable to promulgate the deci-
sion under review. In the latter scenario, the administrative procedure will simply 
conclude at that point. 
However, under Article 99 of the constitution, the president is allowed to 
state his or her disagreement with the comptroller-general’s judgement and insist 
on the approval of the decree or the resolution. 7 In this case, the procedure will 
continue, but the final outcome will depend on further considerations. At this 
point, two situations have to be distinguished. If the decree or the resolution was 
originally rejected on legality grounds (that is, violation of statutes), the executive 
will prevail with finality. In this case, the comptroller-general ought to uphold 
the decision, but the office must refer the entire file to the Chamber of Depu-
ties, which in turn can scrutinise the action on policy grounds. However, if the 
measure was rejected on constitutionality grounds, the president is not allowed 
to insist on its approval, and only the Constitutional Tribunal can make the final 
decision. In this latter case, the president can react to the comptroller-general’s 
adverse determination by referring the dispute to the Constitutional Tribunal, 
which will have the last word on the matter. 
7.3.2.2 Types of administrative actions under review 
The constitutional provisions that govern this procedure indicate the kinds 
of administrative actions that the comptroller-general must review. The most 
important group includes ‘decrees and resolutions that, according to the law, 
shall be handled by the Comptroller-General’ (Article 99). These are different 
forms of secondary or subordinated legislation. The distinction between decrees 
and resolutions refers to decisions adopted by the President of the Republic or on 
his or her behalf (decrees) and decisions adopted by executive agencies (resolu-
tions), respectively. Decisions of both individual and general effects are included 
in the review procedure. A typical example of a decision that has to be submitted 
for this review is a regulation ( reglamento) that implements the provisions of a 
statute. 
However, a number of exceptions exist ( Silva Cimma 1996 , pp. 194ff.;  Cordero 
2007 ). In fact, the constitution does not itself establish which decrees and reso-
lutions should be reviewed by the comptroller-general. The constitution merely 
states that the Organic Law governing the institution regulates this matter. As 
a result, the specific definition of the rules to be submitted to the comptroller-
general for examination is determined by legislation. The office’s Organic Law 
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defines the first important filter. Article 10.5 declares that the comptroller-general 
may exempt from review any decree and resolution that he or she perceives as 
‘not essential’. In practice, for efficiency reasons, since the 1960s the comptroller-
general has exercised this power for the purpose of exempting the majority of 
administrative decisions from review, excluding those related to topics explicitly 
singled out by the office. This entails that only the most important decisions 
adopted by administrative agencies have to undergo the comptroller-general’s 
legal scrutiny. Nonetheless, it has been estimated that over 50% of administrative 
regulations and orders are not exempted from this checking mechanism (Garcés 
and Rajevic 2009, p. 618). 
The second group of exemptions regarding specific administrative agencies 
derives from statutes that exclude the comptroller-general’s review ( Carmona 
2005 , p. 1). A case in point is the significant exclusion of municipalities from 
this review mechanism (Art. 53 Organic Law of Municipalities). It is not easy 
for the executive to pass legislation ousting this legality check. In fact, accord-
ing to the Constitutional Tribunal, a statute excluding a decree or a resolution 
from the comptroller-general’s review should be approved by a four-sevenths 
supermajority. 8 
The third group does not consist of actual exclusions but of exceptions to 
the preventive character of the comptroller-general’s check. In fact, the con-
gress (again by a supermajority vote) may postpone a legality review, enabling 
the administrative authority to enact (with immediate effect) an administrative 
order in case of an emergency. This is the case with the so-called urgency decrees, 
whose promulgation does not prevent the comptroller-general’s check but only 
entails delayed scrutiny, as the review will take place after the administrative deci-
sion at stake is entered into force ( Silva Cimma 1996 , pp. 230–233). 
The discussion so far has concerned administrative actions, that is, individual 
orders or general regulations whose effects are subordinated to statutory law. 
However, the comptroller-general can also examine presidential regulations that 
have the ‘force of statutory law’; that is, those that can exceptionally regulate 
matters falling within the legislature’s domain.9 The particularity of these so-
called decrees with force of law is that they have the same legal force as that of 
regulations passed by the congress ( Bermúdez 2011 , pp. 47–48). They can actu-
ally repeal or modify congressional legislation. 10 The power to enact this sort of 
legislation is entrenched in Article 32 n. 3 and Article 64 of the constitution. 11
 8 See Constitutional Tribunal Decision (1987) Rol 45; Constitutional Tribunal Decision 
(1988) Rol 63; Constitutional Tribunal Decision (2003) Rol 384. 
9 For an examination of this kind of power, see  Carey and Shugart 1998 , p. 9. They define 
decree as ‘the authority of the executive to establish law in lieu of action by the assembly’. 
10 These powers to make ‘decrees with force of law’ are comparable to the Henry VIII pow-
ers in Britain, but in Chile there is no parliamentary scrutiny regarding the exercise of these 
powers. Even closer to Chilean arrangements are the French  ordonnances. See Elliott et al. 
2006 , pp. 72–73;  Brown and Bell 1998 , pp. 12–13. 
11 The current constitution explicitly authorises the congress to delegate to the president the 
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Although there is no congressional scrutiny of the decrees enacted under these 
delegated powers, under Article 99 of the constitution, the comptroller-general 
must examine these decrees, rejecting them if they exceed or contravene the leg-
islative delegation or infringe the constitution ( Silva Bascuñán 2000 , pp. 84–85). 
There is no presidential power of insistence if the comptroller-general turns down 
a decree with force of law. If the president disagrees with the adverse determina-
tion, he or she has to refer the dispute to the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 93 
n. 4). However, if the decree was unlawfully upheld by the comptroller-general, 
members of the congress could also bring the case to the Constitutional Tribunal 
for determination. 
In short, the comptroller-general’s legality review concentrates on major 
pieces of secondary legislation. Executive decrees regulating matters of legisla-
tive domain are also included in the jurisdiction of the office. In this sense, this 
non-judicial scrutiny process is the primary mechanism for ensuring the legality 
of government rules. 12 However, it also includes other administrative decisions 
such as appointments, urban plans, environmental permits, disciplinary sanctions, 
and even constitutional declarations of emergency. 
7.3.2.3 Participants 
The paradigmatic institutional actors that participate in the procedure are admin-
istrative agencies, which seek to enact the rules or the decisions under review. 
These administrative authorities include the President of the Republic and all 
the bodies in the central administration. However, a number of other authori-
ties do not fall within the purview of this legality review procedure. Indeed, 
some regulatory agencies, the Central Bank, and the municipalities are excluded. 
Nonetheless, it is still the case that most of the components of the Chilean public 
administration fall under the comptroller-general’s oversight via this non-judicial 
legal accountability mechanism. 
An interesting aspect of the legality review procedure is whether affected par-
ties can challenge or support administrative decisions in this forum. In other 
words, the issue here is whether non-governmental organisations have a voice. 
Neither the constitution nor the Comptroller’s Organic Law explicitly regulates 
the issue of private party access. Nonetheless, a long-standing practice recog-
nises the possibility of the affected parties’ intervention. As early as the 1960s, a 
leading commentator explained, ‘There is no procedure for this remedy, but in 
practice it is accepted, and on occasions the Comptroller-General has adopted 
time, the constitution was silent regarding this legislative practice. As a result, it was unclear 
if the comptroller-general had jurisdiction over reviewing this type of regulation. For that 
reason, when the congress delegated regulatory powers, it often explicitly stipulated that the 
comptroller-general was endowed with the power to check whether the secondary legislation 
was consistent with the enabling statute ( Daniel 1960 , pp. 36ff.). 
12 There are remarkable parallels with the scrutiny by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instru-
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decisions rejecting administrative decisions on grounds raised precisely by inter-
ested parties’ ( Daniel 1960 , pp. 43–44). The commentator pointed out that 
regarding regulations of general interest (i.e., administrative rules), it was very 
difficult when directly affected parties only learned through the media that a 
procedure of this kind was being conducted. 
Currently, both officers and litigants report that affected parties’ participa-
tion is just a matter of informal contacts among the regulators, the regulated, 
comptroller officers, and third parties. However, in legal terms, the right to 
make petitions in the legality review process is remarkably weak ( Cordero 2010 , 
p. 183). For instance, the comptroller-general has decided that the lodging of 
ex parte briefs does not interrupt the process and that neither the Office of the 
Comptroller-General nor the regulators have to address the concerns raised by 
affected third parties (Ruling 27,272, 2008). Thus, private parties can be heard, 
but there will not necessarily be an adversarial process. This discouraging attitude 
towards private party participation is explained by the fear of excessive judicialisa-
tion of this legality review process ( Vergara 2012 , pp. 106–107). 
7.3.2.4 Standard of review 
The decrees or the regulations examined by the comptroller-general through this 
procedure are judged under legal and constitutional standards. This implies that 
administrative decisions are assessed in the light of statutory and constitutional 
provisions (Constitution, Art. 99). Underpinning the nature of the comptroller-
general as an independent legal check, not an advisory body, it is not allowed to 
review the merits of the decision under examination (Organic Law, Art. 21B ; 
Bordalí and Ferrada 2008 , pp. 34–35). However, there is a long-standing view 
that the check by the comptroller-general must go beyond mere legality. For 
instance, an influential scholar has argued that in this procedure, the administra-
tion is required to demonstrate not only the legality of the measures but that the 
outcome is the right solution to address the social problem at stake ( Soto-Kloss 
2012 , p. 203). Thus, in this viewpoint, the scrutiny should encompass both legal-
ity and merit. More recently, some scholars have argued that the examination 
under the legality review procedure should embrace broader notions of good 
administration, not only formal legality ( Vergara 2012 , p. 106). 
The comptroller-general lacks investigatory powers during the legality review 
procedure. However, he or she can request officers of any administrative depart-
ment to provide information related to the service (Organic Law, Article 9). 
Additionally, it is a well-established practice that the office can require supporting 
factual evidence before deciding on the legality of an administrative decision (see, 
e.g., cases mentioned in Millar 2000 ). 
7.3.2.5 The insistence mechanism—the presidential override 
The influence of the Office of the Comptroller-General on public administra-
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agencies. However, its main source of power resides in the fact that it can
paralyse administrative action, including presidential regulations. This may be
surprising because this checking body does not have the last word on the
legality of administrative acts. As mentioned, if the comptroller-general rejects
an executive decision on legality grounds, the president can, under certain
conditions, insist on overriding the former’s determination. This mechanism is
often called ‘presidential insistence’. If the rejection is based on constitutional
grounds, the president can request the Constitutional Tribunal to adjudicate
the dispute.
Currently, presidential insistence is regulated at both the constitutional and 
the legal levels (Constitution, Article 99; Organic Law, Article 10). It has been 
argued that this procedure expresses a non-legalistic conception of political dis-
agreements ( Atria 2012 ). 13 While a legalist conception conceives a disagree-
ment as a technical controversy to be solved in a technical forum, a political or 
reflexive conception claims that political controversies must be decided (in the 
last instance) by political bodies, such as presidents or parliaments ( Atria 2012 , 
p. 331). In this viewpoint, the importance of the presidential override is that 
despite being politically costly for the president to take his or her preferred course 
of action, it does not prevent him or her from having the last word ( Atria 2012 , 
p. 333) Therefore, if the president insists, he or she will escalate the conflict, 
transforming it from a technical legal controversy to a political disagreement in 
which public opinion and other political actors might be engaged. However, this 
new dimension of the conflict will be informed and enriched by the perspective of 
the comptroller-general and other technical instances that may have been heard 
in the meantime. 
In concrete terms, in politically controversial times, the president has inten-
sively exercised his or her powers to prevail over the comptroller-general’s oppo-
sition by insisting on his or her previous determinations. One such period was 
during Salvador Allende’s socialist government in the 1970s (Faúndez 2007a, 
ch. 9, 2007b). However, this complex institutional device has not been used over 
the last few decades. Indeed, the last time a decree of insistence was enacted by 
the executive was in 1990, just after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, when the 
President of the Republic intended to remove the head of a public university. 
An explanation for the president’s unwillingness to exercise his override power 
may lie in the relative consensual politics that have been commonplace in Chile 
since Pinochet’s dictatorship. In contrast to the situation in previous decades, 
the political elites’ disagreement concerning the boundaries of legality has not 
reached critical levels (see  Figure 7.1 ). An alternative explanation may simply be 
that it is rare for the comptroller-general to reject administrative decisions ( Gar-
cés and Rajevic 2009 ).
13 This view seems to be inspired by discussions about legislative overrides in commonwealth 



























































































































































































































































Figure 7.1 Insistence decrees, 1933–2019 
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7.3.3 The power of dispute resolution 
7.3.3.1 Basic provisions 
The dispute-resolution function of the Office of the Comptroller-General is 
based on its power to provide legal opinions interpreting administrative legality. 
The office’s interpretive power ( potestad dictaminante) may be defined as the 
non-judicial power to issue binding legal opinions in case of any doubt or uncer-
tainty about the proper interpretation of the statutes that regulate public services. 
In contrast to the ex-ante power of the legality review ( toma de razón), no consti-
tutional provisions regulate this interpretive power. Nevertheless, although with 
a different language, it has been regulated in the comptroller-general’s Organic 
Law since the inception of the institution. However, the contemporary features 
of this power only crystallised in the 1950s. 
This power is currently primarily contained in Article 6 of the comptroller-
general’s Organic Law in the following terms: 
It is only for the Comptroller-General to report about salaries, rewards, allo-
cations, evictions, pensions, retirements . . . and in general about the mat-
ters related to the statute of public employees, and about the functioning of 
public services under its oversight, in order to ensure the proper application 
of the statutes and the regulations that govern them. 
Equally, it is for the Comptroller-General to inform about any other
issue related to or that may relate to the expenditure or commitments of
public funds, as long as doubts arise over the proper application of the
respective statutes.
The Comptroller-General shall neither intervene nor report on issues that 
either by their nature are of litigious character or that fall under the domain 
of the courts of justice, or that fall under the remit of the State Defence 
Council, notwithstanding the powers that, regarding judicial matters, this 
law grants to the Comptroller. 
According to the foregoing, only the decisions and reports of the
Comptroller-General of the republic could be invoked as administrative
jurisprudence in the matters referred to in Article 1.
This somewhat confusing provision has been interpreted in the following manner. 
On one hand, it ensures the comptroller-general’s interpretive domain in matters 
relating to public administration. It conceives the institution as the primary non-
judicial interpreter of administrative legality. Moreover, its determinations are 
binding on administrative offcers and institutions: they constitute ‘administrative 
jurisprudence’. On the other hand, the interpretive powers of the offce must not 
invade the judicial domain. Although it offers no guidance for drawing boundar-
ies, the provision assumes the separation between administrative issues and judi-
cial disputes. Certainly, there are historical reasons for interpreting the provision 
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acted as a court substitute due to the restricted regime of judicial review in the 
country, and the ambiguity of this legal provision has allowed political actors to 
justify the offce’s adjudicatory functions. 
7.3.3.2 Aims and functions 
In principle, this power operates regardless of any concrete administrative deci-
sion. Originally, it was not designed as a power to challenge administrative action 
directly but as a power to provide authoritative interpretations of the statutes 
governing the use of administrative power. However, over the years, the function 
has become more complex. Currently, through its statements, the Office of the 
Comptroller-General can render interpretive opinions about the rules that regu-
late the civil service, solve conflicts of jurisdiction among public bodies, coor-
dinate internal control procedures of administrative agencies, and, importantly, 
adjudicate disputes between public bodies and private parties ( Letelier 2015; De 
la Cruz 2019 ). Beyond academic disagreement about boundaries, the Office of 
the Comptroller-General currently operates as a site for the protection of rights 
against administrative action on a daily basis ( Valdivia 2017 , p. 351). 
According to the literature, this power is aimed to ensure that public law is 
properly and uniformly interpreted and applied across administrative agencies 
( Cordero 2010 , p. 171). In exercising this power, the Office of the Comptroller-
General operates as a centralised interpretive non-judicial forum. Consequently, 
this institution may reduce with a general effect the ambiguity of legislation, 
avoid further litigation, and make administrative action more predictable ( Lete-
lier 2015 ;  Cordero 2010 , pp. 180ff.). In addition to its interpretive role, the 
institution has also performed more ambitious, creative tasks. For instance, some 
commentators have explained that the Office of the Comptroller-General has 
acted as a ‘positive legislator’, filling the gaps left by a legislature that has been 
unable to provide enough basic general regulation for public administration 
( Cordero 2010 , pp. 180ff.). 
An illustration of this creative power is the role of the Office of the Comptroller-
General in administrative procedures ( Jara 2013 ;  González 2012 ;  Pierry 2002 , 
p. 389). Indeed, through its interpretive function, the office filled numerous gaps 
of the Chilean regime of administrative procedures before the promulgation of a 
general piece of legislation in 2003. According to some commentators, the insti-
tution has played a ‘generalising role’ ( Jara 2013 , p. 64). By adjudicating com-
plaints from individuals or responding to agencies’ requests for clarification of 
questions of law, the Office of the Comptroller-General has constructed a com-
plete regime of administrative procedures in the absence of statutory legislation. 
Drawing on the constitutional right of petition, it developed the right to obtain 
a response from administrative agencies. According to the office, the administra-
tive bodies have the duty to provide proper responses to petitions filed by citizens 
( Jara 2013 , p. 77). Furthermore, an administrative response should meet certain 
requirements, such as being written, timely, and conclusive. A written copy of the 
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developed by this body have been publicity, the means of internal reviews, and 
due process in disciplinary proceedings and in public procurement ( Jara 2013 , 
p. 70). More recently, when the legislature has intervened by providing statu-
tory legislation, it has taken inspiration from the rules and the principles already 
elaborated by the office. Even after the enactment of the Chilean Administrative 
Procedure Act 2003, the comptroller-general has continued to play a leading role 
in the clarification of the alleged obscurities in the law. The comptroller-general 
has issued interpretive statements regarding several matters, such as the scope of 
the law, the content of the principles of procedure, the means of invalidation by 
the administration itself, internal complaints procedures, administrative inaction, 
and so forth ( Jara 2013 ). Further areas of involvement are local government, 
government information and advertising, urban planning, probity and conflict of 
interests, state enterprises, and public procurement, among many others. 
This feature echoes the function performed by the Conseil d’Etat in France. For
instance, Bell explains that ‘the role of the  Conseil d’Etat has very much been to
supplement the rules laid down by the legislator’ since ‘[its function] is both to cre-
ate and enforce standards’ ( Bell 2001 , p. 156). Similarly, Hamson indicates that the
French institution has created a body of precedents ‘to secure a proper and decent
standard of behaviour in the French administration’ ( Hamson 1954 , pp. 126–127;
Edley 1992 , p. 242). As Edley states it, the Conseil d’Etat has developed ‘extrastat-
utory doctrines of quasi-constitutional administrative law’ ( Edley 1992 , p. 242).
In contrast to the Chilean judiciary, the Office of the Comptroller-General has 
a strong doctrine of precedents ( Marín 2012 ;  Astorquiza 2012 ). Based on a nar-
row reading of the Chilean Civil Code, the courts usually maintain that their rul-
ings apply only to the case under consideration. Thus, judicial decisions have no 
general application, and courts do not abundantly cite them in their reasoning. 
This implies that it is not difficult to find contradictory decisions within the same 
court. In contrast, the Office of the Comptroller-General usually makes constant 
and profuse references to its previous decisions on the same issue. It also explicitly 
declares when a criterion has changed. This practice is based on a reading of the 
office’s Organic Law, as Article 6 states that only its decisions could be invoked as 
binding administrative precedents. For the purpose of keeping its precedents up 
to date, it administers an enormous database containing its previous decisions on 
a range of topics.14 As a result, practitioners usually consult the office’s database 
to anticipate the actions of the comptroller-general and administrative agencies. 
7.3.3.3 Access 
As for access, Article 5[3] of the Organic Law provides a general clause that allows 
intervention by public and private parties. It stipulates that the Office of the 
14 The origin of the use of precedents in the office is essentially bureaucratic rather than judi-
cial. Former Comptroller-General Enrique Silva Cimma reports that as a result of internal 
bureaucratic needs, a crucial device for the institution’s doctrine of precedents was created in 
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Comptroller-General will issue ‘interpretive statements’ ( dictámenes) upon the 
request of affected parties, heads of public services, or any other authorities. A 
well-established interpretation of this regulation is that both public agencies and 
private parties can ask the Office of the Comptroller-General to issue statements 
that provide authoritative interpretations of administrative legality. Moreover, the 
office usually issues statements about the legality of administrative decisions if it 
detects an illegality. In these cases, it intervenes on its own initiative. 
This interpretive power has become increasingly important over the last few 
decades because it further allows private avenues to challenge administrative 
decisions. Thus, while an ex ante legality review is conducted mainly through a 
procedure with limited private party participation, the exercise of this interpre-
tive power enables private individuals to voice their grievances and complaints 
against the administration ( Bermúdez 2011 , pp. 403ff.). For instance, between 
2007 and 2014, over 70% of the cases involving interpretive power were initiated 
by petitions from private parties or public employees (see Comptroller-General 
Annual Reports). 
Private access to the comptroller-general’s remedies through this procedure is 
not only a matter of fact but also a matter of law. Since 1974, the comptroller-
general has accepted the jurisdiction to intervene if the request is based on a previ-
ous refusal or a delayed response by an administrative agency (see rulings 24,841, 
1974 and 61,598, 2011). In other words, the affected party first has to seek relief 
from the primary decision maker and only subsequently from the comptroller-
general. Of course, this criterion echoes the rule of the ‘prior decision’ in French 
administrative law (Brown and Bell 1998, pp. 165–166). However, today’s access 
is even greater. In March 2015, the Office of the Comptroller-General issued a 
new statement that would determine the rules governing the request for an inter-
pretive opinion (ruling 24,143, 2015). According to this scheme, government 
bodies can request the office’s legal opinions only in matters that fall under their 
jurisdiction or that have a direct impact on their powers. Moreover, they must 
previously submit a legal report drafted by their internal advisors and clearly and 
precisely state their request. As for private parties and administrative officers, 
in their personal capacity, they can only request for legal opinions on affairs in 
which they have rights or specific interests, either individual or collective, at stake. 
Although this represents a narrow view of locus standi, it eliminates the need 
for a previous complaint against the administration in order to lodge a request 
with the comptroller-general. Moreover, the new regulation gives the institution 
the discretion to issue a legal opinion—when the nature and the circumstances 
of the case call for it—despite the complainant’s failure to meet the previously 
mentioned conditions. Hence, this last provision opens the possibility for public 
interest standing before the office. 
7.3.3.4 Legal authority and limits 
Compliance with the comptroller-general’s rulings is mandatory for administra-
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of the Organic Law states that the comptroller-general’s ‘interpretive opinions 
are binding to the respective officers, in the case or cases they refer on’. Article 
19 also states that lawyers and in-house counsel in every department of the public 
administration or in institutions under the oversight of the comptroller-general, 
who do not represent the government in courts, will be subjected to the technical 
supervision of the office, whose jurisprudence and resolutions must be observed. 
Disregard for the legal interpretation issued by the office may result in disciplin-
ary or even criminal proceedings ( Cordero 2010 , p. 170;  Aldunate 2005 ). In 
other words, the rulings cannot be enforced directly but through disciplinary 
proceedings ( Marín 2012 , p. 153). 
In practical terms, the comptroller-general’s statements consist of clarifica-
tions of legal provisions. According to the office’s doctrine, these rulings merely 
declare what is already implicit in the law. As they are mere interpretations, they 
do not change the law ( Cordero 2013 , pp. 264–265). As a result, it has been 
argued that these interpretations have retroactive effect. In other words, they 
merely declare the proper interpretation of the statute’s meaning and intent since 
its enactment ( Pallavicini 2010 , p. 127;  Aróstica 1989 , p. 541). Nevertheless, 
the office can quite flexibly reconsider its own interpretive opinions. 15 Thus, in 
contrast to the judiciary, the principle of res judicata does not apply to the inter-
pretations issued by the office. As a commentator expressed it in 1963, the office 
has the duty to actively seek the right interpretation of the law and address recon-
sideration petitions filed by affected parties because ‘it is not possible to persist in 
error if subsequently one becomes fully aware of it’ (ruling 62,927, 1963, cited 
by Marín 2012 , p. 153). To avoid harming legitimate expectations, the office has 
recently developed a doctrine according to which its reconsiderations only apply 
prospectively. 
The Organic Law states an important limit to the otherwise extensive powers 
of the comptroller-general. Article 6.3 states that the office shall neither inter-
vene nor report on issues that by their nature are either litigious or subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. The provision adds that these issues fall 
under the remit of the Council of Defence of the State, the agency in charge of 
the legal representation of the treasury before the courts. According to the tradi-
tional interpretation, this provision sets the boundaries within which the Office 
of the Comptroller-General can act. Beyond that, it would interfere in the judicial 
arena ( Silva Cimma 1995 , p. 172). 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the structure, functions, and powers of 
the Chilean Office of the Comptroller-General as a non-judicial mechanism for 
legal accountability. This brief outline helps broaden the understanding of the 
15 However, Soto-Kloss has adopted the extreme position that the Office of the Comptroller-
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institutional forms of holding administrative power to account beyond the tradi-
tional court system, drawing on previous work about non-judicial legal account-
ability in Latin America and elsewhere. 
This Chilean institution of non-judicial legal accountability exhibits the follow-
ing three main features. First, the institution is governed by rigid legal arrange-
ments, which are difficult to modify without a high degree of political and 
inter-institutional consensus. This has also entailed the survival of old-fashioned 
legal structures with little room for adjustment to new circumstances. Second, 
the institution enjoys a high degree of independence from the other branches of 
government. Although a component of the executive branch, it is conceived as 
autonomous from the President of the Republic. This independence is reflected 
in the appointment, tenure, and everyday operation of the institution. The Office 
of the Comptroller-General is equally independent of the judiciary and the con-
gress. Its constitutional status has prompted some commentators to regard it as 
the fourth branch of government in the Chilean political system. Internally, the 
office displays a hierarchical structure, concentrating power in the office head. 
However, a large bureaucracy works within the institution that for historical and 
functional reasons has enjoyed a good reputation. 
Third, the Office of the Comptroller-General can be described as a multitask-
ing institution. It performs expert financial and legal accountability functions, 
and its role as a financial oversight body is a feature shared with comparable 
organisations elsewhere. What is distinctive about the Office of the Comptroller-
General is its non-judicial legal accountability role. It intervenes in reviewing 
major government rules and administrative decisions before their promulgation, 
wielding a remarkable veto power. To avoid the risk of administrative deadlock, 
under certain conditions, the executive branch can override adverse determina-
tions of the comptroller-general. The institution also performs adjudicatory func-
tions, acting as an arbiter in disputes among public bodies or between them and 
private parties. This dimension of the office has been developed by interpreting 
its ambiguous organic legislation, with the view of broadening access to the lim-
ited forms of administrative justice existing in Chile. 
In brief, the Office of the Comptroller-General has developed as a hybrid insti-
tution that has adapted to demands for legality in the context of dysfunctional 
administrative justice arrangements. Despite its non-judicial nature, the body has 
operated to promote distinctive legal accountability values such as consistency, 
rule interpretation, impartiality, publicity, and aggrieved parties’ access to redress. 
Its unplanned growth has given the office some distinctive organisational and 
functional features that have made it a non-judicial institutional entity worthy of 
closer inspection. 
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 8 Presidents’ (mis)use of public 
accountability 




There has been a steady rise in the number of countries with directly elected 
presidents in recent decades and, similarly, an increasing research focus on the 
concentration of power around single executive leaders ( Passarelli 2015 ,  2018 ; 
Poguntke and Webb 2005 ). Semi-presidentialism, where a directly elected presi-
dent shares executive power with a prime minister, is currently the constitutional 
model in about 20 European countries. 1 The dual executive structure of semi-
presidentialism poses some specific challenges of accountability, as the voters 
elect a president who appoints a prime minister who in turn relies on the con-
fidence of the parliament in order to survive. Thus defined, the prime minister 
in a semi-presidential system serves as an agent of two directly elected principals 
(the parliament and the president) creating a built-in potential for institutional 
conflict. Moreover, and in contrast to a presidential system where the president’s 
responsibility for government policy is more direct and transparent, a dual execu-
tive structure allows the president to either claim credit for successful policies 
or escape policy responsibility by publicly criticising the cabinet, depending on 
how it may serve his or her future electoral prospects. Thus, in terms of account-
ability to the electorate—that is, to what extent the voters can discern whether 
the executives are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately—the 
dual executive structure is more ambiguous than parliamentary and presidential 
systems. 
Hence, comparative political research on semi-presidentialism has paid consid-
erable attention to regime stability and how presidential power and a divided gov-
ernment affect democratic performance (e.g.,  Cavatorta and Elgie 2010 ;  Cheibub 
et al. 2014 ;  Elgie 2011 ;  2016 ; Sedelius and Linde 2018). A number of studies 
have focused on intra-executive conflicts between the president and the prime 
minister ( Elgie 2018b ;  Protsyk 2006 ;  Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013 ). Evidently, 
intra-executive conflicts have caused disruptive policy-making processes, repeated 
1 These countries are Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
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constitutional reforms, and even political instability in some cases (e.g., Poland in 
1995 and 2007; Romania in 2012, 2017–2018; Ukraine in 2006–2010). 
Semi-presidential constitutions in Europe predominantly favour the prime 
minister over the president, with presidential prerogatives largely restricted to 
representative functions and co-shared leadership in foreign, security, and defence 
policies ( Raunio 2012 ). However, contrary to what constitutional power reveals, 
political outcomes of intra-executive tensions are often in the president’s favour 
( Raunio and Sedelius 2019 ). The reasons why the president often prevails over 
the prime minister may vary, but they often directly or indirectly relate to the per-
ceived moral authority and public support enjoyed by the president. The president 
is directly accountable to the people and typically more popular than the prime 
minister (and other party politicians), and aggressive use of public grandstanding 
may work in the president’s favour. However, few studies, if any, have systemati-
cally examined to what extent going-public tactics really matter to intra-executive 
relations in semi-presidential systems. Previous research on presidential strategies 
has been primarily based on presidential systems in the US and Latin America 
(cf. Kernell 2013 ), where no dual executive structure exists. From these studies, 
it appears that presidents can effectively use the option of public addresses to 
strengthen their bargaining position and do so by illustrating the potential elec-
toral costs to opponents ( Cox and Kernell 1991 ). In semi-presidential systems, 
this option should intuitively be attractive to presidents, considering their more 
limited constitutional powers but the usually strong public support for them. 
Additionally, in the absence of a detailed constitutional division of labour and 
coordination between the president and the prime minister, the president is likely 
to exploit public opinion in order to possibly intervene in matters falling under 
the competence of the government. However, just as going-public tactics may 
contribute to resolving conflicts, they may also further exacerbate conflicts and 
tensions between the executive leaders. 
Hence, in this chapter I examine the link between the presidents’ use of going-
public tactics and intra-executive conflicts in European semi-presidential regimes. 
The idea is to investigate when and how perceived popular legitimacy by the 
president impedes and sometimes even outperforms formal constitutional power 
in intra-executive relations. Using both primary and secondary data on president-
cabinet relations and intra-executive conflicts, including expert interview mate-
rials from three countries (Finland, Lithuania, and Romania), I examine how 
presidents with relatively weak constitutional powers use informal strategies of 
going public to increase their influence on government and policy. The empirical 
analysis covers the period from the early 1990s to 2019 and highlights a number 
of intra-executive confrontations where the presidents’ perceived popular legiti-
macy has played a role in the direction and outcome of conflicts. 
In the next section, I present this study’s comparative design and data, fol-
lowed by definitions and theoretical standpoints, where I briefly elaborate on 
how to define semi-presidentialism but discuss in more detail the built-in institu-
tional logic of semi-presidentialism, including how the president’s popular man-
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cover a contextual presentation of the three countries’ semi-presidential systems, 
followed by the analysis, in which I examine a number of intra-executive con-
flicts where the presidents have used going-public tactics to influence political 
outcomes in their favour. Finally, I discuss how the popular mandate and the 
perceived popular support of the president function as an informal institution and 
an accountability mechanism where popular opinion has a determining effect on 
political behaviour between elections. 
8.2 Research design and data 
This research is based on a comparative case study design, including two Central 
European countries (Lithuania and Romania) on one hand, and Finland as a 
long-lasting case of European semi-presidentialism on the other. Finland aside, 
Lithuania and Romania have the shared legacy of systemic communism, their 
subsequent transition to democracy and a market economy in the 1990s, and 
their European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
accession processes in the 2000s. However, each country represents a unique 
semi-presidential trajectory: high levels of institutionalisation and the weakening 
of a historically strong presidency in Finland since the early 2000s; general intra-
executive stability under a personalised political system in Lithuania; and party 
system instability, strong presidential influence, and high institutional tensions 
in Romania. By examining the conditions and the implications of going-public 
tactics used by ten presidents in these three countries, I am especially interested 
in the extent to which the presidents’ (perceived) popular legitimacy impedes 
and even outperforms formal constitutional power in the intra-executive relations 
between the presidents and the prime ministers. A guiding assumption in this 
study is that the impact of the presidents’ going-public strategies is conditioned 
by formal constitutional powers, unified or divided governments (cohabitation), 
the presidents’ influence on their parties, and the prevailing norms among the 
political elites regarding the presidents’ role in the political systems. 
The empirical materials consist of primary and secondary data on president-
cabinet relations and intra-executive conflicts, including expert interviews cover-
ing the period from the early 1990s to 2019.2 Written sources include official 
documents (e.g., constitutions, laws, rules of procedure), academic literature 
(e.g., comparative and case study-oriented articles, books, reports and updates) 
2 The experts in each country were contacted in order to collect information on how the 
semi-presidential systems had worked in practice with regard to intra-executive relations and 
coordination mechanisms. The key objective of the interviews was to establish the actual role 
and importance of intra-executive institutions, and the data were primarily used for a project 
whose outcome is largely reported in  Raunio and Sedelius (2020 ). The interviewees were will-
ing to speak only under the condition of confidentiality. In total, 10 persons were interviewed 
in Finland, 9 in Lithuania and 12 in Romania. Many of them had experience in intra-executive 
coordination under two or more presidents. The interviewees’ positions include current and 
former high-level civil servants, counsellors and advisors in the offices of the president and the 
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and additional secondary materials (e.g., online resources, such as the research-
based blog Presidential Power). 
8.3 Theory and definitions 
Since Duverger’s founding definition 3 of semi-presidentialism, there has been a 
contentious and drawn-out debate on how to categorise dual executive regimes 
with a popularly elected president and an indirectly elected/selected prime minister
accountable to the parliament. Duverger’s (1980 , p. 4) non-institutional criterion,
stating that in a semi-presidential regime ‘the president possesses quite consider-
able powers’, has caused confusion. Scholars have approached it differently, and 
classifications of semi-presidential countries have varied extensively. In response, 
Elgie (1999 , p. 13) proposes a minimalist and strictly constitutional definition: 
‘semi-presidentialism is where a constitution includes a popularly elected fixed-
term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible
to the legislature’. In turn, Elgie’s definition has triggered considerable critique for
encompassing too many and disparate countries. For both theoretical and empirical
reasons, there is a need to separate different forms of semi-presidentialism. Among
the alternatives in the literature,  Shugart and Carey’s (1992 ) distinction between 
two sub-types of semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential and president-parlia-
mentary regimes) has gained broad acceptance. In premier-presidentialism, (1) the
president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term of office and (2) the president
selects the prime minister who shall head the cabinet, but (3) the authority to dis-
miss the cabinet rests exclusively with the parliament. In president-parliamentarism,
(1) the president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term of office, (2) the 
president appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other cabinet ministers, 
and (3) the prime minister and the cabinet ministers are subjected to parliamen-
tary and presidential confidence ( Shugart 2005 , p. 333;  Shugart and Carey 1992 , 
pp. 23–24). Hence, the defining distinction is that under president-parliamenta 
rism, the government is accountable to both the president and the parliament,
whereas under premier-presidentialism, the government is accountable to the par-
liament only. In this study, I confine the analysis to premier-presidentialism and to
three selected European cases.
Power sharing between the executives precludes a clear separation of pow-
ers, which may exacerbate constitutional ambiguity and conflict. Due to the
parliament’s exclusive power to dismiss the prime minister under premier-
presidentialism, the government is likely to propose policy that the parliamentary 
majority can accept even when in conflict with the president’s agenda. Therefore, 
intra-executive tensions between the president and the cabinet can be expected 
whenever the president and the parliament have different policy directions. 
3 Duverger (1980 , p. 4) defines semi-presidentialism based on three criteria: (1) The president 
is elected by universal suffrage. (2) The president possesses quite considerable powers. (3) The 
prime minister and other ministers also possess executive and governmental powers but can 
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Empirical studies confirm this expectation, showing that intra-executive conflicts 
are conditioned by presidential powers, majority conditions in the parliament, 
and even the prime minister’s presidential ambitions ( Amorim Neto and Strøm 
2006 ;  Protsyk 2005 ,  2006 ;  Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010 ).  Sedelius and 
Ekman’s (2010 ) study on the implications of intra-executive conflicts in Eastern 
Europe suggests that conflicts are associated with early resignation of govern-
ments. Cohabitation, ‘where the president and prime minister are from oppos-
ing parties and where the president’s party is not represented in cabinet’ ( Elgie 
2011 , p. 12), increases the likelihood of intra-executive conflicts ( Sedelius and 
Mashtaler 2013 ). Cohabitation may cause tension and undermine general per-
formance, especially in young democracies, or when no clear-cut constitutional 
provision sets out the distribution of power among the key actors ( Elgie 2010 ; 
Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013 ;  Shoesmith 2003 ). 
Variations in formal presidential powers go a long way towards explaining key 
differences among semi-presidential regimes and to determining the power bal-
ance between the president and the prime minister. To what extent presidents 
actually use or need to use their formal powers certainly varies and does not only 
depend on the distribution of power, however. In this study, I am interested 
in how presidents try to influence politics through informal power and direct 
appeals to the public. Based on a study of Central and Eastern Europe,  De Raadt 
(2009 ) argues that constitutional ambiguity about executive leadership provides 
the presidents with substantial room to manoeuvre, making it more difficult for 
citizens to determine whom to hold accountable. Such considerations are partic-
ularly relevant, as surveys have shown high levels of public trust in the presidents 
but outright distrust in other political leaders, including the prime minister and 
political parties (cf.  Baltic Barometer 2014 ;  Ekman et al. 2016 ). 
Cooperation and overall smooth intra-executive relations have clear bene-
fits, especially in terms of policy-making. However, regarding policy influence 
and vote-seeking, a smooth cooperation strategy is not self-evidently the most 
rewarding option ( Lazardeux 2015 ). There are sometimes rational incentives for 
the president to avoid cooperation and instead go public with opinions that go 
against the prime minister, especially when he or she needs to claim credit or 
avoid blame for particular policies. The underlying motive might be to use the 
public as an intermediary to win support in order to illustrate that there is a 
potential electoral cost to the prime minister. In an analysis of American presi-
dents, Kernell (2007 , pp. 1–2) defines ‘going public’ as ‘a strategy whereby a 
president promotes himself and his policies . . . by appealing directly to the . . . 
public for support’. Through public speeches and writings, the president ‘seeks 
the aid of a third party—the public—to force other politicians to accept his 
preferences’. Aware of their popular support, presidents can effectively use the 
option of public addresses and make ‘public commitments to particular positions 
in order to raise the costs of reneging and thereby strengthen their bargaining 
position’ ( Cox and Kernell 1991 , p. 243). Although a gambling strategy, this can 
prove to be effective if the presidents are able to illustrate the potential electoral 
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injurious to bargaining, going public undermines the legitimacy of other politi-
cians’ ( Kernell 2013 , p. 303). In a premier-presidential system, the president may 
find this option particularly attractive, considering that the constitutional powers 
of the presidency are limited, whereas support for the president is usually strong. 
Diffuse conditions of accountability seem to favour the presidents in terms of 
both informal powers and citizen support ( Raunio and Sedelius 2020 ). It might 
be that the presidents’ higher popularity is attributed to their limited powers and 
to their status of being above party politics and thus somewhat elevated from 
day-to-day political quarrels. When seeking ways of converting their perceived 
authority into actual power, they have the option of going public to criticise 
the government without necessarily being held to account by the electorate in 
subsequent elections. In this way, formally weak presidents may compensate for 
their limited constitutional prerogatives by exploiting their perceived popular 
authority but retaining the option of shielding themselves behind the cabinet 
and avoiding blame for any failed policy. 
8.4 Semi-presidentialism in Finland, Lithuania, 
and Romania 
Table 8.1 presents indicators on the level of democracy and presidential powers 
in 17 premier-presidential regimes in Europe, including the three selected cases 
(in bold font). Finland, Lithuania and Romania all have democracy scores that 
are sufficient to be placed under the ‘Free’ category in Freedom in the World’s 
2020 measure but with varying degrees. As a long-established and prosperous 
democracy in Scandinavia, Finland continuously ranks at the very top of various 
democracy rankings (cf. EIU Democracy Index 2019 ;  Lührmann et al. 2020 ). 
As a much younger democracy, post-Soviet Lithuania has performance scores 
that are overall stronger than Romania’s, as also confirmed by Lithuania’s earlier 
membership in the EU (2004)—three years ahead of Romania (2007). 
Table 8.1 also lists presidential power scores, as recorded by  Doyle and Elgie 
(2016 ). These scores measure the presidents’ constitutional powers and are com-
piled and weighted based on 28 existing measures in the literature. The scores 
range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) in separate time periods, following consti-
tutional changes in a country’s presidential powers. On this measure, Finland’s 
post-2000 constitution provides the weakest presidential power scores (0.050) of 
all the listed countries, whereas the presidencies in Romania (0.250) and Lithu-
ania (0.282) are among those with higher scores. 
For the same set of countries, Table 8.2 reports a more detailed measure 
of presidential power, as developed by  Shugart and Carey (1992 ). The index 
includes six ‘legislative’ and four ‘non-legislative’ powers, with scores ranging 
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 4 on each prerogative. These data con-
frm that premier-presidentialism in Europe provides (in general) relatively weak 
presidencies and that Finland’s post-2000 constitution belongs to the group with 
little formal powers of the president. Lithuania and Romania score higher on 
both legislative and non-legislative powers. Presidential powers in Lithuania are 
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Table 8.1 Level of democracy and formal presidential powers in European semi-presidential (premier-presidential) regimes 
Country Year of adoption of Democracy 2020 Year of EU Presidential power scores,
semi-presidential Freedom in the World membership Doyle and Elgie (2016 ), Prespow1 normalised 
constitution aggregate scores score (standard error) year interval
Bulgaria 1991 80/100 (F) 2007 0.183 (0.044) 1992–present 
Croatia  2001 85/100 (F) 2013 0.291 (0.074) 2001–present 
Czech Republic 2012 91/100 (F) 2004 — 
Finland 1919 100/100 (F) 1995 0.050 (0.035) 2000– present 
France 1962 90/100 (F) 1958 0.131 (0.020) 1963–present 
Ireland  1937 97/100 (F) 1973 0.062 (0.048) 1938–present 
Lithuania 1992 91/100 (F) 2004 0.282 (0.044) 1993– present 
Moldova 1994, 2016 60/100 (PF) Non-member 0.240 (0.059) 1995–2000
Montenegro  2007 62/100 (PF) Non-member — 
North Macedonia 1991 63/100 (PF) Non-member — 
Poland 1997 84/100 (F) 2004 0.241 (0.044) 1997–present 
Portugal  1976 96/100 (F) 1986 0.197 (0.016) 1983–present 
Romania 1991 83/100 (F) 2007 0.250 (0.033) 1992– present 
Serbia 2006 66/100 (F) Non-member — 
Slovakia 1999 88/100 (F) 2004 0.189 (0.139) 2002–present 
Slovenia 1991 94/100 (F) 2004 0.118 (0.019) 1992–present 
Ukraine 2006, 2014 62/100 (PF) Non-member 0.329 (0.206) 2005–2010
Note: Freedom House annually measures civil liberties and political rights and provides an aggregated ‘Freedom Score’, ranging from 0 (least free) to 
100 (most free). F = free; PF = partly free. Doyle and Elgie’s scores measure the presidents’ constitutional powers and are compiled and weighted based 
on 28 existing measures in the literature. The scores range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). 
Sources: Doyle and Elgie (2016 );  Elgie (2015 );  Freedom House (2020 ). 
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Table 8.2 Shugart and Carey’s presidential power scores for European semi-presidential
(premier-presidential) regimes 
Country PKV PTV DC EXL BUD REF CF CD CEN DIS Total
Ireland  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Macedonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Bulgaria 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Slovakia, 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
1999–present 
Slovenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4
France 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 5
Lithuania 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 6
Poland 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 6
Ukraine, 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 6
2006–2010, 
2014–present 
Moldova, 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 7
1991–2000, 
2016–present 
Croatia, 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 7
2001–present 
Romania 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 7
Portugal  2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 8
Note: Countries arranged in order of total scores. Shugart and Carey’s measure of presidential 
power separates six legislative powers (PKV = package veto, PTV = pocket veto, DC = decree 
power, EXL = exclusive initiative of legislation, BUD = budgetary powers, REF = referendum 
initiative) and four non-legislative powers (CF = cabinet formation, CD = cabinet dismissal, 
CEN = cabinet censure; DIS = dissolution of parliament). Each power is scored from 0 to 4, with 
a total maximum power score of 40. For a full explanation of the scoring scheme, see  Shugart 
and Carey (1992 , pp. 148–152). 
Source: Raunio and Sedelius (2020 );  Shugart and Carey (1992 ). 
distributed across fve categories: package veto, decree power, cabinet forma-
tion, cabinet censure, and dissolution of parliament. The total score in Romania 
is distributed across four of the included categories: decree power, referendum 
initiative, cabinet formation, and dissolution of parliament.
Despite their limited legislative and policy powers, the presidencies in Finland, 
Lithuania, and Romania are assigned a number of representative functions and 
have a political voice in national security and foreign affairs. Article 93 of the 
Constitution of Finland states that ‘the foreign policy of Finland is directed by 
the President . . . in co-operation with the Government’. Similarly, the president 
of Lithuania shall ‘settle basic foreign policy issues and, together with the Gov-
ernment, implement foreign policy’ (Art. 84, para. 1). Likewise, Article 80, para. 
1 of the Constitution of Romania declares that the president ‘shall represent 
the Romanian State and is the safeguard of the national independence, unity 
and territorial integrity of the country’. The Romanian Constitution (Article 80, 
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Constitution and the proper functioning of the public authorities’ but differs 
from the Constitutions of Finland and Lithuania by also assigning the president 
to ‘act as a mediator between the Powers in the State as well as between the State 
and society’. Additionally, the presidents in all three countries possess power to 
appoint high-level offcials to various offces in public administration. Usually, 
such appointment powers are shared with the prime minister or other govern-
ment institutions and include the right to nominate judges to the Constitutional 
Court, the Chairman of the National Bank, the Commander of the Army, the 
Head of the Security Service, and the Prosecutor General. 
Finland, Lithuania, and Romania share similar semi-presidential constitutions 
but have very different semi-presidential experiences. Until the late 1980s, Fin-
land had been characterised by powerful presidents with a strong executive role 
in managing the country’s sensitive relations with the Soviet Union—both for-
mally and informally. However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been 
a gradual marginalisation of the president’s position in the political system. Fin-
land adopted a new constitution in 2000, which has considerably restricted the 
president’s role by limiting presidential authority in government formation and 
dissolution matters, decision-making, decree power, and vetoing legislative bills. 
Hence, Finland represents a contemporary case of a constitutionally weak presi-
dency embedded in a legacy of strong and powerful presidents. 
In contrast to its Baltic neighbours, Estonia and Latvia, which established par-
liamentary systems in the early 1990s, Lithuania opted for a semi-presidential 
constitution, ratified in 1992, in the post-Soviet context of deep ideological 
cleavages, weak parties, and personality-based politics. To some extent, inter-
war experiences of powerful presidencies carrying symbolic references of national 
independence influenced the establishment of direct presidential elections. Previ-
ous analyses of semi-presidentialism in Europe suggest that Lithuania is one of 
the countries with the lowest frequency of intra-executive conflicts ( Elgie 2018a ; 
Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013 ). However, the relations between the president and 
the government have shifted quite significantly during the post-Soviet period, 
and despite the relative stability of the Lithuanian political system, scholars have 
characterised it as personality-centred ( Duvold and Jurkynas 2013 ). Personality-
centred politics indeed creates favourable conditions for presidential activism. 
Romania ratified its semi-presidential constitution in 1991 in the context of 
a violent transition. Although the president’s role in policy-making is constitu-
tionally limited, the presidents to date have exercised considerable influence on 
Romanian politics. The country has faced severe transitional challenges and is still 
struggling with ineffective policy-making, widespread corruption, and recurring 
political crises. Cohabitation in Romania has repeatedly generated high levels of 
institutional conflict and has twice (2007, 2012) resulted in impeachment proce-
dures against the president. 
Similar to the cases of other Central and Eastern European countries, the 
political systems in Lithuania and Romania have been characterised by person-
alisation and relatively low levels of institutionalisation ( Crowther and Suciu 
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percentage of citizens appears to favour the presidency over other institutions, 
including the office of the prime minister and political parties (cf.  Baltic Barom-
eter 2014 ;  Ekman et al. 2016 ;  New Baltic Barometer 1993 ,  1995 ,  1996 ,  2000 , 
2001 ,  2004 ;  New Europe Barometer 2001 ,  2004 ). Despite its formally weak 
powers, the presidency in both countries is considered the major prize for ambi-
tious political leaders, which enhances the importance of personalities ( Duvold 
and Jurkynas 2013 ). In this sense, a presidentialisation component is involved, 
where political parties have often been organised around individuals with politi-
cal ambitions related to personal interests and to the presidency (cf.  Samuels and 
Shugart 2010 ). 
8.5 Analysis 
In this section, the empirical findings are reported. The analysis starts from a 
general presentation of previously recorded intra-executive conflicts involving the 
three cases. I examine some of these conflicts more closely to identify when and 
how presidents have employed going-public tactics. 
8.5.1 Presidents, cabinets, and intra-executive conflicts 
The three cases show notable variations in intra-executive conflicts. Upon a 
closer examination of the president-cabinet relations in the three countries, their 
presidents, prime ministers, governing parties, cohabitation (yes/no) and intra-
executive conflicts (low/high) are reported in  Table 8.3 . Using both expert sur-
vey estimations and secondary sources,  Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013 , p. 113) 
define a ‘high level’ of intra-executive conflict as observable instances of ‘manifest 
and durable tensions between the president and the cabinet’ (cf.  Elgie 2018a ).
8.5.2 A strictly constrained but highly popular presidency in 
post-2000 Finland 
Finland has only one instance of a high-level conflict recorded in the data, which 
concerned the period of cohabitation between President Tarja Halonen and 
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, when the two openly disputed about who would 
represent Finland in the European Council in 2009. Before the Lisbon Treaty, 
the president had participated in the majority of the European Council meet-
ings, usually together with the foreign minister, but the Lisbon Treaty required 
a single representative. Ultimately, the conflict was resolved when the parliament 
adopted a bill to amend the Constitution, stating that the prime minister would 
represent Finland in the European Council. Overall, executive relations in Fin-
land are characterised by consensus seeking and by highly regulated relations 
between the president and the prime minster. Detailed regulations and the politi-
cal elites’ shared understanding about maintaining strict limits to presidential 
interference in policy-making have limited presidential activism since the 2000 
constitutional reform. 
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Table 8.3 Intra-executive conflicts and periods of cohabitation: Finland, Lithuania, and Romania
President (party) Prime minister Prime minister’s party Cohabitation Intra-executive conflict
term in office (term in office)
Finland
Mauno Koivisto Kalevi Sorsa (Feb. 1982–Apr. 1987) SDP N — 
(SDP) Jan. 1982–Mar. 1994 Harri Holkeri (Apr. 1987–Apr. 1991) KOK N — 
Esko Aho (Apr. 1991–) KESK Y — 
Martti Ahtisaari (SDP) Esko Aho (Apr. 1995) KESK Y Low 
Mar. 1994–Mar. 2000 Paavo Lipponen (Apr. 1995–) SDP N Low 
Tarja Halonen Paavo Lipponen (Apr. 2003) SDP N Low 
(SDP) Matti Vanhanen (June 2003–June 2010) KESK Y High
Mar. 2000–Mar. 2012 Mari Kiviniemi (June 2010–Jun. 2011) KESK Y Low 
Jyrki Katainen (June 2011–) KOK N Low 
Sauli Niinistö Jyrki Katainen (–June 2014) KOK N Low 
(KOK) Alexander Stubb (June 2014–May 2015) KOK N Low 
Mar. 2012–present Juha Sipilä (May 2015–Dec. 2019) KESK N Low 
Sanne Mirella Marin (Dec. 2019–) SDP Y — 
Lithuania
Algirdas M. Brazauskas (LDDP) Adolfas Šleževičius (Mar. 1993 –Feb. LDDP N Low 
Nov. 1992–Feb. 1998 1996) LDDP N Low 
Laurynas Stankevičius (Feb. 1996–Dec. TS-LK Y Low 
1996)
Gediminas Vagnorius (Dec. 1996–) 
Valdas Adamkus (formally Gediminas Vagnorius (May 1999) TS-LK N High
non-party) Rolandas Paksas (June 1999–Oct. 1999) TS-LK N —
Feb. 1998–Feb. 2003 Andrius Kubilius (Nov. 1999–Nov. TS-LK N Low 
2000) TS-LK N High
Rolandas Paksas (Nov. 2000–Jun. 2001) LSDP N Low 



























































































      
Table 8.3 (Continued)
President (party) Prime minister Prime minister’s party Cohabitation Intra-executive conflict
term in office (term in office)
Rolandas Paksas
(LLDP)
Feb. 2003–Apr. 2004 
Valdas Adamkus (formally 
non-party) 
July 2004–July 2009






Ion Iliescu (FSN, 1992; FSDN,
1996, PDSR)
Dec. 1989–Nov. 1996 
Emil Constantinescu (PNT-CD) 
Nov. 1996–Dec. 2000 




Dec. 2004–Dec. 2014 
Algirdas M. Brazauskas 
Algirdas M. Brazauskas (June 2006) 
Gediminas Kirkilas (July 2006–Dec. 2008)
Andrius Kubilius (Dec. 2008–)
Andrius Kubilius (Dec. 2012)
Algirdas Butkevičius (Dec. 2012–Dec. 
2016)
Saulius Skvernelis (Dec. 2016–) 
Saulius Skvernelis (Dec. 2016–) 
Petre Roman (Dec. 1989–Oct. 1991) 
Theodor Stolojan (Oct. 1991–Nov. 1992)
Nicolae Vacaroiu (Nov. 1992–) 
Nicolae Vacaroiu (Dec. 1996) 
Victor Ciorbea (Dec. 1996–Mar. 1998) 
Radu Vasile (Apr. 1998–Dec. 1999) 
Constantin Isarescu (Dec. 1999–Dec. 
2000)
Adrian Nastase (Dec. 2000–Dec. 2004)
Calin Popescu-Tăriceanu (Dec. 2004–
Dec. 2008)
Emil Boc (Dec. 2008–Feb. 2012)
























































































    
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
  





Klaus Iohannis (PNL) Dec. Victor Ponta (Nov. 2015) PSD Y High
2014–present Dacian Cioloș (Nov. 2015–Jan. 2017) Non-party N —
Sorin Grindeanu (Jan. 2017–June 2017) PSD Y — 
Mihai Tudose (June 2017–Jan. 2018) PSD Y — 
Vasilica Dăncilă (Jan. 2018–Nov. 2019) PSD Y High
Ludovic Orban (Nov. 2019–) PNL N —
Notes: Cohabitation is defined here as the situation ‘where the president and prime minister are from different parties and where the president’s party is not 
represented in cabinet’ ( Elgie 2011 , p. 12). 
Party abbreviations:  Finland: KESK = Suomen Keskusta (Centre of Finland),  KOK = Kansallinen Kokoomus (National Coalition, centre-right),  SDP = 
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Piolue (Social Democratic Party of Finland).  Lithuania: LDDP = Lietuvos Demokratinė Darbo Partija (Democratic Labour 
Party of Lithuania),  LLS = Lietuvos Liberalų Sąjung (Liberal Union of Lithuania), LSDP = Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija (Social Democratic Party of 
Lithuania), LVZS = Lietuvos Valstiečių ir Žaliųjų Sąjunga (Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union, agrarian, centrist, Green conservative),  TS-LK = Tėvynės
Sąjunga-Lietuvos Konservatoriai (Homeland Union-Conservatives of Lithuania),  TS-LKD = Tėvynės Sąjunga-Lietuvos Krikščionys Demokratai (Homeland 
Union-Christian Democrats of Lithuania). Romania: FSN = Frontul Salvării Naţionale (National Salvation Front, split from  PCR = Partidul Comunist Român 
[Romanian Communist Party], 1989–1993, then PD),  PD = Partidul Democrat (Democratic Party, Social-Democratic, former FSN, 1993–2007, merged into 
PDL), PDL = Partidul Democrat Liberal (Democratic Liberal Party, centre-right, merger of PD and Partidul Liberal Democrat [Liberal Democratic Party]), 
PDSR = Partidul Democraţiei Sociale din România (Party of Social Democracy in Romania, ex-Communist, former FSDN, 1993–2001, merged into PSDR), 
PNL = Partidul Naţional Liberal (National Liberal Party, liberal, centre-right),  PNT-CD = Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat (Christian Democratic
National Peasants’ Party, Christian-Democratic, PNT successor),  PSD = Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democrat Party, Social-Democratic, merger of PDSR 
and PSDR, established 2001), PSDR = Partidul Social Democrat Român (Romanian Social Democratic Party, Social-Democratic, merged with PMR, restored 
1990–2001, merged into PSD),  UNPR = Uniunea Naţională pentru Progresul României (National Union for the Progress of Romania, Social-Democratic, 
split from PSD, established 2010). 
Sources: Data adapted and updated from  Elgie (2018a , 2018b);  Raunio and Sedelius (2020 );  Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013 );  World Statesmen (2020 ). 
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Rarely do Finnish presidents criticise the government publicly. Certainly, there 
are differences of opinion, particularly under cohabitation, but the presidents 
have largely refrained from publicly attacking the prime minister and the cabinet. 
The exceptions are issues falling under the foreign policy co-leadership between 
the president and the government, where on rare occasions President Halonen 
and President Sauli Niinistö have publicly questioned the comments made by 
cabinet ministers. When the Social Democratic Halonen shared power with 
centre-right prime ministers from 2003 to 2012, she often emphasised different 
topics in her speeches, but even in cases of open clashes, such as over some civil 
service appointments or representation in the European Council, she did not try 
to delegitimise the government. 
President Niinistö, who was a finance minister from 1996 to 2003 and the 
chair of the National Coalition from 1994 to 2001, has in turn often commented 
on the state of the economy, but such comments have mainly been general and 
not specifically directed at the government. In his official speeches, Niinistö has 
mainly referred to matters under the jurisdiction of the president. Generally, in 
their speeches and interviews, Finnish presidents primarily focus on foreign and 
security policy issues, thus leaving domestic politics—and mainly EU matters—to 
the prime minister and the cabinet ( Hämäläinen 2013 ). 
While the ‘spirit of the constitution’ is held in high esteem by the political 
elites, the popularity of the presidents must be kept in mind. Presidents are typi-
cally more popular than prime ministers and other ‘party politicians’ in Finland. 
According to survey data, public opinion consistently favours assigning the presi-
dent a stronger role in politics—including domestic politics and EU affairs ( Arvo-
ja asennetutkimus/EVA Attitude and Value Survey 2018). Figure 8.1 shows that 
this trend strengthened over the period following the president’s weakening 
executive role in both domestic and EU affairs, and the share of respondents 
PRESIDENT’S POWER 
“too much” “just enough/appropriate” “too little” 
Figure 8.1 Public evaluation of the powers of the president in Finland, 1990–2017, 
in percentage 
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who considered that the president had ‘too little’ power rose from 14% in 1990 
to 43% in 2017.
President Niinistö has been particularly trusted by the citizenry, enjoying 
broad support across the political spectrum. Furthermore, the constitution leaves 
the window open for presidential activism. For example, regarding government 
formation, the constitution simply states that the president appoints the prime 
minister (and the other ministers) after approval by the Eduskunta (parliament). 
The constitution therefore does not rule out presidential interference in govern-
ment formation. 
8.5.3 The presidency in Lithuania: popular leadership as a lever 
for power grabs 
Power sharing with low levels of conflict has characterised the president–prime 
minister relationship for the most part in Lithuania. Nonetheless, since the coun-
try’s independence, all presidents have at some point openly conflicted with the 
prime minister. Since 1992, Lithuania has been under five presidents: Algirdas 
Brazauskas, Valdas Adamkus, Dalia Grybauskaitė, Rolandas Paksas, and Gitanas 
Nausėda. I limit my analysis essentially to the first three, given the short-lived 
presidency of Paksas, and as of this writing, I do not have enough data on the 
recent presidency of Nausėda. 
Previous research has described the first office holder, Brazauskas, as a con-
structive leader. He held the position as head of state carefully, without any open 
conflict with the prime minister or the Seimas (parliament). While Brazauskas 
was very much a party politician, he was also a key figure in the transition to 
democracy and remained popular throughout his political career, including from 
2001 to 2006 as the prime minister ( Raunio and Sedelius 2019 ). Brazauskas 
also favoured an open style of leadership, including active contacts with ordinary 
citizens. Brazauskas (2007 , p. 70) himself noted that due to the limited consti-
tutional powers of the president, he tried to influence the Seimas and the gov-
ernment with his ‘political authority’ and the people’s support. This was easier 
during the first four years of his presidency, when his Social Democratic Party 
(LDDP) was in government and controlled the parliamentary majority. How-
ever, following the 1996 Seimas elections, matters became more difficult under 
the centre-right coalition of the Homeland Union and the Christian Democrats, 
and the president essentially limited his actions to foreign affairs. Brazauskas 
faced difficulties in establishing contacts with the ruling coalition, and while he 
regularly held meetings with Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius (Homeland 
Union), the latter emphasised the need to respect the jurisdictional limits set by 
the constitution. 
Adamkus came from a very different background, having served in the US 
Environmental Protection Agency for nearly two decades. Elected on an indepen-
dent ticket in both the 1998 and the 2004 presidential elections,  Adamkus (2004 , 
p. 38) wrote that he needed to ‘create traditions’ for the presidency. Having 
observed Brazauskas’ weak position towards the end of his presidency, Adamkus 
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strived to act as a ‘counterweight’ to the government. In 1999, an intense conflict 
occurred between Adamkus and Prime Minister Vagnorius when the president 
openly criticised Vagnorius about economic reform. As the president had no sup-
portive majority in the Seimas, he leaned heavily on his popular support. The 
opinion polls at that time showed approval rates of over 80% for the president and 
less than 20% for the prime minister ( Sedelius 2006 , p. 149). Adamkus publicly 
voiced his distrust in the prime minister, stating that he could not perform his 
duties as long as Vagnorius stayed in office. Following the Russian economic crisis, 
the sharp decline of the economy gave the president the upper hand, and he could 
effectively insist—although without formal dismissal powers—on the resignation 
of Vagnorius. This outcome was indeed an important moment in strengthening 
presidential leadership in Lithuania. 
During his second term, Adamkus adopted a less assertive stance, with the 
balance of power more in favour of the prime minister, even during the minority 
government of Gediminas Kirkilas (2006–2008). Adamkus co-shared executive 
power with prime ministers and cabinets from opposing political camps for most 
of the period. Support ratings mattered, as Brazauskas was also an unusually 
popular politician in Lithuania during his tenure as the prime minister. None-
theless, in 2006, Adamkus again resorted to a statement on national television, 
questioning whether the government still enjoyed the confidence of the Seimas, 
with Prime Minister Brazauskas resigning afterwards. In 2005, Adamkus had also 
intervened in the conflict between Viktor Uspaskich, the leader of the Labour 
Party and the minister of economic affairs, and Artūras Zuokas, the mayor of 
Vilnius and the chair of the Liberal and Centre Union. In yet another television 
appearance, Adamkus requested the resignations of the quarrelling politicians 
from their public offices, with Uspaskich indeed deciding to leave his ministerial 
post. 
President Grybauskaitė, who was also elected as an independent candidate in 
both the 2009 and the 2014 elections (although in 2009, she was supported by 
the centre-right parties, Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats and 
the Liberal Movement), became more powerful than her predecessors. Through-
out her terms of office, her leadership style was more assertive and confronta-
tional. With the exception of the period 2009–2012, Grybauskaitė shared power 
with prime ministers from opposing camps, which certainly influenced her strate-
gies. She had a policy profile leaning towards the EU and economic affairs, as she 
had previously served as the Finance Minister and the Commissioner for Finan-
cial Programming and the Budget. From late 2012 to 2016, Grybauskaitė shared 
power with Algirdas Butkevičius’ Social Democratic-led coalition and from 2016 
onwards, with the cabinet led by Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis that brought 
together the Peasant and Greens Union and the Social Democrats. By 2018, 
the relations between Grybauskaitė and Skvernelis deteriorated due to various 
disputes. Grybauskaitė was on particularly bad terms with the chair of the Peas-
ant and Greens Union, Ramūnas Karbauskis. In her state of the nation address in 
the Seimas in June 2018, the president focused on the then ongoing corruption 
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failing to address major societal problems. Simultaneously she called on the main 
political actors to stop all the quarrelling for the sake of the national interest. 
Hence, both Adamkus and Grybauskaitė did not hesitate to go public, often 
questioning the legitimacy of prime ministers and their governments. Article 84, 
para. 18 of the Lithuanian Constitution stipulates that the president ‘shall make 
annual reports at the Seimas on the situation in Lithuania and the domestic and 
foreign policies of the Republic of Lithuania’. Adamkus—and even more fre-
quently, Grybauskaitė—used such state of the nation addresses to criticise the 
government. The presidents attempted to mark their authority throughout their 
tenures and often emerged victorious from intra-executive conflicts. Similar to 
other semi-presidential regimes, periods of cohabitation reduce the influence of 
the president and result in more intra-executive disputes. Presidents have benefit-
ted from their popularity, with Adamkus and Grybauskaitė further reinforcing 
this through their anti-party or anti-establishment rhetoric ( Krupavičius 2013 ). 
8.5.4 Challenged mediation, popular support, and intra-executive 
conflict in Romania 
Romania has experienced more instances of severe intra-executive conflicts than 
both Finland and Lithuania (cf. Table 8.3 ). Although the president’s role in policy-
making is constitutionally weak, the Romanian presidents have exercised consider-
able political influence, although to different extents and for various reasons. 
Ion Iliescu (1990–1996, 2000–2004) and Traian Băsescu (2004–2014) were 
presidents with high levels of activism and did not avoid institutional confronta-
tions, whereas Presidents Emil Constantinescu (1996–2000) and Klaus Iohan-
nis (2014—present) have adopted more cautious modes of operation. Overall, 
cohabitation has clearly mattered more in Romania than in Finland and Lithu-
ania, with the presidents also utilising party contacts to a larger extent than in the 
other two cases. 
Iliescu was a powerful and popular figure during the transition to democracy, 
which facilitated his subsequent activism in office. Iliescu used his strong party 
links for directing the government, as the National Salvation Front (FSN)/Social 
Democrats were dominant actors in Romanian politics and economy until the 
mid-1990s. With Prime Minister Petre Roman’s cabinet faring poorly in the polls 
on account of failed economic reforms in 1991, Iliescu most likely orchestrated a 
miners’ strike to force the resignation of Roman, who had been challenging Ili-
escu for influence within the FSN. Iliescu and Roman disagreed on several issues, 
and after ousting Roman, Iliescu secured the appointment of two loyal prime 
ministers, Theodor Stolojan and Nicolae Văcăroiu. Iliescu was clearly using his 
links to a variety of stakeholders, ranging from trade unions and large businesses 
to the intelligence services, and he even publicly criticised many court decisions. 
In 1994, the parliament initiated an impeachment procedure against Iliescu on 
account of his failure to respect the separation of powers among state institutions, 
especially regarding courts. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that Iliescu’s 
public statements did not constitute ‘grave acts infringing upon Constitutional 
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provisions’ (Art. 95), and his friendly parliamentary majority voted against the 
impeachment ( Gherghina 2013 ;  Sedelius 2006 ;  Verheijen 1999 ). 
Similar to Iliescu, President Băsescu had considerable experience gained from 
party politics before assuming office. He had served as the minister of trans-
port in several cabinets during the 1990s, as well as the mayor of Bucharest. 
Băsescu certainly did not shy away from confrontations with the government and 
used various channels to influence Romanian politics. In the 2004 parliamen-
tary elections, the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party, but President 
Băsescu appointed as prime minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu from the National 
Liberal Party, which had formed an alliance with Băsescu’s Democratic Party. 
Furthermore, Băsescu was able to persuade the Humanist Party to break their 
pre-electoral coalition with the Social Democrats and instead join the new gov-
ernment. Thus, Băsescu managed to avoid cohabitation while obtaining a friendly 
majority in the legislature. Băsescu basically even ‘handpicked some of the min-
isters’ ( Anghel 2018 , p. 111). However, by the end of 2006, the Humanists left 
the coalition, and the relations between the two leaders had soured. Băsescu 
wanted to topple Popescu-Tăriceanu, who fired the Democratic Party ministers 
from his cabinet, but the latter refused to resign. Băsescu publicly attacked the 
government while unleashing similar criticism against the Social Democrats, 
which by then were supporting the government. In a public speech, Băsescu 
accused Popescu-Tăriceanu of asking him to intervene in favour of Dinu Patriciu, 
a Liberal Party member who had been caught in a corruption case. Băsescu even 
presented excerpts from his private conversation with Popescu-Tăriceanu in a 
press conference that was widely covered by the media ( Gherghina et al. 2016 , 
p. 12). According to  Elgie (2018b , pp. 127–149), this cohabitation produced 
one of the highest levels of intra-executive conflict across his examination of 21 
European countries. 
Following the 2008 parliamentary elections, Băsescu called for the formation 
of a grand coalition between the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) and the Social 
Democrat Party (PSD). This coalition lasted until October 2009, when the Social 
Democrats left the coalition. Two months later, Băsescu was re-elected as presi-
dent and was able to forge a legislative majority for his party (PDL), with the 
help of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians (UDMR) and using 35 defect-
ing members of parliament (MPs) from the PSD and the Liberals. As he did in 
2004, Băsescu strongly influenced the formation of the new government under 
Prime Minister Emil Boc. From 2008 to 2011, Băsescu’s position was indeed 
very strong and probably reached the peak in the presidentialisation of Roma-
nian politics thus far. However, by early 2012, the government’s popularity was 
quickly declining on account of austerity measures. Băsescu reacted by replacing 
Boc with Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu as the prime minister. The PDL did not 
appreciate this move, as many party insiders believed that the replacement of 
the prime minister had been decided unilaterally by the president. Following 
the successful motion of no confidence against the Ungureanu cabinet in April 
2012, Băsescu was forced to appoint the Social Democrat Victor Ponta as the 
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Another example of Băsescu’s activism involved the 2009 presidential elec-
tions. Băsescu, whose popularity had declined, campaigned on a strong discourse 
about state modernisation, arguing that existing political institutions were ineffi-
cient. According to Article 90 of the Constitution, the president ‘may, after con-
sultation with Parliament, ask the people of Romania to express, by referendum, 
their will on matters of national interest’. Băsescu thus used his constitutional 
right and called for two consultative referenda on introducing a single-chamber 
parliament and decreasing the number of MPs to 300. Both referenda were 
passed with strong majorities in favour of the president’s positions; subsequently, 
the issues were linked to a larger constitutional reform that also gained the sup-
port of the government led by Prime Minister Boc. However, by 2011, when the 
constitutional reform bill was presented to the parliament, the ruling president-
friendly coalition did not manage to obtain the required two-thirds majorities in 
both chambers. At the end, the bill was voted down in 2013 under the leadership 
of the second cabinet of Victor Ponta ( Gherghina and Hein 2016 , pp. 185–186). 
However, it was this kind of presidential activism that led to the two impeach-
ment cases against Băsescu. The reason behind both impeachments was his 
alleged misuse of presidential powers, especially the way that he allegedly over-
stepped the ‘mediating’ function prescribed by the constitution. It was argued 
that Băsescu unnecessarily interfered in the work of the government and the 
parliament and used his party connections in an unconstitutional manner, and in 
2012, he was accused of violating the independence of the courts. There was also 
a serious dispute about who would represent Romania in the European Coun-
cil. Băsescu also unleashed strong attacks against the media. The Constitutional 
Court criticised Băsescu for his failure to be neutral and to act as a ‘mediator’ 
in society. In the previous 2007 referendum, 74.5% of the voters were against 
impeachment. In 2012, however, 89% voted for impeachment, but the turnout 
at 46% was below the required threshold ( Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013 ;  Iusmen 
2015 ;  Perju 2015 ). 
Presidents Constantinescu and Iohannis have behaved in a much less confron-
tational manner, but they have had their share of intra-executive tensions as well. 
Constantinescu’s presidency was characterised by considerable social unrest and 
economic decline while he tried to consolidate democracy and a stronger admin-
istration in order to edge closer towards both EU and NATO memberships. 
Constantinescu shared power with three prime ministers: Victor Ciorbea (1996– 
1998, Christian Democratic-National Peasants Party), Radu Vasile (1998–1999, 
Christian Democratic-National Peasants Party), and Mugur Isărescu (1999– 
2000, independent). In 1999, Constantinescu attempted to oust Prime Minister 
Vasile from office. The Vasile cabinet was suffering from internal disputes and 
poor economic performance. Constantinescu asked Vasile to resign, but as the 
latter refused to comply, the president asked all other ministers to step down. The 
ministers obeyed Constantinescu, who then issued a presidential decree in which 
he sacked Vasile. Aware that the president had no such constitutional instru-
ment, Vasile first refused to resign but finally gave in to pressure. Constanti-
nescu’s manoeuvres also seemed to have the support of the main political parties. 
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As a result of this incident, the constitution (Art. 107) was reformed in 2003 to 
explicitly prevent the president from dismissing the prime minister. However, 
as concluded by Perju (2015 , p. 253), overall, Constantinescu preferred not to 
intervene in domestic matters. 
President Iohannis, finally, had served as a mayor of a small town in Transyl-
vania and was noted for his civil society activism. Iohannis had led the National 
Liberal Party for half a year before being elected as president, but similar to 
Constantinescu, he lacked the kind of party politics background that Iliescu 
and Băsescu possessed. Overall, Iohannis has maintained a rather loose connec-
tion to his party. His term has been plagued by the continuing instability of 
Romanian politics, including corruption charges against leading politicians, sev-
eral court cases, various political scandals and profound distrust in the political 
elite. Iohannis has co-ruled with several prime ministers from opposing political 
camps: Victor Ponta (Social Democrat, 2012–2015); Dacian Cioloș (indepen-
dent, leading a technocrat government, November 2015–January 2017); Sorin 
Grindeanu (Social Democrat, January–June 2017); Mihai Tudose (Social Demo-
crat, June 2017–January 2018); and Viorica Dăncilă (Social Democrat, January 
2018–present). 
Elected on the basis of an anti-corruption campaign, Iohannis has mainly 
clashed with the government over corruption. Iohannis has constantly criticised 
the various cabinets for not tackling the problems and has refused to appoint 
to public positions those politicians with links to corruption. In January 2017, 
Iohannis unexpectedly attended a Grindeanu cabinet meeting that discussed an 
emergency decree to pardon certain detainees and amend the penal code. Four 
days later, the president joined widespread street protests against the planned 
government ordinance. Iohannis then announced that he would call a referen-
dum if the government did not withdraw the bill. Iohannis has also intervened 
in government formation and termination. In 2015, tensions between Iohan-
nis and Prime Minister Ponta surfaced repeatedly, with the president question-
ing governmental key policies, including a new fiscal plan, and publicly calling 
for Ponta’s resignation after a criminal investigation opened against him. Fol-
lowing Ponta’s resignation in the middle of nationwide anti-corruption pro-
tests in November 2015, Iohannis nominated the former EU Commissioner 
for Agriculture Cioloș as the new prime minister. In December 2016, Iohan-
nis refused to nominate Sevil Shhaideh as the prime minister without publicly 
explaining the reasons behind his decision. The Social Democratic-Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats coalition responded by threatening Iohannis with presi-
dential impeachment. Iohannis subsequently appointed the second nominee of 
the Social Democrats, Grindeanu, as the prime minister. In early January 2017, 
Iohannis sharply attacked the government in a speech delivered on the occasion 
of the Grindeanu cabinet’s taking office. Iohannis criticised the government for 
not addressing how it would deal with the budget deficit while promising to 
increase salaries and pensions and cut down value-added tax ( Bucur 2017 ). In 
March 2017, the parliament retaliated by adopting a declaration accusing Iohan-
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In the spring of 2018, Iohannis encountered serious cooperation problems 
with Prime Minister Dăncilă, which peaked over the decision to move the coun-
try’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. After Dăncilă had repeatedly 
avoided meetings and phone conversations with Iohannis on both domestic and 
international issues, Iohannis asked Dăncilă to resign, arguing that ‘she can’t 
cope with the role of prime minister of Romania and is transforming the govern-
ment into a vulnerability’. Iohannis also accused Dăncilă of taking orders from 
her political party, announcing that the prime minister had lost his confidence 
and that the Dăncilă cabinet should resign ( Paun 2018 ). According to Iohannis, 
it was a ‘political necessity’ to replace the government, which he called a crash 
of Romanian democracy ( Rettman 2018 ). Despite such intra-executive conflicts 
and public appearances calling for the government to resign, Iohannis has been 
more reserved in his use of informal channels of influence than Băsescu. 
Romanian presidents use the going-public strategy in a fairly routine manner, 
blaming the government for various policy failures and commenting on issues 
under the jurisdiction of the cabinet. The majority of presidential speeches are 
widely covered by the media, and the public is quite attentive. An interesting fea-
ture in this regard constitutes the presidential speeches in the parliament. Accord-
ing to Article 88 of the Constitution, ‘the President of Romania shall address 
Parliament by messages on the main political issues of the nation’. Such mes-
sages have become more numerous over time 4 and can be considered an agenda-
setting device, with the president presenting his vision on the most important 
societal questions. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Presidents in semi-presidential systems have formal prerogatives, such as (lim-
ited) appointment and dismissal powers, veto and monitoring functions, as well 
as informal options, such as meeting with individual politicians, including party 
leaders and various interest groups. In this chapter, I have raised the question of 
when and how presidents in semi-presidential systems use their perceived popular 
support to go public. The option of going-public tactics by using public speeches 
and media addresses seems particularly appealing, considering that the constitu-
tional powers of the presidency in semi-presidential systems are rather limited, 
whereas public support is usually strong. My analysis of the presidents’ actions 
during intra-executive conflicts confirms this assumption and illustrates how the 
deliberate use of public grandstanding often works in the presidents’ favour. 
The presidencies of Finland, Lithuania and Romania have broadly compa-
rable constitutional prerogatives, although the post-2000 Finnish presidency is 
somewhat weaker. The analysis reveals both similarities and variations in how 
4 Between December 2014 and March 2016, Iohannis addressed MPs six times, in comparison 
to only once by Constantinescu (1996–2000), five times by Iliescu during his second term 
(2000–2004), and 17 times by Băsescu between 2004 and 2011 ( Bucur 2016 ;  Levai and 





150 Thomas Sedelius 
the presidents have utilised the option of going public. Arguably, contextual 
differences are more salient than constitutional powers for understanding these 
variations. 
Finland is an old democracy known for its political stability, highly formalised 
procedures, and low level of corruption. Lithuania and Romania are younger 
democracies that needed to adopt new constitutions in the heated circumstances 
of the early 1990s. Their party systems tend to be less stable and their politics 
more personalised. Both countries, particularly Romania, have also experienced 
serious problems with corruption. Hence, Finnish citizens tend to trust their 
political institutions to a greater extent than do Lithuanian and Romanian citi-
zens. However, in Finland, the president is more popular than the prime minister 
most of the time. Nonetheless, historical experiences of very dominant presiden-
tial figures have formed the political elites’ shared view about the highly restricted 
role of the Finnish president. In contrast, in Lithuania and Romania, it is consid-
ered both legitimate and appropriate for the president to take a stronger position 
and to interfere in matters that constitutionally belong to the competence of the 
government. 
In Finland, the president rarely criticises the prime minister and the cabinet in 
public. Disagreements do occur but are largely handled behind the scenes, with-
out public conflicts. In contrast, the Lithuanian and the Romanian presidents 
have adopted quite confrontational stances, repeatedly unleashing harsh attacks 
on the government. In many instances, such public grandstanding has taken place 
in official, ceremonial duties (e.g., when addressing the parliament). The presi-
dents have questioned the government’s competence and legitimacy and have 
requested the prime ministers’ resignation. In both countries, it is largely consid-
ered appropriate for the president to be actively involved in issues falling under 
the jurisdiction of the cabinet. Indeed, such presidential activism is facilitated by 
the low trust in political parties and party politicians and a personality-centred 
political culture overall. Whether such presidential activism is beneficial for the 
country can be debated; nevertheless, it is a built-in logic of semi-presidentialism. 
Power sharing between the president and the prime minister can provide 
much-needed checks and balances in the political system. In the context of seri-
ous societal turmoil, presidents can bring order and stability with their speeches, 
legislative vetoes, or other measures. However, presidential powers and activism 
are slippery slopes, and therein lies the danger of accumulation of power in the 
hands of the president. The combination of direct elections and strong popular 
support works in favour of the president, especially in the personality-centred 
political cultures found in Central and Eastern European regimes. In Romania, 
there have been attempts to decrease the constitutional prerogatives of the presi-
dent, precisely because of the accumulation of power in the presidency and the 
strongly personalised political culture that it embodies. 
This apparent gap between a constitutionally restricted presidency on the one 
hand and citizen support of a significantly stronger president on the other is 
effectively exploited by the presidents from time to time. In terms of accountabil-
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To the extent that citizens can hold their presidents accountable in subsequent 
elections, semi-presidentialism offers a separate democratic chain of delegation 
that is non-existent in a parliamentary system. However, the dual executive struc-
ture also diffuses power and responsibility, making it more difficult for citizens to 
determine who is responsible for various political outcomes. 
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 9 Ministerial criminal liability 
in the Greek legal order 
A concise critical review 
Eugenia Kopsidi and Ioannis A. Vlachos 
9.1 Introduction 
In modern democratic societies, the political responsibility and criminal lia-
bility of Members of the Cabinet are assessed individually, under different
approaches and through distinct processes and procedures. While political
responsibility refers to the investigation, through parliamentary scrutiny, of cab-
inet members’ acts and omissions with regard to the public interest, criminal 
liability encompasses the investigation by judicial authorities of criminal offences 
punishable by provisions of the Criminal Code and special criminal legislation. 
In this sense, political responsibility is much broader than criminal liability, as it 
involves any misconduct attributable to a minister, even without his/her direct 
entrenchment therein. Although several legal orders distinguish between minis-
terial ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’—with the latter suggesting an aspect of 
personal blame, the two terms are used indistinctively in the Greek political and 
legal discourse and are therefore interchangeably mentioned herein. In contrast, 
criminal liability is a subclass of legal liability substantiated when a minister’s act 
or omission is classifiable as a criminal offence. 
However, the bond between these two forms of accountability has always been 
particularly tight, as the legislature’s prosecution of ministers originally served as 
a substitute to the conceptual lack of political responsibility. In particular, in the 
pre-democratic British parliamentary practice, when the institution of ministerial 
accountability first emerged, the monarch’s absolute and unquestionable unac-
countability regimen was offset by a parliamentary control mechanism against 
ministerial accountability by means of the institution of impeachment ( Loverdos 
1995 , p. 50;  Besila-Vika 1985 , p. 11). At this early stage, such responsibility 
was joint, distinctive and separated from the common notion of criminal liabil-
ity applicable to everyone else, which largely substantiated the strong political 
aspects of this extraordinary procedure. 
Along these lines, the political responsibility of the members of the executive in 
its contemporary sense is the evolution of the initially uniform ministerial respon-
sibility, which simultaneously incorporated elements of civil and criminal liability. 
The consolidation of parliamentarianism in the UK and its gradual prevalence in 
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from dealing with ministerial criminal liability by drawing a clear distinguishing 
line between the notional aspects of political and criminal answerability and by 
envisaging the corresponding investigative competences. 
Albeit ministerial criminal liability and political responsibility are currently 
acknowledged as two distinct and separate concepts in modern democracies, 
exploring the former (as this chapter aspires to do) inevitably entails a political 
facet that often justifies or at least explains its governing peculiarities. 
The extraordinary regime governing ministerial criminal liability is a prickly 
and controversial issue that has persisted for decades in Greece, from both politi-
cal and legal perspectives. Although its primary intent is not the enhanced for-
tification of ministers as natural persons but the good functioning of the polity, 
the institution of ministerial criminal responsibility has endured fierce criticism 
by political agents and legal theorists alike, as it seems to have failed in its core 
objective and has frequently been exploited in pursuit of political expediencies. 
The specifics applicable to ministerial criminal liability are enshrined in Article 
86 of the Greek Constitution, which stipulates: 
Only the Parliament has the power to prosecute serving or former members 
of the Cabinet or Undersecretaries for criminal offences that they committed 
during the discharge of their duties, as specified by law. The institution of 
specific ministerial offences is prohibited. 
A special substantive and procedural regime is then established to handle the 
criminal liability of secretaries and undersecretaries for offences committed ‘dur-
ing the discharge of their duties’, its key feature being the prosecution not by the 
judiciary but by the legislature, in apparent derogation from the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. The whole process of investigating alleged criminal offences 
committed by ministers functions as an institutional guarantee in the sense that 
the primary objective is to safeguard the executive power and its members from 
unjust or malicious prosecution which would essentially obstruct the exercise of 
their powers. 
The privileged exclusive framework governing ministerial criminal liability— 
including (until recently) the short limitation period and the so-called extin-
guishing deadline—is essentially rationalised by this intention to establish an 
institutional guarantee. Although the concept of ministerial criminal liability 
has often been abused and has repeatedly led to the ‘penalisation of the politi-
cal life’ (as the political revolving doors between government and opposition 
have often led to the prosecution of the Cabinet’s former members when their 
rivals win parliamentary majority in the future), it cannot be overlooked that the 
respective set of provisions remains preferential. Additionally, despite frequent 
prosecutions against former ministers, the perceptible inadequate assignment of 
accountability has exposed both an inherent systemic flaw and a political reluc-
tance that, in turn, have recurrently resulted in immunity. Hence, the Greek 
model of handling ministerial criminal liability evidently reveals that both the high-
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principles shared by modern democracies, such as horizontal equality before the 
law, separation of powers, and accountability in decision-making, therefore con-
tributing to the delegitimisation of the political system. 
Despite the recent pompous public statements and the proclaimed broad con-
sensus for the revision of Article 86 of the Constitution, eventually only the 
extinguishing deadline in para. 3 has been abolished. The exceptional regime 
has remained otherwise unchanged, substantially prolonging a system that has 
long been abused to the point of practical inefficiency and has historically mostly 
served the conservation of political privileges. Thus, a model principally dating 
back to the founding of the Greek State has remained unchanged once more, in 
times when the public’s trust in the political system is quite tenuous and brittle, 
with the country still striving to overcome the dire corollaries of a decade-long 
economic crisis. 
This contribution assesses the vulnerabilities of the current system, stem-
ming not so much from the constitutional text and the pertinent legislation, 
but predominantly from their practical application since the adoption of the 
1975 Constitution. By delving into the reasons which have led to the virtual 
non-implementation of the institution, this review of ministerial criminal liability 
aspires to critically investigate the demand for further revision of the applicable 
system. To this end, it is crucial to first examine the scope of Article 86 and 
its interpretative issues regarding the selective inclusion of specific ministerial 
offences within its exceptional regime. This is followed by a deliberation on the 
concerns arising from the short limitation period and the so-called extinguishing 
deadline, that is, the most idiosyncratic feature of the Greek system, considered 
by many as the singular root of a chronic evil. Next comes the matter of complic-
ity in the sense of accessory impeachment under the exclusive procedure appli-
cable to ministers, which raises additional issues of (un)equal treatment. Lastly, 
a new and different system is described and proposed, advising a radical amend-
ment of Article 86 to draw an unambiguous line between political responsibility 
and criminal liability, assigning the latter to the sole competence of the judiciary.
9.2 The scope of ministerial offences under 
Article 86 
Article 86, paras. 1 and 4 of the Constitution envisage a special competence 
of the Parliament and the Special Court to correspondingly prosecute and try 
criminal offences committed by incumbent or former members of the cabinet 
or undersecretaries during the discharge of their duties. In line with Article 86, 
para. 1, which also grants respective legislative delegation to the Parliament, Law 
3126/2003 was passed to further regulate the field in detail. In its Article 1, 
para. 1, the constitutional reference to such ‘criminal offences’ is specified to 
include only ‘misdemeanors and felonies’ committed by said persons ‘during the 
discharge of their duties’. It is thus initially derived and also expressly stated in 
Article 1 para. 3 that any other crime perpetrated by members of the cabinet or 
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and calls for the application of the common criminal procedure, as the ordinary 
substantive criminal stipulations remain firmly enforceable ( Charalambakis 2009 , 
p. 769). Of course, this likewise agrees with the constitutional prohibition to 
establish special ministerial offences (i.e.,  delicta sui generis) in Article 86, para. 1. 
Given the remarkably large number of such cases brought before the Greek 
Parliament since the late 1980s and the massive publicity they usually entail, 
the accurate interpretation of the phrase ‘during the discharge of their duties’ 
has become one of the principal issues of debate in the Greek political and legal 
domain. In the words of the former long-time minister and professor of consti-
tutional law, E. Venizelos, these incidents ‘triggered a widespread interpretative 
discord and friction, and brought a number of issues to light’ ( 1993a , p. 463). 
Prior to discussing the more prevailing perceptions on the issue, it is elemental 
to provide a succinct outline of the optimal interpretative model for such an 
approach. 
The distinctive handling of ministerial criminal violations establishes an 
extraordinary indictment regime which is commonly favourable to its subjects. 
As a special procedure, it falls within the general hermeneutic canon by which 
the interpretation of exceptional statutes must remain as narrow as possible.1 In 
this sense, it should be exclusively restricted to incidents which fully correspond 
to the fundamental purpose of such atypical practices ( Spyridakis 2014 , p. 845). 
Furthermore, this exceptional treatment is not intended to safeguard cabinet 
members at the personal level but to guarantee the proper functioning of the 
executive branch’s top tier. Therefore, the natural judge’s competence is con-
stitutionally circumvented only to serve the interests of the State and to neither 
endorse crypto-immunity for ministers nor encourage the micropolitical game. 
This aspect likewise calls for a narrow interpretation of the said provisions, as the 
natural judge principle (i.e., ‘nobody can be removed from the natural judge 
established by law’; Neppi Modona 2012 ) is dominant in the Greek constitu-
tional and penal doctrine and tradition. 
Additionally, as both the separation of powers and the pertinent necessity for 
checks and balances are pillars of liberal democracies grounded in the rule of 
law, the constitutional deviation of Article 86 should also be approached with 
a restrictive mind, allowing the legislature to substitute the judiciary only when 
absolutely indispensable and befitting. As noted by Spyridakis: 
a narrow interpretation promotes the enforcement of the regular criminal 
provisions (i.e. those generally applicable to the public), with a correspond-
ing expansion of the judiciary’s powers. This ‘burden’ on the judiciary’s 
back must not expose its members to the risk of involvement with political/ 
partisan skirmishes. To steer clear of such peril, we should ensure that: legal 
proceedings against members of the Cabinet are not exploited or otherwise 
1 In its 1/2011 ruling, the Judicial Council in Art. 86, para. 4 of the Constitution held that ‘by 
general principle of law, exceptional provisions are interpreted narrowly. The Law on Ministe-
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manipulated, consistent with the presumption of innocence; indictments 
against Ministers are not indiscriminately depicted as penalizations of the 
political life; the ministerial criminal liability maintains its individual/per-
sonal nature, and is not perceived as a symptom of a broader shared collec-
tive accountability of their political party or faction. 
( 2014 , p. 846) 
Reverting to the phrase ‘during the discharge of their duties’, it leaves room
for three potential interpretations. Specifcally, the offence (a) is committed
during the ministerial tenure according to a strictly temporal criterion, or (b) is
linked to the exercise of ministerial duties or (c) is in itself the act or the omis-
sion by which ministerial duties are discharged ( Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2011 , 
p. 496).
With respect to the first alternative, it is easily discredited by the rules of gram-
matical interpretation. In purely linguistic terms, ‘discharge of duties’ signifies 
the conduct through which the ministerial powers are exercised, whereas ‘dur-
ing’ does not allude to time but to the process of implementing the said author-
ity. Besides, such reading of the text would contradict both the obligation to 
impose restrictive construal tools and the rationale of the constitutional legislator. 
The latter acknowledges that such exceptions are tolerable only inasmuch as they 
defend the efficient and effective operation of the Government and the State, not 
when they offer an all-inclusive safe haven for ministerial criminality.2 In prin-
ciple, therefore, the special regime is reserved for offences that must somehow be 
associated with the discharge of ministerial duties. 
According to  Feloutzis (2005 , p. 455), an offence is committed during the 
discharge of ministerial duties only when it is substantially linked to such exer-
cise, not when it is merely perpetrated in the course of the minister’s tenure. 
However, this nexus is not always as palpable as it initially appears. For example, 
it would prima facie seem that a minister’s act of corrupting/seducing a minor in 
exchange for a material trade-off would not fall under Article 86, as such viola-
tion seems irrelevant to the discharge of ministerial duties. Nevertheless, in this 
case, if the victim is an irregular immigrant and the trade-off is a residence card 
which the minister can issue, then the crime does not seem detached from the 
exercise of ministerial powers. Hence, the law reasonably avoids a restrictive list 
of specific offences, leaving the examination of the aforementioned crucial ele-
ment to the prosecuting body. 
Useful inferences can be drawn from a comparative reading of the provision 
as it evolved in applicable legislation over time. Article 6 of Legislative Decree 
802/1971 reads: 
2 This inference is emphatically and unanimously held in the Greek Constitutional and Crimi-
nal Law doctrines and jurisprudence, in relevant case law and in the opinions traditionally 
expressed by Greek MPs in parliamentary committees and in the plenary, as chronicled in the 
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Offences committed by members of the Cabinet and Deputies which are 
unrelated to their public duties are not subject to the provisions of this 
Decree. They shall be heard in the courts cited in the provisions of Articles 
111 para 6 and 112 para 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
An almost consistent phraseology also appears in Article 3 of the succeeding Law 
2509/1997: ‘Offences which are unrelated to the ministerial duties are tried in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the com-
petent courts’. Given that the current law diverges from the previous wording 
and instead, prefers the expression ‘offences not committed during the discharge 
of their duties’, it appears that crimes may exist which are not committed during 
the discharge of ministerial duties but are also not irrelevant to such functions, 
for which prosecution is handled under the ordinary regime. In affrmative terms, 
the text of the law denotes that some offences are  linked to the fulflment of the 
said duties but are not perpetrated  during their implementation. Unsurprisingly, 
this premise bolsters the third and narrowest interpretation. 
However, it is not only the special statutes that pave the way towards this 
evaluation. As evident in several of its provisions, the Penal Code also adopts the 
aforesaid distinction between acts committed during the discharge of ministerial 
duties and acts simply related to such practices. Article 235, paras. 1–3 on the 
passive bribery of public officials selectively read as follows: 
1. A public official who, directly or through a third party, requests or receives 
or accepts the promise of any sort of illicit benefit for himself or for another 
in return for a future or completed act or omission  related to the discharge 
of his duties, shall be sentenced to imprisonment and a pecuniary penalty. 
2. If such act or omission of the perpetrator breaches his duties, he shall be 
sentenced to incarceration of up to ten years and a pecuniary penalty . . . . 
3. A public official who requests or receives, for himself or for another, an 
illicit asset-related benefit by  exploiting his capacity, shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment if the offense is not punishable under another penal provision. 
As evident, neither the expression ‘during the discharge of offcial duties’ nor 
any equivalent thereof is included in the provision. Nonetheless, the legislator 
refers to acts or omissions that are either ‘related to the discharge of’ such duties 
or contravene them (‘breaches’). Therefore, regardless of the permutations of 
passive bribery and their corresponding individual constituent elements, passive 
bribery of public offcials is never committed ‘during the discharge’ of their 
duties. 
Article 137A of Penal Code on torture also provides revealing feedback; it is 
therein envisaged: 
A public or military official whose duties include the prosecution of, interro-
gation for or investigation of offenses or disciplinary violations, or the execu-
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incarceration up to ten years if,  during the discharge of said duties, he tortures 
a person under his authority. 
As Symeonidou-Kastanidou comments: 
It is apparent from the wording of the law that the act of torture must be 
carried out at the time when the official prosecutes, interrogates, investigates 
or detains a person, i.e. precisely at the time when he exercises the powers 
bestowed upon him by the law or by the competent authority. A different 
interpretative approach, which would assimilate criminal acts merely ‘related’ 
to these duties with those committed ‘during’ such discharge would con-
stitute a contra legem reading to the detriment of the defendant, which is 
consequently intolerable. 
( 2011 , p. 498) 
Others have also proposed a more restrictive approach to the issue ( Margaritis 
2011 , pp. 490ff.), agreeing that the rationale behind Articles 137A and 235 
of the Penal Code should be utilised as an interpretative benchmark, whereas 
the obsolete Article 6 of Legislative Decree 802/1971 and Article 3 of Law 
2509/1997 could also provide serviceable guidance. Margaritis adds that 
another effective tool is the much pondered (in both theory and case law) ‘civil 
liability in case of mistrial’ found in Article 73 of the Introductory Law to the 
Code of Civil Procedure and in Article 6, para. 1 of Law 693/1977, where the 
expression ‘during the discharge of duties ascribed to the judicial functions’ is 
utilised. He concludes that the wording ‘during the discharge of duties’ encom-
passes only the acts that refer to the exercise of legally stipulated competences 
and the omissions to act according to legally stipulated functions. Margaritis 
argues: 
This assumption which detaches the crimes of bribery and money launder-
ing from the exceptional regime, is not at odds with the letter of the law 
and certainly responds to the exceptional nature of the relevant regulatory 
framework. 
( 2011 , p. 492) 
Anagnostopoulos (2011 ) disagrees with the above-mentioned arguments, main-
taining that such approaches which lean towards a sweeping reduction of the 
offences to which Article 86 of the Constitution applies are ‘suffocatingly nar-
row’. They mainly aim at mitigating the growing discomfort in the inability to 
prosecute former ministers due to the expiry of the constitution’s special statute 
of limitations, appearing in the form of an extinguishing deadline ( Anagnosto-
poulos 2011 , p. 575). 
Another line of reasoning which reinforces the application of the narrowest 
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judicial body competent to asses ministerial offences following parliamentary 
referrals. In accordance with the express constitutional provision of Article 86, 
para. 6: 
The Court competent for trying the relevant cases, at first and last instance 
is, as supreme court, a Special Court, which is composed for each case by six 
members of the Supreme Administrative Court and seven members of the 
Supreme Civil and Criminal Court. 
One of several amendments to the system governing ministerial criminal liability 
after the 2001 constitutional revision relates to the composition of the Special 
Court. This court is composed not only of senior judges to the Supreme Court 
(Areios Pagos) who serve civil and criminal justice, but also of six members of 
the supreme administrative court (Council of State), who bring their construc-
tive experience from participating in the disciplinary proceedings against civil 
servants, as well as their broad comprehension of public law, given that the pros-
ecution usually contends with administrative acts. Moreover, the Special Court 
is assisted by a Judicial Council, comprised by two members of the Council of 
State and three members of the Supreme Court, who are barred from concurrent 
membership in the Special Court. 
It is worth noting that according to the pan-European comparative report of 
the Committee on Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Coun-
cil of Europe in 47 Member States, it appears that Greece is moving into the 
‘main European trend’, which includes national legal orders which have estab-
lished a competent court composed exclusively of supreme justices, and not poli-
ticians (members of the House of Representatives or senators), as the case goes 
elsewhere. At any rate, this particular composition of the Special Court and the 
Judicial Council, involving exclusively high-profile judges, seems to correspond 
to the particularities accompanying the accountability of senior government 
officials. 
It has been suitably argued that: 
The nature of the ministerial responsibility resides within both Criminal and 
Administrative Law, not only because the institution is incorporated in the 
Constitution, but because ministerial duties are essentially bound by rules 
set in public law, whose violation interpretatively matches the mens rea, the 
actus reus and the other conditions of criminal provisions. 
( Venizelos 1993b , p. 57) 
Therefore, criminal acts referable to the Special Court may only be linked to the 
exercise of public authority and powers; otherwise, there would be no defensible 
claim for the participation of administrative judges, who obviously are unau-
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9.3 Statute of limitations and the extinguishing deadline: 
a hasty elimination of punishability 
Until recently, a very challenging aspect of ministerial criminal liability in Greece 
related to a set of tight temporal boundaries, not only regarding the statute of 
limitations but also the expiration of the so-called extinguishing deadline. The 
former is a well-known concept shared by most legal orders; the latter, while 
seemingly procedural, had an annulling impact on prosecution as a whole, which 
would eventually lead to immunity via the abolition of punishability. Prior to the 
constitutional revision of 2019, Article 86, para. 3 stated that ‘the Parliament 
may exercise its competence pursuant to paragraph 1 until the end of the second 
regular session of the parliamentary term commencing after the offence was 
committed’. This short time limit was put in place to prevent the lingering of 
pending criminal cases beyond the second national elections following the per-
petration of the alleged offence. The provision practically meant that potential 
early dissolutions of the Parliament (i.e., adding up to less than the maximum 
of 8 years for two 4-year parliamentary sessions) would automatically and per-
manently cease prosecution for all applicable cases, irrespective of the severity of 
the alleged offences. In other words, the culmination of the second parliamentary 
session following the commitment of the act stripped the parliament of its com-
petence to exercise prosecutorial powers, and the State could no longer advance 
in criminal proceedings against any offence committed by a minister or a deputy 
minister during the discharge of their duties ( Chrysogonos 2003 , p. 562). 
The extinguishing deadline, in conjunction with the statute of limitations, has 
raised a number of interpretative issues which have often split theory and case 
law.3 It is noteworthy that up until the previous constitutional revision of 2001, 
no reference had been made to the statute of limitations. This absence has since 
been cited as an excuse to prevent the procedural termination of prosecution, 
overlooking and possibly confusing it with the extinguishing deadline.4 Nonethe-
less, the legal nature of the extinguishing deadline initiated a dogmatic dispute 
that has been the focus of intense scientific and political debates. In particu-
lar, it has been argued that it quite resembles the deadline for the timely filing 
of a criminal complaint for a non–ex officio indictable violation under Article 
117 of the Criminal Code, after which criminal prosecution cannot be initiated 
3 See Ruling no. 1943/2010 (Judicial Council of the Athens Court of Appeals; Pinikí Dikaiosíni 
2011, p. 961). It refers to the accusations against the former minister of transport under K. 
Simitis’ administration (September 1997–April 2000). Therein, it is especially noteworthy that 
the prosecutor’s proposal to the Parliament views the statute of limitations and the extinguish-
ing deadline as one and the same legal concept. 
4 According to Art. 86, para. 5 of the Constitution: 
5. Should the procedure on the prosecution of a serving or former member of the Cabi-
net or Undersecretary not be completed for any other reason whatsoever, including the 
reason of status of limitations, the Parliament may, at the request of the person itself or 
of its heirs, establish a special committee for investigating the charges in which highest 
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( Magkakis 1984 , p. 283). It has also been asserted that the extinguishing dead-
line constitutes an ‘atypical form of amnesty’ as it practically encompasses the leg-
islator’s partiality for a particular category of acts ‘in order to restore social peace 
or to appease political passions’ ( Jescheck and Weigend 1996 , p. 923). 5 The most 
convincing view is that the extinguishing deadline is a sui generis case of a statute 
of limitations, on the grounds that they both eliminate punishability, thus render-
ing criminal prosecution inadmissible ( Mantzoufas et al. 2014 , p. 67). 
Indeed, both time limits set a clear point beyond which criminal prosecution is
impossible. The shorter (by default) cycle of the extinguishing deadline practically
lasted from two to six years (in case of a ministerial offence committed in the begin-
ning of a parliamentary term, the interval would eventually last for the entire four
years plus an approximately two extra years for the two sessions of the next term,
according to Article 53 of the Constitution), while the post-2011 statute of limita-
tions now depends on the nature of the offence (5 + 3 years for misdemeanours,
15 or 20 + 5 years for felonies). However, until the adoption of Law 3961/2011,
the exceptional statute of limitations was restricted to five years, irrespective of
the nature or gravity of the offence. Therefore, a crucial characteristic of the dif-
ferent criminal jurisdiction for ministerial offences was the substantially privileged
treatment of Cabinet members, as any parliamentary delay or procrastination in
initiating the required proceedings triggered the elimination of punishability, due
to either the expiry of the statute of limitations or the passing of the extinguish-
ing deadline. To this day, the application of Article 86 has largely and essentially
resulted in the inappropriate indirect impunity via expiration, which prevents scru-
tiny of ministerial criminal liability, and has thus confirmed that this constitutional
provision notably undermines not only the separation of powers but also the con-
stitutional principle of equality before the law ( Koukiotis 2010 , p. 1048).
9.4 Issues on complicity 
Article 1, para. 2 of Law 3126/2003 states that ‘accomplices are co-referred and 
tried according to the provisions herein’. Article 7, para. 1 mentions that the 
prosecution against the minister is extended to the accomplices, who are hence-
forth indicted and tried with the minister. Of course, the law follows the 2001 
amendment of Article 86, para. 4, whereby ‘in the case of impeachment before 
the Special Court of a serving or former member of the Cabinet or Undersecre-
tary, any participants are also jointly indicted, as specified by law’. 
However, according to para. 3: 
If the House rejects the proposal to prosecute as manifestly unfounded . . . or 
decides to not prosecute . . . the ordinary criminal courts are still competent 
over the accomplices and the provisions herein do no longer apply. 
5 See also Judgement no. 378/2005 (Athens Three-Judge Court-Marshal;  Piniká Khroniká
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Ergo, if a minister is the alleged principal offender and eventually avoids pros-
ecution, this would mean that the procedure otherwise endures for his/her 
accomplices, even though their involvement may be comparatively lesser or even 
secondary. Apart from disturbing implications on equal treatment and propor-
tionality, this absurdity also entails another possible setback: if the judges and the 
prosecutors consider such a case extremely serious (especially when signifcant 
damages have been incurred, to the public detriment), the exigency to punish 
the culprits and the frustration caused by the inability to prosecute the involved 
member of the Cabinet could lead to the draconian treatment of the accomplices 
( Kalogirou and Galetsellis 2009 , pp. 46ff.) 
A more equitable approach would call for an extension of equal treatment 
among all participants throughout every possible procedural outcome. In the 
words of Aravantinos, one of the founding fathers of modern constitutional the-
ory in Greece: 
Convictions against the Minister’s accomplices are an indirect conviction sine 
iudicio against the Minister and a stain on the Parliament, which tolerates the 
Minister and does not prosecute him, although his involvement was proven 
during the trial of the accomplices. 
( 1880 , p. 185) 
Androulakis agrees and characteristically stresses that ‘the Parliament . . . needs 
to rise up to the expectations and allow prosecution for all accomplices under the 
special regime, and thus contribute to the catharsis’, adding: 
Accomplices to the same crime must generally be tried together, for a mul-
titude of reasons (safer discovery of the truth when all parties are tried 
simultaneously, finer assessment of each defendant’s liability, prevention of 
contradictory decisions). 
( 1989 , p. 69) 
It is therefore imperative that the matter of complicity be also adjusted in line 
with the preceding remarks, as the procedural fragmentation essentially under-
mines the effectual handling of substantive aspects and culminates in breaches of 
the principle of isonomy. 
9.5 In defence of amending Article 86 
As scrutinised previously herein, the constitutional rationale behind the exceptional
procedure against ministerial offences is embedded in an otherwise seemingly believ-
able claim to avoid the likelihood of abuse by either governing majorities against
formerly governing political antagonists or by oppositions on a mission to tarnish
the credibility of a government by dragging its cabinet members behind criminal
hearings which dominate the public discourse. However, the experience amassed
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argument at its practical projection. On the latter, as fairly and laconically stated, ‘if
the political impartiality of the judiciary is uncertain or questionable, the political
impartiality of MPs is, by definition, nonexistent’ ( Chrysogonos 1997 , p. 459).
Per the former, the sheer number of ministerial prosecutions brought before the
Parliament over the last 45 years does not reveal signs of efficient abuse control.
Of course, the very few cases which ended up in trials in comparison to the large
number of prosecutions by parliamentary accord only add insult to injury.
In the words of Charalambakis: 
the parliamentary vote(: as regards ministerial prosecutions) is influenced by 
irrelevant aspects and policies or, more accurately, micro-political consider-
ations entirely unrelated to the penal assessment, such as the degree of the 
suspect’s popularity with the party leadership, or whether the cohesion of 
the governing majority hinges on the ballot outcome, etc. A typical example 
is the vote of May 5, 2009, on the prosecution of an MP of the then ruling 
party for acts allegedly committed during his stint as Minister, when—as 
admitted by almost all parliamentarians—their evaluation and, eventually, 
their choice was directly swayed by whether (depending on their affilia-
tion to the government or the opposition) the outcome of the vote would 
result (due to the marginal parliamentary majority of the ruling party) to 
the loss of the governing majority and the eventual fall of the government. 
As all political analysts highlighted, the result of the vote would be com-
pletely different if the ruling party had the luxury of ampler parliamentary 
preponderance. However, this blunt confession leads to an apparent loss 
of credibility in the functioning of the Parliament, a brutal devaluation of 
parliamentarism as a cornerstone of polity and a digression of democracy 
towards treacherous paths. 
( 2009 , p. 777) 
Furthermore, the supplementary claim that retaliation and vindictive micropo-
litical pettiness are essentially rooted in societies, where everyday politics ste-
reotypically involve exaggeration and tartness, is also fawed. First, it arbitrarily 
conjures a hypothetical built-in societal faw and thus oversees the fact that social 
constructs—much more, political ones—are not by any means subject to such 
deterministic and quasi-Darwinistic approaches. Behaviours, norms, and customs 
change over time and are basically outcomes of societal rather than natural vari-
ables. Second, it creates a zone of expedient idleness in favour of those who 
howsoever beneft from such advantages by trying to convince the public that 
these inherent imperfections are impossible to overcome. Of course, this pro-
motes a highly detrimental institutional stagnation whose impact can range from 
parliamentary crises to constitutional derailments. Moreover, this assumption 
serves better as a counterargument, as it becomes self-contradictory by imply-
ing that the crucial competence to impeach ministerial offences should not only 
be awarded to a non-judicial body, in breach of the separation of powers, but 
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vicious; that is, lacking the composed, unbiased, and impartial attributes typically 
required in such circumstances. 
The extraordinary regimen also allegedly seeks to shield secretaries and 
undersecretaries from the mendacious litigiousness of those whose interests are 
practically debilitated by the exercise of governing powers, given that policy 
implementation is fundamentally a decision-making process which most fre-
quently leaves certain individuals or groups displeased. In principle, this seems 
to be a rather convincing argument. Nevertheless, it loses significant momentum 
due to its quite restrictive outlook: decisions which may significantly obstruct 
important personal or collective pursuits are unquestionably not a ministerial 
monopoly. On a daily basis, hundreds of other political officials (directors, public 
enterprise CEOs, presidents of agencies, mayors and regional governors, etc.) 
take executive or quasi-executive action which may trigger the irritation or dissat-
isfaction of various stakeholders. Surprisingly, the legislature has never thought of 
lending an exceptional procedural hand to any such official, although it definitely 
should in terms of both equality and proportionality, as equivalent circumstances 
call for equivalent treatment, mutatis mutandis. 
Reflecting on the presented facts and observations, a cohesive and credible 
proposal to transcend the pressing standoff (between fundamental principles, 
constitutional commitments, the rule of law, operative polity, and political func-
tionalism) ostensibly lies in prioritising these contesting elements in terms of 
primacy—but not dominance—and in striking a fair balance between them by 
assessing the degree of compliance or defiance thereof. It is an almost joint con-
clusion that the constitutional and legal arsenal, albeit far from ideal in some 
aspects, is suitably equipped to sufficiently serve its alleged objectives. Still, it is 
almost unanimously admitted that the relevant provisions are consistently mis-
read by the MPs through the lenses of arbitrary intentions and that the recurring 
abuses grimly impair legality, justice, the Greek political system, and society’s per-
ception of and confidence in its institutions. The abolition of the extinguishing 
deadline via the recent constitutional amendment is an upgrade in principle but 
not a warranty of actual rectification. Besides, any moderate revision of Article 86 
still conforms to the general construct of parliamentary intervention in the crimi-
nal procedure, that is, to the entrusting of judicial or quasi-judicial competence 
to non-judges. 
If one revisits the underlying claims in favour of an exceptional legal framework 
for ministerial criminality, it becomes apparent that their ‘utilitarian’ requirements 
can also be met otherwise, even to the extent of completely abandoning the cor-
responding outlook. The perspective of abolishing all parliamentary interference 
and leaving the investigation and adjudication of ministerial offences exclusively 
to the hands of prosecutors and judges seems more appropriate and efficient. 
This is by no means a radical or an unusual hypothesis. As far back as 1891, 
when Harilaos Trikoupis—a true cornerstone of Greek political history who 
served seven terms as prime minister—was contesting a motion filed for alleged 
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I will stand accused before the judiciary. Before you, I am but a Member of 
the Parliament, and as a Member of the Parliament I have come to review 
your deeds and reprimand those who manage our matters. 
( Soleintakis 2005 , p. 108) 
Similar views have also been conveyed by a number of jurists and legal experts. 
The abolition of Article 86 in its entirety has been suggested, as 
it does not add anything substantial to the guarantee already acknowledged 
to MP’s in Article 62 para. 1 (i.e. immunity from criminal proceedings). If a 
former minister (given that such criminal liability primarily refers to former 
ministers) continues to be actively involved in political life . . . then he would 
normally carry the MP status, and, in lack of Article 86, permission of the 
House would certainly be required prior to prosecution. What is more, once 
the appointment of non-parliamentary ministers is disallowed, there will be 
no issue of extending legal protection beyond the limits of said immunity. 6 
Similarly, Professor of Constitutional Law George Kasimatis (2013) has offered 
this advice: 
Immediately abolish the current privileged prosecution system for members 
of the Cabinet and, in its place, ordain that ministers will now be prosecuted 
and tried as every other citizen, save for an absolute prioritization to ensure 
a prompt conclusion to the political limbo which harms democracy. 7 
Androulakis argues that Article 86 establishes ‘an unacceptable regime of forum 
speciale and extraordinary criminal liability’ and asks ‘why Ministers should 
be exempt from the ordinary criminal procedure’, concluding that ‘[this legal 
framework] should be annulled by way of a constitutional amendment’ ( 1989 , 
pp. 63–64). Others vouch in favour of parliamentary abstinence from the crimi-
nal procedure against ministers (e.g.,  Charalambakis 2009 , p. 777). It has also 
been questioned whether ‘a constitutional provision can denote disbelief against 
the institution of Justice’ and proposed that ‘competence to handle these crimi-
nal proceedings should be awarded to the ordinary judiciary, to senior prosecu-
tors or even to a collective body’ ( Vlachopoulos 2013 ). 
Initiatives along these lines reinstate equality before the law, as the indictment 
of secretaries and undersecretaries will not be arbitrarily assessed by their peers 
but by a judiciary with institutional competence over legal matters. Juvenal’s 
classic ‘quis custodiet ipsos custodes’ deadlock also finds proper practical resolu-
tion, and the separation of powers is likewise restored. This would similarly serve 
as a symbolic token for the consolidation of social peace, as it will verify that 
6 For this issue, see Chrysogonos’ (2011 ) study. 
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democracy trusts in the functioning of the institutions that it has established and 
are quintessential to its subsistence. Describing Article 86 as ‘an unconstitutional 
provision of the Constitution’, Koukiotis remarks: 
The equality principle established in Article 4 of the Constitution and the 
separation of powers according to Article 26 . . . can render Article 86 paras. 
1–3 invalid and non-applicable, and, therefore, lead to the prosecution of 
Ministers under the ordinary criminal procedure. 
( 2010 , p. 1049) 
Moreover, it is quite challenging to grasp how politicians are expected to oper-
ate as apt and equal substitutes of judges without typically having any relevant 
experience, while many even lack a rudimentary legal background, which is the 
bare minimum to merely comprehend the intricacies inherent in the criminal pro-
cedure. Therefore, on rare occasions when the parliamentary intervention does 
not practically lead to impunity, such practices innately debase the administration 
of justice. Of course, it would be simplistic to argue that judges and prosecutors 
are politically or otherwise completely unbiased, but they still remain signifcantly 
better alternatives to MPs. 
A certain degree of parliamentary armistice and serenity is another beneficial 
derivative of this proposal. Liberated from this (at best, controversial) capacity, 
the MPs will concentrate more on their primary duties of lawmaking and repre-
sentation in the political discourse and practice. To a certain extent, this will facil-
itate both the detachment of political responsibility from criminal liability at the 
parliamentary scrutiny level and the alleviation of the infamous ‘penalization of 
the political life’ (or perhaps, the politicisation of the criminal life). The mongers 
of petty micropolitical feuds and their schemes will have fewer opportunities to 
turn the house into a public showground of ambiguity and nebulous innuendos, 
which acutely violate the presumption of innocence and fuel popular distrust in 
the political system by and large. 
Of course, the suggested model should not neglect the legitimate concerns 
in defence of governance and politics. It is true that criminal procedures for 
ministerial offences are intrinsically ‘sensitive’, as their expected publicity and 
nationwide awareness put political systems, parties, and societies to a strenuous 
test. Although such crimes typically require long and sophisticated investigations 
and may involve numerous witnesses or suspects and procedural lags, neither 
the political system nor society as a whole should be required to endure lengthy 
intervals of unrest and instability. This would only perpetuate a vicious cycle and 
thus defeat the purpose of ensuring an inclusively effective regime. 
Immediate procedural prioritisation of such indictments and exceptional com-
petence of experienced prosecutors and investigating magistrates could provide 
a solid foundation to moderate the harmful by-products of criminal procedures 
against political figures. Indictment for ministerial misdemeanours could be han-
dled by public prosecutors to the Court of Appeals and should always entail man-
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should be appointed as investigating magistrate, and a deputy public prosecutor 
assigned to the Supreme Court should order the investigation and draft the sum-
mons. A judicial council comprising five Supreme Court judges will then resolve 
possible disputes between the investigating magistrate and the prosecutor and 
irrevocably decide to refer the case before the Special Court, cease prosecution, 
not press charges, or request supplementary investigation.8 
As envisaged in Article 86 of the Constitution, the Special Court carries suf-
ficient guarantees to pass irrevocable judgement on ministerial offences, that is, 
to ‘adjudicate at the first and final instance’, as typically expressed in Greek legal 
jargon. The implied prohibition to appeal the Special Court’s decision has been 
amply discussed regarding its compatibility with Article 2 of Protocol 7 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
which Greece ratified by virtue of Law 1705/1987. The article, titled ‘Right of 
Appeal in Criminal Matters’, stipulates in its first paragraph: 
Everyone convicted of a criminal offense by a tribunal shall have the right to 
have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise 
of this right, including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be 
governed by law. 
The prevailing opinion—as also articulated in case law 9—holds that a balanced 
interpretation of the stipulation found in the second paragraph of Article 2 resolves 
the issue in favour of conformity by introducing an exception to the respective 
right ‘in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the frst instance by the 
highest tribunal’. Therefore, given that the Special Court is staffed by judges to 
the Supreme Court and the Council of State, it substantially fulfls the ‘highest 
tribunal’ clause, and the exception validly applies. 
Additionally, given that no reference to transparency is incorporated in Article 
86 of the Constitution or in its explanatory remarks, inclusion of such a clause 
would streamline the charter’s animus to reflect current international develop-
ments in the field and could prove beneficial as an interpretative mechanism 
towards observing the respective principle. 
In a nutshell, our proposal encourages a paradigm shift which endorses par-
liamentary disengagement from all judicial powers and the establishment of a 
different procedural system to better fit the necessities of everyday politics with-
out paying a hefty price in terms of compromising fundamental principles and 
the rule of law. In doing so, the authors consider that the constitutional provi-
sions relating to the Special Court can still prove useful, effective and justifiable; 
8 Anagnostopoulos has recently proposed that the Plenary of the Athens Court of Appeals (a 
collective body envisaged in Art. 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and comprising about 
200 appellate judges serving in Athens) should replace the house as the competent body to 
decide by vote on ministerial prosecutions. See  Mandrou (2019 ). 
9 See Decision no. 69/1992 (Special Court in Art. 86 of the Constitution;  Epitheórisi Evropa-
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therefore, an amendment to Article 86 of the Constitution ranks ahead of an 
abolition—at least for the time being. Unfortunately, the constitutional amend-
ment of November 2019 did not seize the opportunity to move forward with a 
bolder agenda on the issue, limiting itself to the (fair) effacement of the extin-
guishing deadline in Article 86. According to Article 114, para. 6, this means that 
any possible further improvements would have to wait for at least five years and 
might even require broader consensus by 180 out of 300 representatives. More-
over, if the degree of parliamentarian concord during the recent amendment 
carries any predictive value, it leaves more to be desired regarding a future wider 
consent. Meanwhile, our aspirations as the authors are that the political system 
will mature in the years to come and that such cases will be handled with a sol-
emn commitment to seriousness and a sense of duty to observe the fundamental 
principles and to improve society and democracy. 
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 10 Transparency and accountability 
of the Italian public administration 
in the context of public 
procurement 
The case of below-threshold contracts 
Francesca Sgrò
10.1 Introduction 
The principles of transparency and accountability have entered the Italian legal
system relatively recently. In fact, their recognition is the result of the mod-
ernisation process in public administration (PA) that originated in the 1990s
and was accelerated by the ‘institutional’ use of the internet and the increas-
ingly frequent application of e-government models in several areas of public
activity.
According to Italian law, transparency is the total accessibility of information
about the organisation and the activity of PA. Closely linked to the principle
of transparency is the accountability of PA, which implies the obligation to
explain and justify the performed activity, public spending, and the pursued
objectives.
Since their first applications, transparency and accountability have been consid-
ered instrumental principles for the implementation of the principle of impartial-
ity in PA, enshrined in Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. In particular, Italian 
doctrine and jurisprudence have recognised  ab origine the necessary functional 
relation between transparency and accountability on one hand, and impartiality 
on the other hand, which has predominantly connoted the identity of the two 
examined principles. 
The objective of this research is to verify whether transparency and account-
ability have progressively developed autonomous relevance, detaching themselves 
from strict adherence to the principle of impartiality alone, and whether they can 
be considered independent principles/values oriented to the protection of the 
community, which in fact—due to transparency and accountability instruments— 
can exercise a democratic check on the PA action. The chosen field of investiga-
tion is the subject of public contracts, which represents the privileged scope of 
application of the transparency and accountability principles, since it is precisely 
through their instruments that it is possible to check whether the PA’s choice of 
contractor is legitimate. The research focuses on the examination of the particular 
area of public procurement that concerns contracts whose economic costs are 
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parabola of the legal significance of transparency and accountability regarding 
public contracts with lower values. 
This research is therefore aimed at verifying whether transparency and account-
ability are only projections of the principle of impartiality, as historically rec-
ognised by Italian doctrine and jurisprudence, or whether they have developed 
a more marked identity with multiple functionalities. In fact, transparency and 
accountability also significantly contribute to the fight against corruption, avoid-
ing any conflict of interest and promoting compliance with legality in the area 
of public contracts ( Fratini 2018 ). Moreover, transparency and accountability 
tools contribute, albeit indirectly, to the efficiency of decision-making processes 
because they allow the partial liberalisation of public evidence procedures to be 
constantly subject to the inspection of the National Anti-Corruption Author-
ity (ANAC), stakeholders and partners. From this perspective, transparency and 
accountability seem to partially detach themselves from the exclusive identifica-
tion with the principle of impartiality in order to progressively open up to the 
other two constitutional principles that have to guide PA (again in accordance 
with Art. 97 of the Italian Constitution), that is, good performance and admin-
istrative legality. 
The survey method used is based on the study of the legislative discipline on 
public procurement below the threshold. Through this focus and with an induc-
tive approach, the study aims to define the current physiognomy of the principles 
of transparency and accountability (i.e., the research problem). In particular, the 
study of public contracts below the threshold intends to demonstrate that Italian 
legislators now consider transparency and accountability instruments the main 
bastions that are able to counterbalance some political-legislative choices (risky 
in some aspects), aimed at simplifying procedures and relaunching the economy, 
as they allow administrative legality to be always ensured. 
In this sector, transparency and accountability seem to become the crossroads 
of the different constitutional principles that characterise administrative action— 
not only impartiality but also good performance, legality, and democracy. It 
can be deduced that transparency and accountability have attained legal maturity, 
becoming autonomous principles/values and instruments to bring citizens closer 
to PA. 
The legal concepts of transparency and accountability, which may be perceived 
as two sides of the same coin, are briefly described in Section 10.2. In Section 
10.3, the application of these principles in the context of Italian public procure-
ment is examined, focusing on the transparency and accountability obligations 
that are imposed on the contracting authority in service and supply contracts 
below the threshold. In the context of below-threshold contracts, an attempt is 
made to identify the importance of the principles of transparency and account-
ability, taking into account Italian legislators’ current choice to simplify pub-
lic procurement procedures. In particular, the transparency and accountability 
obligations that the legislators have differentiated according to a proportionality 
criterion on the basis of the value of the public contract are examined in Sections 
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that aim to detect the alleged evolution of the principles of transparency and 
accountability from the Italian perspective. From principles closely linked to the 
impartiality of PA, they seem to emancipate themselves into some autonomous 
principles/values in order to provide guidelines for both the protection of the 
legality of administrative action and the good performance of PA (Section 10.6). 
10.2 Transparency and accountability as two sides 
of the same coin 
Transparency is the total accessibility of information about the organisation and 
the activity of PA. It aims to promote a widespread check on the implementation 
of institutional functions and the use of public resources. 
The principle of transparency—which in Italy was already enshrined in Admin-
istrative Procedure Law no. 241/1990 and subsequently specified in Legislative 
Decree no. 33/2013—entails the obligation to publish administrative acts, and by 
means of this, PA reveals and defines its accountability. In particular, each action 
of PA must be disclosed through the publication of relevant acts on institutional 
websites, specifically in the Transparent Administration section (which is specifi-
cally dedicated to this purpose), to allow anyone to access the administrative doc-
uments that have external relevance. Transparency is not achieved through the 
mere communication of information, but it requires the flow of information to 
be rational and understandable. This means that information and communication 
must be organised and decoded in order to make the recipients (citizens, judiciary,
and guarantee authorities) truly aware of the administrative choices. 
Along with the publishing rules that are imposed on PA, the duty to provide 
reasons also represents the most traditional expression of the principle of trans-
parency ( Masucci 2015 ). Acknowledged as a general principle of administrative 
action by Article 3 of Law no. 241/1990, it covers the obligation of PA to com-
municate the reasons for its decisions and concerns all public measures that have 
external relevance. In particular, PA provides the justification for administrative 
decisions, stating the relevant facts and evidence and citing the relevant legal 
norms and showing how they fit each other. The function of this justification 
is to ensure the transparency of administrative action and therefore to endorse 
a general check on public choices. The duty to provide reasons in fact offers a 
rational reconstruction of the administrative activity by explaining the logical and 
legal arguments followed by PA to reach its final decision. In this way, the duty 
to give reasons has become a fundamental guarantee for citizens ( Torchia 2016 ). 
Closely linked to the principle of transparency is accountability of PA, which 
implies the obligation to explain and justify the undertaken activity, the public 
spending, and the pursued objectives. In fact, accessibility to PA information is an 
instrumental requirement to give an account of the PA choices in terms of con-
sistency with the pursued objectives, the achieved usefulness, and the justification 
for public spending ( Opdebeek and De Somer 2016 ). This supervision ensures 
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There is a circularity between transparency and accountability because of their 
close relation. In particular, transparency is the  objective connotation of admin-
istrative action and has its own reflection in accountability, which connotes PA
as a subjective attribute. They are the two sides of the same coin, and both are 
functional in achieving direct impartiality and indirect legitimacy of administra-
tive decision-making. 
Accountability—which today represents a typical prerogative of every PA—is 
not only tightly connected to the principle of transparency but is also instrumen-
tal to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness of administrative action. By 
means of accountability tools, PA declares and demonstrates the usefulness of any 
administrative action, reports the results achieved, and explains the main steps 
of the administrative proceedings. In this way, it is induced to act legitimately, 
use public resources proportionately to the results to be achieved, and satisfy the 
public interest. 
In the context of public procurement, accountability has a high value. In fact, 
public economic resources allotted to the functioning of administrative bodies 
are largely available, increasing the risk of creating a grey area that may cause the 
occurrence of abuse, violations of rights, conflicts of interest, and, in the more 
serious cases, infiltrations by criminal organisations aimed to illegally appropriate 
public money through public procurement. This explains the enhancement of 
PA accountability in the field of public procurement, as shown by the legislative 
reforms over the last few years, aimed to strengthen the tools that allow PA to 
give an account and justify its action. In this sector, PA is required to disclose and 
justify the functionality of a contract as being for the public interest, the choice of 
the economic operator, and the consequent public expenditure. 
The Italian regulation on public procurement, whose core lies in the Public 
Contract Code (CCP; Legislative Decree no. 50/2016), has been reformed many 
times to simplify the administrative procedures in order to promote the public 
works necessary for the development of the country and thereby to increase eco-
nomic investments ( Caringella and Giustiniani 2019 ). In low-value contracts, the 
objective to speed up and streamline the procedures has led to the simplification 
(as much as possible) of the award procedures or even the exclusion of the call for 
tenders, with the aim of ensuring effective and rapid action that is functional for 
PA efficiency. CCP promotes the approval of public contracts whose values are 
inexpensive, reducing some caution, but has always guaranteed the procedures’ 
transparency, the contracting authority’s accountability, and the protection of the 
competition of economic operators interested in negotiating with PA. 
In this chapter, the aim is to analyse the most recent physiognomy of the prin-
ciples of transparency and accountability of Italian PA through the study of spe-
cific innovations introduced by the recent reform of CCP (i.e., the Unblocking 
Construction Sites Reform approved in 2019). This investigation is limited to the 
contract awards for supplies of goods and services whose values are less than the 
threshold of the value that marks the European relevance of the awards (and also 
includes the awards for public works of equal value). The reason is to verify how 
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public procurement when the level of public spending is not high and therefore 
the risk of illegality is low. Regarding this category of awards, the recent CCP 
reform has in fact marked a new balance among the different principles involved 
in this field. This reform aims to promote PA efficiency, which implies speed and 
economy of choices, while the need to prevent illegal behaviour and corruption 
practices is met by means of transparency and accountability tools that are pro-
vided in every step of the public procedure. In essence, the analysis is intended to 
outline the current meaning of these principles in the light of their most recent 
applications in Italy in the context of public procurement, particularly regarding 
the contract awards for services and supplies with values below the threshold of 
European relevance (and works with the same value). 
10.3 Transparency and accountability in the context 
of Italian public procurement 
According to Article 1655 of the Italian Civil Code, procurement is ‘the con-
tract by which a party undertakes to perform a work or render services, with the 
organisation of the necessary means and with management at its own risk, in 
return for compensation in money’. When PA launches calls for tenders for the 
contract awards for works, supplies, or services for the performance of its institu-
tional activity, it is necessary to follow a public procedure. This procedure aims to 
identify the counterpart of the contract that the PA will enter into and is based on 
the fundamental principles of administrative activity: legality, impartiality, good 
performance, transparency, economy, and accountability. 
The legal framework of public procurement appears metaphorically as a levia-
than, that is, an imposing corpus whose members make up the different sectors 
involved in public contracts, distinct but in any case, united by a single identity 
matrix, which they contribute to shaping. In fact, public contracts include het-
erogeneous contract categories (works, services and supplies, concessions, etc.). 
These categories are subjected to a partially different regulation, which is none-
theless characterised by the development of the same decision-making process, 
beginning with the ‘decision to contract’, continuing with the award, and ending 
with the stipulation and the execution of the contract. It is a complex, composite, 
and constantly evolving regulation, which is set up in a partially different way, 
based on the object of the contract and the subject/PA that leads the public pro-
cedure. The regulation of public contracts for works, supplies, or services was set 
out in Legislative Decree no. 50 of 18 April 2016 and subsequent amendments 
(CCP), and over time it has been integrated in many aspects by the interpreta-
tions proposed by ANAC in its guidelines. This complex regulatory architecture 
provides both the public phase, which starts with the publication of the contract 
notice and ends with the award, and the subsequent contractual phase, which 
begins with the stipulation of the contract and after its execution, terminates with 
the payment for the activities carried out by the economic operator. 
Many constitutional interests are relevant in the field of public procurement 
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need to adopt a wide range of guarantees to safeguard  impartiality and trans-
parency in choosing contractors must be coordinated with the objective of  good 
performance of PA in terms of simplification, speed, and maximum functionalisa-
tion of efficiency and care for the pursued public interest without compromising 
equal treatment and free competition in the reference markets ( Corrado 2019 ). 
From this perspective, transparency and accountability are direct expressions of 
the constitutional principles of impartiality and good functioning of PA, as estab-
lished in Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. This explains the legislators’ con-
tinued interest in the Public Contract Code (CCP), which has been frequently 
updated, most recently due to the passing of Law no. 55 on 17 June 2019 (con-
version of Decree Law no. 32/2019, i.e., the Unblocking Construction Sites 
Reform Decree) and Law no. 58 on 28 June 2019 (conversion of Decree Law 
no. 34/2019, the so-called Growth Decree). 1 
The general principles governing administrative activity in public procurement 
are established in Article 30, p. 1 of CCP. This article (‘Principles for the Award 
and Execution of Procurements and Concessions’) integrates and coordinates 
the traditional principles of administrative action with the rules of primary law 
contained in the European Union (EU) treaties that apply to all public contracts 
(regardless of their economic values). This provision states: 
The award and execution of works, services and supplies contracts and con-
cessions . . . shall ensure the quality of the performances and shall be carried 
out with respect to the principles of cost-effectiveness, efficacy, timeliness and 
correctness. In awarding contracts and concessions, the contracting authori-
ties shall also respect the principles of competition, non-discrimination, 
transparency, proportionality, as well as publicity, according to the modalities 
indicated in this Code. The principle of cost-effectiveness may be derogated, 
within the limits in which it is expressly allowed for in current legislation 
and in this Code, by criteria, provided in the call for competition, inspired 
to social exigencies, as well as to the safeguard of health, environment, cul-
tural heritage and the promotion of sustainable development, also under an 
energy standpoint. 
(Legislative Decree no. 50/2016 art 30) 
In particular, CCP moves along four directions. First, it is oriented towards sim-
plifying and speeding up procedures. Second, it aims to promote free competi-
tion in the reference markets. Third, it aims to protect transparency and prevent 
corruption practices and infltrations by criminal associations. Fourth, it enhances 
1 This chapter does not examine Law no. 120 dated 11 September 2020 (conversion of Decree 
Law no. 76 dated 16 July 2020 (the so-called Simplifications Decree), which introduced a 
temporary regime in the derogation of Art. 36, para. 2 of CCP for procedures starting on 31 
December 2021. This change is limited in time and is aimed at encouraging public investment 
in the infrastructure and public service sector and addressing the negative economic effects of 
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environmental and social protection. The latest trends in public procurement— 
expressed by the recent CCP reform (the Unblocking Construction Sites 
Reform)—testify to a partial change of perspective. This reform aims to promote 
the principles of simplifcation and transparency, also reducing the weight of the 
criterion of economy (even if the latter is mentioned before the others in the suc-
cession of the principles pursuant to Art. 30 of CCP). This solution is adopted 
in the name of the unprecedented acceleration of procedures, which is directed 
towards increasing the construction of public works (unlocking those that are 
already ongoing) and the growth of the country on one hand, and reducing 
procedural obligations when the value of the contract is irrelevant on the other 
hand. Indeed, a dual regulatory approach is established at the European level, 
which identifes and distinguishes between two contract categories based on their 
economic values. All the procurement rules derived from European law are in 
fact directed towards uniformly regulating only those contracts with signifcant 
economic values, whose amounts exceed specifc thresholds established by the 
European Commission. 2 For these contracts, detailed regulations and particularly 
stringent requirements for both contracting authorities and economic operators 
are provided. This discipline aims to defne a uniform set of rules within the EU 
territory, which allows economic operators in all member states to participate in 
public tenders wherever permitted in the EU. Otherwise, for public contracts 
whose values are less than the threshold of European relevance (below-threshold 
contracts), a less rigorous procedural regime is allowed. This is possible because 
the national legislation is subject (only) to compliance with the general principles 
inferred from the European treaties in the feld of public procurement, while the 
legislation in detail is left to the autonomy of each state. 
In Italy, the first version of CCP (Legislative Decree no. 163/2006, the 
so-called De Lise CCP)—which transposed the provisions of Directives no. 
2004/17/EU and no. 2004/18/EU—disregarded that distinction and adopted 
a similar regulation for below-threshold contracts and for contracts with values 
equal to or greater than the European thresholds. The current version of CCP 
2 The values of the European threshold are updated every two years by means of the European 
Commission’s decisions, which have been directly applied since the date of their publication in 
the Official Journal of the EU. The most recent update of the threshold was made by means 
of the Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) no. 1827–1828–1829–1830 of 30 October 
2019, effective on 1 January 2020. The thresholds of EU relevance are as follows: (a) EUR 
5,350,000 (replacing the previous value of EUR 5,548,000) for public work contracts and 
concessions; (b) EUR 139,000 (replacing the previous value of EUR 144,000) for public 
supply and service contracts and public design contests awarded by contracting authorities 
that are central governmental authorities; (c) EUR 214,000 (replacing the previous value of 
EUR 221,000) for public supply and service contracts and public design contests awarded by 
sub-central contracting authorities; and (d) EUR 750,000 for social service and other specific 
service contracts. In the special sectors, the thresholds of EU relevance are as follows: (a) EUR 
5,350,000 (replacing the previous value of EUR 5,548,000) for work contracts; (b) EUR 
428,000 (replacing the previous value of EUR 443,000) for supply and service contracts and 







Italian public administration 181 
(Legislative Decree no. 50/2016) 3—especially after the latest reform in 2019 4— 
inverts this trend and differentiates between the two categories to simplify the 
award procedures for below-threshold contracts. To counterbalance this simpli-
fication, CCP reinforces the impact of some general principles deemed essential, 
such as accountability and transparency of PA, as well as the protection of com-
petition and equal treatment of economic operators. 
Definitely, the current setting of CCP aims to enhance the fluidity of the trans-
actions conducted by PA in order to streamline procedures and reduce burdens 
on both contracting authorities and economic operators. This recent perspec-
tive explains the raising of the thresholds that allows the direct award of con-
tracts. Essentially, a simplification intent characterises contracts whose values are 
below the threshold of European relevance. This purpose is achieved through the 
enhancement of the tools aimed at selecting the best bid by means of an easier 
and faster procedure. 
10.4 Procurement of services and supplies with economic 
costs below the threshold of European relevance 
after the recent reform of the Italian Public 
Contract Code (CCP) 
Without prejudice to the sequence of activities that characterise a tender (decision 
to contract, selection of the best bid, award, stipulation, and execution), some 
significant diversifications in the public procedure are laid down and are aimed 
to simplify it in cases of contracts with low economic values. As noted, the differ-
ence in the procedures depends on the economic value of the contract, that is, if 
the contract’s amount (estimated net of value-added tax) is greater or less than 
specific thresholds set out by the European Commission and indicated in Article 
35 of the Italian CCP. Limiting the analysis to public procurement of services 
and supplies whose values are lower than the threshold of European relevance (as 
indicated, for the two-year period 2020–2021, this is equal to EUR 139,000 for 
contracts stipulated by central state administrations and EUR 214,000 for other 
3 The Legislative Decree no. 50/2016 has transposed into Italian legislation the provisions of 
Directives no. 2014/23/EU, no. 2014/24/EU, and no. 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014. 
4 The Unblocking Construction Sites Reform (Law no. 55 on 17 June 2019 amending Legisla-
tive Decree no. 50/2016) provides for a return to traditional sources because these sources, 
being rigid, guarantee legal certainty. The provision of a single government regulation, to be 
issued soon (within 180 days from the reform’s entry into force, unless extended), which will 
collect and rationalise some of the most important guidelines of ANAC, implies the downsiz-
ing of the ‘soft law’ system that was enshrined in the original version of the Italian CCP. The 
soft law system in the field of public procurement is mainly based on these guidelines, which 
have certainly produced significant benefits in terms of flexibility and adaptation to the chang-
ing needs deriving from application practices but have also caused some problems. In fact, this 
system has generated several uncertainties in the practical applications of the legislative provi-
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sub-central administrations, such as local authorities) makes clear the legislators’ 
willingness to promote simplification and speed for below-threshold contracts, 
without sacrificing transparency and impartiality in managing the procedure. Pur-
suant to Article 36, CCP defines an autonomous regulation for below-threshold 
contracts and provides the generalised use of direct awards, which replaces public 
competition among multiple economic operators in a completely innovative way. 
Specifically, for below-threshold contracts, the contracting authorities can use the 
simplified procedures set out in Article 36, p. 2 of CCP, which are the so-called 
pure direct award (Art. 36 (a), p. 2) and hybrid or mixed direct award (Art. 36 
(b), p. 2). There is always the possibility of using the ordinary procedures if the 
market requirements suggest maintaining a competitive comparison. 
A detailed analysis of the current procedure for below-threshold procurement 
of services and supplies (referring to other studies for an in-depth treatment of 
the whole subject) shows that the most innovative aspect concerns the replace-
ment of the tender with the direct award in favour of the bidder that the con-
tracting authority (through the official who manages for the procedure) deems 
worthy to be awarded the contract, in light of the general principles concerning 
the matter. This is a high-impact political choice based on the use of the direct 
award as a flexible legal instrument that guarantees the simplification and timeli-
ness of administrative action. 
It is also a choice that partially contradicts the rules governing public contracts 
that exceed the threshold value of European relevance. In fact, over time, the 
public procurement system in Italy has been amended by several reforms, aimed 
to avoid the risk of corruption in the transactions between PA officials and eco-
nomic operators. In this context, the objective of impartiality in the choice of the 
contractor has been pursued through both the minute details of the public pro-
cedure and the provision of stringent transparency and publicity obligations for 
the activities carried out in each phase. This set of solutions seems indispensable, 
not only to discourage corruption practices but also to ensure the accountability 
of the contracting authorities and therefore of PA. The publicity of the acts sup-
porting each procedural step and the knowledge of the reasons that justify public 
choices allow a formal verification from both the public authorities (judiciary) 
and the guarantee bodies (ANAC), as well as from economic operators wishing 
to enter into an agreement with PA and from citizens who can exercise demo-
cratic checks on the administrative activities through the advertising. 
Stated differently, the legislative policy to simplify the procedures in below-
threshold contracts—carried out through the generalised use of direct awards— 
entails conferring immense discretionary power on the contracting authorities 
that are legitimised to enter into the agreement directly (without competition) 
with the bidder deemed more convenient, only in light of the general principles 
governing PA, outside the strict burdens and the guarantees characterising the 
tender for above-threshold contracts. It could be a reckless choice in the context 
of Italian public procurement. Indeed, in the latest reform, Italian legislators 
relaxed those constraints imposed on the public procedure and conferred greater 
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these service and supply contracts (and works of the same amount). In this sector 
of public contracts, a particular delineation of PA efficiency has been privileged, 
which mainly tends to simplify and speed up administrative activities, even at 
the risk of reducing the principle of economy that simultaneously characterises 
the administrative actions, because the absence of competition among several 
competitors sacrifices the possibility to obtain superior goods or services at lower 
costs. 
10.5 The case of the so-called pure direct award 
(for contracts whose amounts are lower 
than EUR 40,000) 
Public contracts for services and supplies with amounts less than the threshold 
of European relevance are examined as constituting a paradigmatic case of the 
strategy with which Italian legislators intend to connect the simplification of 
administrative procedures with the principles of PA transparency and account-
ability. Within this category of contracts for which the direct award has replaced 
the tender, a further sub-distinction, ratione valore, has been established, and 
the procedural constraints have been proportioned so that additional proce-
dural duties have been required for the most expensive contracts. In particular, 
when the contracting authority is a central administration, CCP provides for a 
sub-distinction and distinguishes the awards whose amounts are less than EUR 
40,000 (Art. 36(a), p. 2) from the awards whose amounts are equal to or exceed 
EUR 40,000 and less than the thresholds that are now set at EUR 139,000 for 
supplies and services (Art. 36(b), p. 2). In the first case, the procedure is certainly 
more streamlined because the contracting authorities can grant direct awards, 
‘also without prior consultation of two or more economic operators or for works 
in direct administration’ (Art. 36(a), p. 2). 
Normally, the procurement procedure starts with a decision to enter into an 
agreement (decision to contract) that contains the essential elements of the ten-
der, such as the public interest to be satisfied, the selection criteria for economic 
operators and offers, the object of the award, and the amount. In below-threshold 
contracts, the decision to contract directly produces a binding agreement on the 
subsequent award. In fact, it also indicates the supplier, the reasons for the selec-
tion of the supplier, the supplier’s capability to fulfil the general requirements, 
and technical and professional requirements (if applicable). This is the so-called 
decision in a simplified form (pursuant to Art. 32, p. 2 of CCP), which is pre-
ceded by an informal investigation conducted by the contracting authority by 
means of the activity of the official responsible for the procedure, specifically 
designated for each award. 
In this phase, it is possible to use market analyses (preferably, but not neces-
sarily, on the electronic markets of PA) or consult the lists of economic operators 
(previously drawn up by the contracting authority) to identify not only the costs 
of the goods or the services and the specific solutions proposed in the market 
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simplification are achieved because the contracting authority, on one hand, is not 
required to formally consult multiple economic operators in order to compare 
different offers, and on the other hand can award the supply or the service con-
tract to a freely identified economic operator without providing any justification 
for this choice in the award decree ( Biancardi 2020 ). 
Regarding the duty to cite the reasons for the direct award, it is necessary 
to acknowledge the progressive change of opinion that has occurred over the 
last few years. According to the original approach of CCP (2016), the contract-
ing authority was required to give ‘adequate reasons’ in the event that the con-
tract had been directly awarded without a tender. By means of Guideline no. 4, 5 
ANAC confirmed this approach and (in point 4.3.1) clarified that the contracting 
authority should have an ‘adequate’ motivation behind its choice, specifying in 
detail the bidder’s capability to meet the general and the special requirements, 
the offered goods’ or services’ compliance with the public interest, any areas 
for improvement proposed by the bidder, the fairness of the price in relation 
to the quality of the goods or services, and compliance with the principle of 
rotation. However, to simplify the below-threshold procedures, the contracting 
authority was allowed to fulfil its duty of reason giving through the comparison 
among the price quotations to justify the award. Legislative Decree no. 56/2017 
(the so-called Corrective Decree)—with a significant change with respect to the 
ANAC positions—directly reformed CCP and repealed the duty of reason-giving 
for direct awards whose amounts were less than EUR 40,000 (pursuant to Art. 
36(a), p. 2 of CCP). The Unblocking Construction Sites Reform (2019) sub-
stantially confirmed this position. There is thus a trend reversal compared with 
the original approach of CCP (supported by the interpretation of ANAC); cur-
rently, the contracting authority is not required to provide any justification for 
direct awards with very low values. Apparently, the legislators seem to have given 
up a very effective transparency and accountability tool. Indeed, even without 
any explicit requirement, the duty of reason giving for direct awards is derived 
from the general principles of good performance, impartiality and transparency of 
PA, from Article 3 of Law no. 241/1990 (and subsequent amendments), which 
requires a proper and full justification for all administrative acts that produce 
external legal effects, as well as from Article 32, p. 2 of CCP, which states that the 
decision to enter into an agreement must always indicate, albeit in a simplified 
form, the reasons for the selection of the supplier. 
In this case, the justification is not absent; it can be found in the ‘decision in 
a simplified form’ that precedes and legitimises the direct award, while only the 
subsequent award decree (that is, the final act of the public procedure) may not 
contain any explicit reason. 
5 Guideline no. 4 (‘Procedures for the award of public contracts for amounts less than the 
thresholds of European relevance, market analyses and management of the lists of economic 
operators’) was approved with the resolution of ANAC no. 1097 of 26 October 2016 and 
(after the Unblocking Construction Sites Reform) was most recently updated with the resolu-
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Definitely, the contracting authority must always justify (albeit briefly) its 
choice of the economic operator and specify the correspondence of the operator’s 
offer to the public interest, the fairness of the price in relation to the quality of the 
service (with any areas for improvement offered by the contractor), and compli-
ance with the rotation principle or the reasons for its derogation.6 However, the 
goal of simplification entails that these reasons shall be synthetic and contained 
only in a single act, which is the decision to contract. 
On this point, it is noted that alongside the general principles governing pub-
lic procurement pursuant to Article 30, p. 1 of CCP (cost-effectiveness, effec-
tiveness, timeliness, fairness, free competition, non-discrimination, transparency, 
proportionality, and advertising), in the below-threshold contracts, the princi-
ple of rotation is greatly enhanced, expressly provided by Article 36, p. 1 of 
CCP. This principle represents the concrete implementation of free competition, 
intended as both an equal treatment of the economic operators that access the 
public procurement market and an effective possibility for participation of micro, 
small, and medium enterprises in cases of low-value contracts. The principle of 
rotation aims at avoiding the consolidation of advantageous positions by the bid-
ders who have already been awarded the previous tenders (the so-called outgoing 
operators) or have participated in previous procedures without being awarded. In 
fact, having already obtained information on the management of the procedure 
by the contracting authorities, these operators would be privileged over others in 
the market.7 The rotation applies only to the award immediately preceding the 
one that is currently granted (‘one jump’), provided that the object of the awards 
(previous and current) belongs to the same product or service category and that 
their values are equivalent. 
The principle of rotation is not absolute because the contracting authority may 
derogate from it in exceptional circumstances, but in this case, it is required to 
provide adequate justification. Obviously, a more stringent reason is necessary if 
the derogation concerns the rotation of the awards. In this case, the contracting 
authority shall justify the award to the outgoing operator based on objective data, 
such as the particular structure of the market and the absence of alternatives and 
competitive operators. Another motivating factor behind the choice of the out-
going operator may be its subjective profile, that is, its reliability, deduced from 
the degree of satisfaction recorded in the previous contractual relationship in 
light of the quality of its service and its compliance with the agreed delivery date 
6 To prove the fairness of the price, the contracting authority may use a comparison with market 
price lists, with offers previously presented for identical or similar goods and services or with 
prices charged to other administrations. Certainly, the comparison among multiple offers, 
although no longer expressly requested, still represents a best practice that is useful for ensur-
ing competition, transparency, and accountability without sacrificing the simplification of the 
award procedures. 
7 The principle of rotation is applied to both the bidders (aimed to exclude the outgoing eco-
nomic operator from the tender) and the invitations (aimed to exclude not only the outgoing 
economic operator but also the other economic operators invited in the previous tender 
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and costs. Otherwise, only an essential and concise justification is required in the 
case of derogation from the rotation of the invitations. In this case, the contract-
ing authority may justify its invitation addressed to the previous bidder (albeit not 
awarded), referring to the expectation derived from previous contractual rela-
tionships or other reasonable circumstances, about the operator’s reliability and 
suitability to perform consistent with the expected cost and quality levels. 
Actually, the legislators diversify the transparency burdens based on the real 
needs arising during the procedure, as evidenced by the flexibility of the duty to 
give reasons for the award. The direct award for any work, service, and supplies 
amounting to less than EUR 40,000 does not require an express justification. 
However, the justification for the award is not entirely excluded but results ali-
unde, not from the award decree but from the decision (in a simplified form) to 
contract that legitimises the public procedure. In fact, pursuant to Article 32, p. 2 
of CCP, the decision to contract shall include the reasons that explain and justify 
the award to a specific economic operator. The award decree is therefore strictly 
consequential to the decision to contract and refers to it for the reasons behind 
the choice made by the contracting authority. In this way, the duty to give rea-
sons, which is a general principle (pursuant to Article 3 of Law no. 241/1990), 
remains safe and can be satisfied  per relationem. 
Stated differently, the duty to give reasons once again becomes an impera-
tive obligation that must be expressed explicitly and fully in the event that the 
contracting authority derogates from one of the fundamental principles govern-
ing the procedure, as in circumstances where it cannot respect the rotation and 
decides to award the contract to the outgoing operator (in legitimate cases). In 
such cases, the contracting authority is required to explain the legitimacy of its 
derogation from the principle of rotation, and the duty of reason giving becomes 
the main accountability tool8 to explain the legitimacy and the impartiality of the 
administrative choice and the proper functioning of PA. 
10.6 The case of the so-called hybrid or mixed direct 
award (for contracts whose amounts are from EUR 
40,000 up to the level of European relevance) 
As noted, contracts for supplies and services whose amounts are equal to or 
exceed EUR 40,000 and less than EUR 139,000, which is currently the thresh-
old of European relevance, can also be directly awarded. In this case, the more 
consistent values of the contracts have led legislators to introduce additional 
procedural burdens to protect impartiality, transparency, and accountability, 
which require enhanced protection due to the increase in public spending. For 
8 In 2005, Koppell presented five ‘conceptions of accountability’: transparency (revealing the 
facts about the performance), liability (facing the consequences of the performance), control-
lability (acting in line with the principal’s desires), responsibility (following the rules) and 
responsiveness (meeting expectations). These five conceptions provide a framework for analys-
ing accountability concerns and priorities ( Koppell 2005 ). 
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this category, the public procedure is featured by the direct award, with prior 
consultation, where existing, with at least five economic operators for services 
and supplies (three for works of the same value), identified on the basis of 
market analyses or lists of economic operators, in accordance with the crite-
rion of rotation of invitations (pursuant to Art. 36(b), p. 2 of CCP). Accord-
ing to this new procedure—introduced by the Unblocking Construction Sites 
Reform (2019) and qualified by the first commentators as a hybrid or mixed 
direct award—the contracting authority shall carry out a thorough investigation 
before awarding the contract. In particular, it is required to carry out market 
analyses or consult official lists of economic operators and then select different 
operators to be invited to the competition. The competitive comparison among 
the bids determines the choice of the contractor. The hybrid or mixed direct 
award is therefore based on the comparison among various offers, and although 
simplified forms and procedures are used, it does not sacrifice but enhances 
the obligation of publicity aimed at protecting transparency and accountabil-
ity. Indeed, the new regulation requires the acquisition of at least five bids in 
the sector of services and supplies; in this regard, the contracting authority is 
required to consult various operators to acquire different offers, among which 
a comparison is made. This seems to be an element of stiffening and aggravat-
ing the procedure (despite the intentions of the reform), which is nonetheless 
justified to safeguard the impartiality of public choice. The procedure starts with 
the decision to contract, which can be adopted in a simplified form (pursuant 
to Art. 32, p. 2 of CCP) and contains information similar to that provided for 
the pure direct award (pursuant to Art. 36(a), p. 2 of CCP). Subsequently, the 
procedure is divided into three phases: (1) ‘selection of economic operators’ 
to be invited to the competitive comparison, which are identified by means of 
market analyses or consultation of lists; (2) ‘invitation’ to the selected economic 
operators to submit an offer; and (3) ‘competitive comparison’ among the bids 
submitted, with the choice of the successful bidder. The operators invited to 
the procedure are selected in a non-discriminatory way, whose number is pro-
portional to the amount and the relevance of the contract and in any case, at 
least equal to five (for services and supplies) on the basis of the criteria defined 
in the decision to contract, as well as in compliance with the principle of rota-
tion of the invitations. Even in the hybrid or mixed direct award (similar to the 
pure direct award), the invitation addressed to the outgoing contractor is excep-
tional and shall be adequately motivated. To guarantee the transparency of the 
choice and the efficiency of the procedure, the contracting authority can adopt 
a regulation to govern the comparison of the invited economic operators. 9 The 
tools assigned to the contracting authority to perform its investigation are both 
market analyses and operator lists, which are subject to stringent publication 
9 The regulation may indicate (a) the methods of conducting market analyses, possibly grouped 
by amount range; (b) the methods of establishing the lists of suppliers, possibly grouped by 
category and amount range; and (c) the criteria for choosing the subjects that will be invited 
to submit an offer. 
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requirements. The market analysis has an exploratory function, aimed at identi-
fying the economic operators that are present on the market, meet the require-
ments set by the contracting authority and are interested in participating in the 
tender. In this way, the contracting authority will gain in-depth knowledge of 
the reference market and the conditions that are generally applied and obtain 
important information concerning both the features and the quality standards of 
the requested goods and service, plus the charged costs. The contracting author-
ity has the broad freedom to choose the methods and the criteria to perform 
market analyses and can diversify its modus operandi based on the value of the 
award or the type of the requested goods or service. As a rule, the most used 
method is the consultation of catalogues of the electronic market. The start of 
the investigation activity is disclosed by publishing a notice on the contracting 
authority’s website (Transparent Administration section) for at least 15 days 
(which can be reduced in cases of particular necessities). In this notice, the ele-
ments that will be included in the subsequent invitation to the competition are 
substantially moved up. These elements are the value of the award, the essential 
components of the contract, the requirements of professional suitability, the 
minimum requirements of cost-effectiveness and financial capacity, the level of 
technical and professional ability, the minimum number (not less than the num-
ber indicated by law) and possibly the maximum number of operators that will 
be invited to the competitive comparison, the selection criteria, and the modality 
for communicating with the contracting authority. 
As an alternative to the market analyses, the group of economic operators to 
be invited may be identified by the contracting authority, which will select them 
from specific lists that were previously drawn up. In particular, the contracting 
authority will publish a notice in the Transparent Administration section of its 
institutional website. In the notice, the contracting authority will declare its deci-
sion to set up official lists, grouped under product categories from which it will 
select the operators to be invited to the public procedures, and will highlight the 
requirements for the registration of the operators on these lists. In particular, the 
notice will establish the general requirements (pursuant to Art. 80 of CCP) that 
the operators must fulfil, the criteria for selection, the categories of the awards 
and the ranges of the amounts, based on which the contracting authority has 
divided the lists, and any minimum requirements for registration. The contract-
ing authority will assess the requirements and check the information provided by 
the operators. At the end of this selection, the final lists of the selected economic 
operators will be published. These lists—which will implement a quality ‘vendor 
rating’ system—are subject to periodic reviews to verify the providers’ consistent 
fulfilment of the requirements over time. By consulting the lists, the contracting 
authority will have a list of operators whose seriousness and professionalism have 
already been verified. Moreover, having asked to be included in these lists, these 
operators have expressed their willingness to participate in the award procedures, 
so they are more reliable. Subsequently, when the public procedure takes place, 
the contracting authority will simultaneously invite some of the providers to the 
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on the award criteria (pursuant to Art. 95 of CCP): the lowest price or the most 
economically advantageous tender. 
10.7 Final considerations on balancing the principles of 
transparency and accountability with the aim of 
simplification in the context of below-threshold 
contracts 
In Italy, the urgent demand to carry out public works and infrastructures and 
speed up the execution of administrative activities has led to the promotion of 
simplification and celerity regarding public contracts that have low economic val-
ues, as evidenced by the recent reform of public procurement. The Unblocking 
Construction Sites Reform (2019) mainly involves the contract awards for works, 
goods, and services that have reduced values, which are strictly instrumental to 
the administrative activities. In such cases, the level of public spending is low; 
therefore, the risk of illegal conduct is reduced. For these reasons, legislators have 
adopted a sort of ‘liberalisation of procedures’, giving up some anti-corruption 
precautions and allowing the contracting authorities to enter into an agreement 
without an ordinary tender but only by means of a direct award. Indeed, in the 
context of below-threshold contracts, the latest reform aims to achieve a balance 
among different interests and therefore promotes gradual liberalisation, diver-
sifying the procedural obligations based on the economic value of the public 
contract. For the awards whose amounts are less than EUR 40,000, a highly 
simplified procedure applies, and the contracting authority can freely choose the 
successful bidder, provided that the general principles are complied with (includ-
ing the principle of rotation). For simplification purposes, in a direct award (that 
is pure), the duty of reason giving is not required, although the reasons that jus-
tify it can be deduced aliunde and in any case, are always expressed in the decision 
to contract (which legitimises the whole procedure). Certainly, the duty to give 
reasons expands and becomes an indispensable element in the event that the con-
tracting authority derogates from the legislative procedure, as in the case of the 
award to the outgoing operator (in legitimate cases) by way of derogation from 
the principle of rotation. In this hypothesis, this derogation from the legislative 
framework increases the demand for transparency so that the duty to give reasons 
becomes the main accountability instrument because it allows the contracting 
authority to justify the legitimacy of the applied derogation. 
For services and supplies (and works of equal value) whose amounts are equal 
to or exceed EUR 40,000 and less than EUR 139,000, the procedural sequence 
is more complex, and each measure aimed at simplification is overseen by a cor-
responding transparency tool. When the value of the contract increases, the leg-
islators consider it appropriate to introduce some caution in ensuring impartiality 
in the management of the award and provide for a competition, albeit simplified, 
based on the comparison among different bids. In this case, the obligations of 
publicity increase because of the demand to disclose the investigation acts sup-
porting the choice of the operators to be invited to submit an offer. In essence, 
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the reinforced proceduralisation of the administrative action does not concern 
the evaluation of the submitted offers (i.e., the final sequence of the award pro-
cedure) but the previous and preparatory phase focused on market analyses and 
official lists of reliable providers. This is the most significant phase of this proce-
dural sequence because it is when the preliminary selection occurs, which is able 
to bind the shortlist of final competitors. This is also the phase that the legislators 
have intended to enrich with additional obligations of publicity, precisely because 
in a maximally simplified competition, this preliminary selection largely influ-
ences the final choice. 
Transparency and accountability characterise the entire regulatory framework 
of public procurement. The proceduralisation of administrative activity and the 
publicity of each decision are necessary tools of legality, and they fight against 
corruption but risk becoming factors of complexity in case they are not propor-
tional to the interests involved. Nevertheless, to unblock a sector that is tradition-
ally affected by delays and slowness, it is necessary to promote the simplification 
of procedures for public contracts whose amounts are not within the threshold 
of European relevance. The recent reform of the Italian CCP has promoted a 
sort of liberalisation based on the simplification of procedures and the increase of 
discretionary power entrusted to the contracting authorities. At the same time, it 
has placed important protective tools alongside each ‘deflationary’ measure—the 
duty to provide reasons and publish the most relevant documents—to safeguard 
transparency and accountability. These measures follow a proportionality crite-
rion; in fact, there is a gradation of transparency burdens because they increase 
not only when the value of the contract increases but also whenever the simpli-
fication measures and the related increasing discretionary power may create a 
grey area in the administrative action. The advertising obligations become crucial 
tools in the most significant phases of the procedure, such as when the contract-
ing authority derogates from the ordinary procedure outlined by legislators or, in 
general, adopts relevant decisions for the public choice. There is a graduality of 
the advertising obligations because the administrative documents are published 
on the basis of real and effective needs for transparency and accountability. An 
excess of information is avoided because, although it discourages corrupt prac-
tices, it may foster ‘bid-rigging’ agreements among the economic operators. 
To promote a groundbreaking balance among different principles and oppos-
ing public interests, the regulation of below-threshold contracts (especially after 
the Unblocking Construction Sites Reform) is tied to the principles/values of 
transparency and accountability, which represent a guarantee of legality, good 
performance, and impartiality. Transparency and accountability have close func-
tional relations for the full achievement of other constitutional principles, but 
over time, they have acquired autonomous ontological relevance. The protec-
tion of transparency and accountability not only influences the legal obligations 
imposed on PA but also shapes the PA’s modus operandi, currently oriented to 
giving account of any choice made, especially whether its activity is carried out 
by the exercise of discretionary power. Transparency and accountability are men-
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the management of administrative power. They aim to ensure both impartiality in 
the choices and good performance in the effects; they also contribute to making 
PA efficient and responsible. Finally, they implement the democratic principle 
because they allow a democratic check on administrative decisions. 
An examination of the latest legislative reforms has revealed the Italian legisla-
tors’ willingness to exclude tenders among several economic operators and to 
opt for direct awards in low-value contracts. In terms of the value, this inten-
tion is reflected in the choice to underrate both the principle of competition 
that pervades the subject of public procurement in European legislation and the 
principle of cost-effectiveness that traditionally characterises domestic legislation. 
The downgrading of these principles is justified by the pressing need to make 
PA more efficient and speed up public procurement contracts of lesser value but 
may generate the risk that corrupt conduct will be fuelled precisely because of 
the lack of the guarantees that the tender ensures. However, it should be noted 
that to counterbalance this choice, the legislators have only used transparency 
and accountability tools, which therefore become predominant in order to avoid 
the risks of corruption and illegality that may arise from the absence of tenders 
among several operators. In addition to the principle of competition, the choice 
of opting for direct granting of contracts below the threshold also downplays 
the principle of cost-effectiveness, which historically puts the subject of public 
contracts under some stringent accounting constraints. The absence of competi-
tive tendering eliminates the possibility that through competition among several 
contenders, PA may purchase goods or services under the best economic condi-
tions. In this case as well, it is a sacrifice decided by the legislators to hasten the 
process of choosing the contractor for contracts below the threshold. On one 
hand, it is offset by the compliance with the principle of rotation of credit facili-
ties (mentioned above); on the other hand, it is supervised by the transparency 
and accountability obligations provided for at each stage of the procedure. 
The accountability of PA that—in the role of the contracting authority—uses 
public resources strengthens the community’s participation in public governance 
and provides a new direction, which is based on disclosing the public choices and 
reporting the results. In this way, whether there is clarity of intent and prompt 
information disclosure, those grey areas that favour corruption and illegality can-
not be created in the delicate and risky public procurement sector. 
If the conceptual autonomy granted to the principles of transparency and 
accountability and the strengthening of the instruments for the implementa-
tion of these principles are really suitable for counterbalancing the simplification 
and guaranteeing the full legality of the administrative action, only the evidence 
of facts, and therefore a subsequent diachronic investigation, can confirm it. It 
is certainly clear that Italian legislators are proceeding with caution, and such 
uncertainty is explained in light of the particular domestic situation and Italy’s 
chronic exposure to corruption risks in the public procurement sector. However, 
this does not diminish the autonomous legal importance that is now ascribed 
to the principles of transparency and accountability, considered essential in the 
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 11 Transparency and government 




On Thursday, 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave the 
European Union (EU) in a process called ‘Brexit’. The in-out referendum on the 
EU membership was held in accordance with the European Union Referendum 
Act 2015. The British voters were asked whether the UK should remain in or 
leave the EU.2 The referendum result has given rise to the most profound consti-
tutional change in decades. Nevertheless, the exclusively politically binding deci-
sion of British society could not naturally result in reversing the processes that 
had shaped the UK’s systems in an evolutionary manner for decades. Holding a 
referendum was not a constitutional or legal requirement. In accordance with the 
British constitutional law, the parliament in its sovereignty could have decided 
to withdraw (or not) without using this form of direct democracy. UK constitu-
tional law scholars (e.g., Barnett 2017 , p. 153) emphasise that ‘referendums in 
the UK have always been considered to be “advisory” rather than legally bind-
ing’. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the purely advisory character of the 
referendum is a hindrance in British political practice to the meaningful impact 
of the majority of voters’ unambiguous opinion on the conduct of a given policy. 
Thus, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU was made to depend on the future result 
of a referendum, which had a purely advisory character in the strict legal sense but 
was binding in the political sense ( Allen 2018 , p. 106). 
From a legal point of view, before the Brexit negotiations formally commenced, 
the court was confronted by a legal challenge. As a result, a ruling was issued on 
the power of the UK Government under the royal prerogative to trigger Article 
50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the first step in the process of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Thus, the Supreme Court’s intervention was 
necessary in order to define the constitutional role of Westminster in this scope. 
1 This chapter presents the results of Research Project No. 2018/29/N/HS5/00685, financed 
by the National Science Centre (Poland). 
2 See Article 1(4) of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. The result showed 51.89% 
voting to exit the EU and 48.11% opting to remain (no minimum percentage of the vote was 
required for a binding decision). In contrast, in the 1975 referendum, two-thirds (67.23%) of 
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This chapter provides an analysis of the EU/UK approach to transparency, 
which was being used as a tactic in the Brexit negotiations and is of particular 
interest. Taking into account the nature of the issue, it would be rational to 
expect the EU and UK political parties to adopt a common approach to transpar-
ency, which would result in increased responsibility. Openness and transparency 
are key elements in ensuring accountability in the decision-making process. The 
UK Government embraced the Brexit talks in a particular way. On the one hand, 
the UK sought to avoid the scenario called the ‘no-deal Brexit’; on the other 
hand, it consistently exposed a tough line on the issues where it was difficult to 
reach an agreement, although it would result in the ‘hard Brexit’. 
Moreover, the UK constitutional structure also influences transparency in the 
Brexit negotiations through the role of Westminster (and its EU Select Com-
mittees). A key component of democratic governance is clarity of responsibil-
ity, enabling voters to accurately hold politicians to account for their actions. In 
this context, an important aspect of the current research is the question of how 
accountable the divorce process from the EU should be construed. The analysis is 
complemented by a brief examination of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
from political and legal perspectives in the context of the Brexit negotiations. It 
is widely known that the UK’s membership in the EU resulted in a progressive 
limitation of Westminster sovereignty. In legal terms, it is also questioned whether 
the decision on the withdrawal from the EU will result in a ‘renaissance’ of the tra-
ditional sovereignty doctrine, per A. V. Dicey (1982 ). Thus, this chapter links the 
processes taking place at the international level with those on the domestic plane. 
The following research hypotheses were adopted. First, the result of the 2016 
EU referendum took on a particular political role because its effect made it 
impossible for the UK Parliament to disregard the will of the people. Second, the 
outcome of the so-called Miller I case showed that the courts had been forced 
again to draw the boundaries of constitutional competence between the executive 
and the parliament, in the sense that they had consistently backed Westminster. 
Third, the more open the Brexit process was, the more responsible the govern-
ment became. Therefore, maintaining control over the dissemination of infor-
mation, especially regarding disputes among cabinet ministers as to what form 
Brexit should take and how long it should last, was of paramount importance 
to the stability of the government. Fourth, in legal terms, the objective of this 
chapter is to present the argument that the expected results of the process of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not lead to restoring the traditional doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty but may only apparently result in the revitalisation 
of the current status quo of individual state institutions. 
11.2 The UK’s exit from the EU 
11.2.1 The conduct of the UK’s foreign affairs—a brief outline 
In the UK, it is commonly known that the capacity to conclude and denounce 
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negotiating, signing, and ratifying treaties is conducted by the currently ruling 
government on behalf of the Crown (see, e.g.,  Higgins 2009 , p. 550). Conse-
quently, the responsibility for concluding and terminating treaties involving the 
UK lies with the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Develop-
ment Affairs. In turn, a government department, the Foreign, Commonwealth 
and Development Office is responsible for all aspects of foreign and EU policies 
concerning the conclusion of treaties and the decision-making process in formal 
and procedural issues. In this light, it is obvious that the British system draws a 
clear demarcation line between the strictly international sphere, which is imma-
nently a part of royal prerogative ( Leyland 2016 , p. 87;  Loveland 2015 , p. 93) 
and implemented by the executive authority with the prime minister at its head, 
and the domestic plane, which is the internal effectiveness of international obliga-
tions ( Gillespie and Weare 2015 , pp. 94–95). 
11.2.2 Triggering of Article 50(2) of the TEU without 
parliamentary authorisation 
The sovereign’s will, as expressed in the 2016 EU referendum, became the politi-
cal basis for the government’s decision to withdraw the UK from the EU. How-
ever, from the legal point of view, following the events, the main concern of 
both British scholarship and case law was the triggering of Article 50 of the TEU 
procedure. The cited provision is the legal basis for such an action because pursu-
ant to the regulations contained therein, ‘any Member State may decide to with-
draw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’. 3 
A member state wishing to withdraw from the EU is obliged to formally notify 
the European Council of its intention to conduct negotiations and conclude a 
withdrawal agreement. 4 It is important to note that neither the method nor the 
form of notification has been specified in the EU Treaties’ provisions. In this 
context, the matter of proper procedure should be considered in the case of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU structures. In British constitutional practice, two 
important issues related to this matter emerged. First, owing to the uncodified 
British Constitution, it was necessary to define unequivocally the British ‘con-
stitutional requirements’ in this respect. Second, there arose the fundamental 
question—triggering a discussion both politically and doctrinally and requiring 
judicial intervention—of whether the government had independent competence 
to trigger Article 50(2) of the TEU, ergo what role the parliament should play 
in this respect. Against this backdrop, the decoding of the normative content 
of Article 50(2) of the TEU, whose provision determines the starting point of 
the Brexit, is identified with the act of submitting an application (notification of 
3 See Article 50(1) of the TEU. As it appears, this formulation is autonomous, while its content 
should particularly consider the manner of participation of a member state in supranational 
organisations, especially regarding the form and the manner of terminating international 
agreements. 
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intention) to withdraw from the EU. Undoubtedly, in accordance with the politi-
cal tradition of the UK, this competence (on the exercise of prerogative power) 
in practice is bestowed on the government. However, against this background, 
there arose the legal question of whether the executive government could use the 
Crown’s prerogative powers to give notice of the withdrawal without parliamen-
tary authorisation. 
Initially, the answers to one of the most important questions related to the 
Brexit process were sought in the scholarship views. For example,  Barber et al 
(2016 ) argued that prior consent was required in the statutory form to take fur-
ther necessary steps in the withdrawal procedure (in this context, see also  Phillip-
son and Young 2018 ). An additional confirmation of this thesis is the role of the 
parliament established in the literature and practice, measured by its significance 
for the political system. As pointed out by Bradley and Ewing (2003 , p. 77): 
Parliament’s importance within British government depends less on absolute 
legislative power than on its effectiveness as a political forum in expressing 
public opinion and in exercising control over government. 
In this connection, an interesting aspect of the discussed issue was the impact 
of the results of the referendum of 23 June 2016 on the future decision of 
Westminster. 
Two circumstances need consideration here. First, as indicated in the scholar-
ship, despite the non-binding nature of the referendum outcome, overall, the UK 
Parliament respects the position expressed by the citizens, which results simply 
from the contemporary realities of political life. Due to its unequivocal character, 
the outcome of the referendum did not leave any room for a decision in terms of 
the parliament’s reinterpretation of the will of the nation (despite a slight major-
ity of votes). In the public opinion, it was emphasised that the parliament should 
deem itself bound by the result of the advisory participation of voters. 5 There-
fore, in political terms, the result of the 2016 referendum took on a particular 
role because its effects made it impossible for the parliament to disregard the will 
of the people. Second, it is impossible not to refer briefly to the method of the 
implementation of EU legislation within the UK legal system, which was relevant 
in the Brexit process. It should be emphasised that the principle of dualism exist-
ing in the British constitutional law means that in addition to legal acts consti-
tuted by national authorities, if international agreements and other international 
acts (including those established by the authorities of international organisations) 
would be applied, then in the understanding of the UK doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, international legal acts require appropriate, separate, and indepen-
dent ‘anchoring’ in domestic law. Thus, it is necessary to apply the appropriate 
procedures to transform the norms of international law into provisions of the 
5 As Matthews (2017 , pp. 604–607) points out, the increased practice of referenda has consoli-
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British legal system. Since foreign affairs in the UK are generally conducted on 
behalf of the Crown by ministers as part of prerogative power, on this basis, both 
negotiation and ratification of treaties may take place without any consultation 
with the UK Parliament, which does not play any direct role in the process of 
concluding international agreements. However, it is worth noting that interna-
tional agreements necessitate obtaining the consent of the relevant legislative 
body in order to enter into force. This means that simply signing and ratify-
ing agreements are not synonymous with their transformation into the domestic 
structure of British law. Thus, in terms of the British legal system, the significance 
for the characteristics of the specifics of the process of implementation of EU 
legislation is that an international agreement subject to ratification (or one that is 
not subject to ratification) does not become an internal part of the UK law until it 
first takes on the form of a primary legislation ( Barnett 2017 , p. 128;  Lang 2017 ; 
Oliver 2003 , pp. 81–82;  Feld 1972 , p. 251). Thus, without the approval of the 
legislative branch, the executive branch may not change an applicable law, mean-
ing that on each occasion, it is necessary to issue a special statute incorporating 
treaty provisions into the national legal system. 
In the above context, the Brexit negotiations allowed the discernment of a 
certain systemic contradiction manifested in two instances. On the one hand, 
UK constitutional law scholars expressly believed that it was impossible to make 
the British institution of the referendum binding. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment of Theresa May claimed the right to trigger Article 50(2) of the TEU 
and thus set the course of the procedure for withdrawing the UK from the EU 
structures without the parliament’s consent. It should therefore be stated that de 
facto, as a result of the EU referendum, the freedom of parliamentary decision 
was curtailed and the referendum lost in practice its  strict consultative nature 
(e.g., Ewing 2016 , p. 293). Thus, the de facto paramount status of popular sov-
ereignty was further emphasised by the conflict over Article 50 of the TEU, 
which could only be resolved by making a judicial decision. 
11.2.2.1 Miller I case judgement 
In the case of R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,6 
the UK Supreme Court, sitting for the first time en banc on 24 January 2017, 
answered a legal question for which the constitutional requirements were legally 
unspecified. The case required a determination on whether the government’s 
triggering of Article 50(2) of the TEU procedure required approval from the 
parliament. In other words, the main question in this case was whether, under 
royal prerogative, the Crown (the executive) had the power to initiate the with-
drawal process from the EU. The decision was issued, following an appeal against 
the High Court of Justice judgement of 3 November 2016, 7 which maintained 
6 [2017] UKSC 5; hereinafter Miller I case. 
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that the case might be subject to a judicial review and that there was no pre-
rogative power to trigger Article 50(2) of the TEU. The prerogative of either 
concluding or denouncing treaties, which operates entirely at the international 
level, cannot be exercised in relation to the EU treaties, particularly if there is no 
applicable basis in this respect, expressed in the primary legislation. Against this 
background, the European Union Referendum Act 2015 provided the legal basis 
for the referendum itself but did not authorise the government to trigger Article 
50 of the TEU. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the established constitu-
tional requirements did not authorise the government to initiate the procedure 
of leaving the EU without conferring this power by the UK Parliament through 
the adoption of a relevant statute. The key problem in the so-called Miller I case 
concerned the determination of the extent to which the scope of the prerogative 
power was subject to a judicial review. The ruling confirmed that the prerogative 
power might be limited or waived by the primary legislation. The Supreme Court 
referred to the views of one of the leading lawyers of the 20th century, Sir H. W.
R. Wade (1980 , p. 47), who wrote that most of the powers that constituted the 
royal prerogative had just been limited or abolished in this way. He pointed out 
that a statutory limitation or revocation of a prerogative right might occur by 
express words or by necessary implication. Since the EU legislation was imple-
mented in the British legal order under the European Community Act 1972, on 
this basis, any national legislation had to comply with the EU law. Thus, minis-
ters have no power to make any changes to the applicable sources of law, unless 
they are effectively authorised to do so by the legislator. Then, as a result of the 
Miller I case judgement, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 
2017 was adopted on 16 March 2017, containing the statutory consent of the 
parliament, authorising the prime minister to refer to Article 50(2) of the TEU. 
Therefore, this series of actions marked the formal and legal start of the Brexit 
procedure. Thereby, the law enforced the notification to be carried out in accor-
dance with regulations. 
11.3 The EU and the UK positions in the Brexit 
negotiations and the impact of the principle 
of transparency 
On 29 March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May submitted a document to the 
president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, notifying him of the UK’s 
intention to withdraw from the EU, as a consequence of invoking Article 50(2) of 
the TEU, after the passing of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Act 2017, following the UK’s EU membership referendum on 23 June 2016. 
This had a twofold effect. First, the formal process of the Brexit negotiations was 
given the green light. Brexit talks were conducted in the light of the guidelines 
provided by the European Council. Second, the goal was to conclude an agree-
ment that would set out the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal, taking into 
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be negotiated in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 218(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The first aspect of the Brexit negotiations was the timing, which was consid-
ered of paramount importance. The withdrawal procedure from the EU stipu-
lates that from the date when the UK Government sends the European Council a 
formal notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU, the two-year period 
will start to apply, during which the negotiations will be held in order to reach a 
formal deal. Thus, the withdrawal was then planned to occur on 29 March 2019 
(Exit Day 1), two years after the date of notification, as specified by Article 50(3) 
of the TEU. Moreover, the normalisation of this in effect also technically allows 
the extension of the two-year period, but only if the EU-27 agree unanimously. 
Therefore, on this legal basis, due to a number of emerging problems, the Brexit 
deadline was initially extended to 12 April 2019, and then again to 31 October 
2019 (Exit Day 2). As is well known, the third extension stipulated the Brexit 
deadline of 31 January 2020. The fact that the UK decided to leave the EU did 
not automatically mean that the EU institutions, procedures, and regulations 
already in operation would no longer apply and that it would be possible to defy 
them. They remained binding for the UK, and their impact on British law was 
still considerable until the end of the implementation/transition period (on 31 
December 2020). 
The second important aspect was the representation, which referred to who 
was able to lead the Brexit negotiation process. Obviously, the UK was repre-
sented by its government, notably by Prime Minister Theresa May (and sub-
sequently by Prime Minister Boris Johnson), but an important role was also 
assigned to David Davis, the UK’s Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union. From 14 July 2016 to 31 January 2020, the Department for Exiting 
the European Union was also appointed, whose main responsibilities were over-
seeing the negotiations to leave the EU and establishing the future relation 
between the UK and the EU. However, this issue was more complicated on 
the EU side. The EU Treaties vest the European Council (i.e., the heads of the 
member states) with the ultimate negotiation power. The European Council 
shall issue the EU’s negotiation guidelines and nominate the EU negotiator; it 
also has the authority—subject to the European Parliament’s consent—to finally 
conclude any Brexit agreement on behalf of the EU ( Hacke 2017 , p. 106). The 
European Council chose the European Commission as the EU lead negotia-
tor. The European Commission was responsible for the negotiations and was 
in close contact with the European Council, which provided political leadership 
and oversight. 
Third, the complexity of the Brexit talks mainly entailed developing the legal 
framework of the Withdrawal Agreement and determining the terms of the UK’s 
future relation with the EU. This involved the adoption of appropriate negotiat-
ing techniques on the sides of both the UK and the EU. In this connection, it is 
essential to portray how the Brexit negotiations were held and what negotiation 
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11.3.1 Brexit negotiation strategy 
Owing to the fact that the UK remained a full member of the EU until its actual 
withdrawal from the latter (which took place on 31 January 2020), the aim of 
the Brexit negotiations was a proper and suitable preparation for the formal 
withdrawal. However, the initial reaction of the British government was Prime 
Minister May’s refusal of a ‘running commentary’ on the Brexit negotiations. 
In the first place, it was triggered by the fear of revealing the British negotiat-
ing position prematurely and the necessity to gain time in order to determine a 
particular approach. In turn, the EU was the first party to start publishing docu-
ments delineating the adopted negotiating position, which somewhat forced the 
UK to react appropriately and promptly. Hence, the UK could not keep post-
poning the publication of the necessary documents and the presentation of its 
negotiating position, including the withdrawal agreement and the post-Brexit 
settlement. Moreover, it soon became evident that the British government did 
not intend to issue any information on the withdrawal negotiation plan, as it 
simply lacked one. It was argued that the decision made in the EU referendum 
came as a surprise, as the government headed by the then Prime Minister David 
Cameron did not expect such a result. As a consequence, the later approach to 
the negotiations of Prime Minister May, who became responsible for managing 
the government and obliged it to withdraw the country from the EU, began to 
be challenged. It was particularly problematic that a conservative manifesto from 
2015 obliged the party to respect the outcome of the referendum, and the cam-
paign was conducted in this spirit, and the Cameron government (to which May 
then belonged) quickly adopted the electorate’s decision. Despite campaigning 
to remain in the EU, when she became prime minister, May had to fulfil her 
promise of respecting the will of the people, emphasising that ‘Brexit means 
Brexit’. It could be observed that in the initial period of her term in office, the 
prime minister demonstrated caution, but at the same time, she strenuously and 
incessantly strived for the withdrawal. She consistently tried to ensure that her 
government and party (Conservative) had the sense of taking the proper direc-
tion in the tumultuous aftermath of the referendum and managed to overcome 
the initial challenge of putting its outcome into effect. 
The information on the intentions of the British government in the context 
of the negotiations was provided in a fragmentary but controlled manner and 
presented in a notification letter sent to the President of the European Council. 
Moreover, the Government White Paper provided the parliament and the country 
with a clear vision of what the government was seeking to achieve in negotiating 
Brexit and the new partnership with the EU. Prime Minister May set out the gov-
ernment’s approach to the discussions, clearly emphasising the fact that the UK 
would strive for the deep and special partnership that takes in both economic and 
security cooperation. Additionally, it was clearly stressed that the Brexit process 
should be used in such a way that the objectives were achieved in a fair and orderly 
manner and with as little disruption as possible on each side. It was also strongly 
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to remain committed partners and allies of the UK’s friends across the continent 
at the same time. In the opinion of Prime Minister May, the cessation of the acces-
sion to the EU structures was not intended to weaken the EU’s position. The EU 
referendum of 2016 was a vote to restore national self-determination, and the 
notification of the intention to act was to give effect to the democratic decision 
of the people of the UK. Hence, the priority goal was to agree on the terms of a 
future partnership alongside those of the withdrawal from the EU. 
The UK Government proposed principles that could help shape forthcom-
ing discussions. First of all, from the outset, it was declared constructively and 
respectfully, in the spirit of sincere cooperation. The government wanted to 
achieve the best possible result of leaving the EU and build a new ambitious and 
special future partnership between the UK and the EU. Agreeing on a high-level 
approach to the issues arising from the UK’s withdrawal was an early priority. 
Government officials realised the challenge to reach such a comprehensive agree-
ment within the two-year period set out for withdrawal discussions in the TEU. 
At the early stage of the negotiations, an important aspect was the setting of the 
implementation period in order to adjust to the new arrangements in a smooth 
and orderly manner. The deep and special partnership was supposed to contrib-
ute towards the prosperity, security, and global power of the European continent. 
Most of all, the UK did not want to lose the regulatory alignment, the trust 
in one another’s institutions, and the spirit of cooperation stretching back for 
decades. Moreover, from the beginning of the negotiations, it was realised that 
the Article 50 exit procedure was intended to put member states (in this case, 
the UK) at a disadvantage when leaving the EU. Therefore, even before a for-
mal notification was given, other EU governments were called upon to indicate 
which demands could be accepted in order to avoid their rejection at the formal 
start of the withdrawal procedure. However, the EU’s position in the Brexit 
negotiations was based on the largely united approach of the four freedoms of 
the single market (goods, capital, services, and labour), which are indivisible in 
nature and cannot be ‘cherry picking’ ( Taylor 2017 ). The EU representatives 
repeated the claim of indivisibility and that the best cannot be chosen among the 
four freedoms. Moreover, it was assumed that the UK’s leaving the EU would 
have consequences, such as losing its influence on rules, which in turn would 
affect the European economy. Thus, in the face of the upcoming exit talks on the 
withdrawal, the EU has adopted a tough line, refusing ‘pre-negotiations’. 
It cannot be denied that the most desired and expected solution would be the
so-called soft Brexit, in which the UK would remain a participant in the European
Economic Area and the single market. Nonetheless, what was feared the most was
that if talks would break down or the UK would leave the EU without having
completed an agreement, then there would be the so-called hard Brexit, which
was the scenario that seemed the most likely from the beginning of the Brexit
talks. It is true that both politicians and EU officials are used to the conservative
and traditional mindset. However, the real reason for the adopted position in the
negotiations should be viewed as out of the fears that if the UK would achieve a
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then other countries—inside or outside the EU—might ask for equivalent deals.
This would entail a weakening of the institutional structures of the EU and could
even lead to its disintegration. Therefore, undoubtedly, when analysing the Brexit
negotiations, it can be concluded that they were mainly based on preventing the
collapse of the EU so that other member states would not start moving towards the
British withdrawal decision. Thus, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU had to be an
example of demonstrating that making such a decision must entail significant rami-
fications. Officially, in March 2017, the European Council authorised the opening
of the Brexit negotiations and adopted the negotiating guidelines. From then on,
the EU required the members of the European Parliament to approve both the
Withdrawal Agreement (negotiated under Article 50 of the TEU) and a free trade
agreement regulating future relations between the UK and the EU.
11.3.2 The EU/UK approach to transparency in the Brexit 
negotiations 
The Brexit negotiations represented a striking example of the rising importance 
of the concept of transparency. The credibility of the EU and the British govern-
ment depended on the transparency of their negotiation activities. It constituted 
an important component to signal to the public and external entities that the 
information offered by the EU/UK was indeed reliable. Transparency is perceived 
as a factor that reinforces cooperation between states and contributes to solving 
collective action problems. It is also a key feature of democracy, which is the gov-
ernment’s constant response to the preferences of its citizens ( Grigorescu 2003 , 
pp. 644–646). Transparency is understood as comprising the features of public 
and disclosed activities, where their condition and course are available to anyone 
interested; therefore, nothing is hidden, uncertain, unclear, or doubtful. Thus, it is 
used in relation to various aspects related to information flow. Informing the pub-
lic opinion about the undertaken activities and intentions is meant to increase the 
public confidence of citizens. It should be stated that the emphasis on transpar-
ency was evident in the narrative around Brexit; however, it is necessary to analyse 
how this system was implemented in practice. To this end, it requires ascertaining 
the EU/UK approach to transparency in the Brexit negotiations. 
Originally, the principle of transparency was not entrenched in the founding 
treaties; however, it was developed in the case law of the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ). Eventually, transparency was enshrined in Article 1(2) of the TEU, 
which makes openness one of the defending characteristics of the EU, opening 
a ‘new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the people 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen’.8 In sequence, Article 15 in the third subparagraph of the 
TFEU provides that 
8 Declaration No. 17 on the right of access to information, annexed to the Final Act of the 
TEU, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, recommended steps to improve public access 
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each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are 
transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provi-
sions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the regulations 
referred to in the second subparagraph. 9 
Therefore, the principle of transparency was implemented within the EU, the 
main piece of legislation being Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to 
the European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents. 10 Article 2(4) 
of the Transparency regulation creates a baseline of the right to access the docu-
ments of the institutions. Moreover, in implementing the transparency policy, 
the EU negotiator acts within the limits of the EU law and respects the Euro-
pean Commission’s legal obligations regarding the protection of information as 
defned in Article 4(1) of the Transparency regulation. Consequently, the trans-
parency regime at the EU level foresees a number of exceptions to the default 
position, as highlighted in the case law, which is of openness, although subject to 
a strict proportionality test in relation to the aim sought. 11 This was recognised 
in Article 4(1)(a) of the Transparency regulation, which establishes an absolute 
exception from the transparency system, inter alia, in international relations. 
Against this background, the political importance of the negotiations determines 
the scope of the freedom to disclose documents and sometimes leads to a dif-
ferent level of transparency, consisting of keeping a certain degree of secrecy in 
external (international) relations. The main argument for this is the need to leave 
the parties some room for manoeuvre in diplomatic and political negotiations. 
Additionally, maintaining a strong and well-functioning government more often 
than not leads to limited information disclosure. 
In the course of the negotiations, both the EU and the UK published a con-
siderable number of documents outlining the details of the negotiating positions 
taken. It is important that the party that publishes first (in this case, the EU) and 
the most is in some way better prepared and as such, has a higher likelihood of 
achieving a more favourable outcome in the negotiations. While trying to sup-
press the growing criticism in the initial phase of Brexit (and not decreasing later ; 
Elgot and Asthana 2017 ) and following the EU’s example, the UK Government 
began to publish various pieces of information with some delay (e.g., published 
position papers, in particular by the newly created Department for Exiting the 
European Union), issued statements, and made speeches and announcements. 
All European Commission negotiating documents made available to the EU 
member states, the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of 
9 The right of access to documents is placed among the treaty provisions that have general 
application (Article 15(3) of the TFEU) as a principle of good governance, and it is regarded 
as a fundamental right, guaranteed under Article 6 of the TEU and in Articles 41 and 42 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU). 
10 31 May 2001 OJ L 145/44; hereinafter the Transparency regulation. 
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the European Union, national parliaments, and the UK were also released to the 
public. The EU published a number of negotiating documents, including agen-
das for negotiating rounds, EU position papers, non-papers, EU text proposals, 
and regularly updated factsheets. The transparency policy was regularly reviewed 
to ensure that it fulfilled its objective and had no negative impact on the integrity 
of the negotiations. 
As the EU negotiator, the European Commission was committed to ensuring 
the maximum level of transparency as a response to the unprecedented situation 
of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In the Brexit negotiation process, a tailor-
made approach to transparency was embraced. Transparency is also the EU’s 
core principle applicable in the Brexit negotiations, according to the European 
Council’s guidelines adopted on 29 April 2017. Generally, the EU approach to 
openness in this process was crucial. Additionally, it is an indispensable principle 
in achieving the EU’s constitutional goals of ensuring the accountability of deci-
sion makers, supporting legal certainty, and strengthening the rule of law (Art. 2 
of the TEU) and the general principle of equality. In fact, transparency ensures a 
more effective management system, which is also more accountable to citizens, 
facilitating participation in public activities, providing access to information and 
resources, and enabling participation in the management process ( Kendrick and 
Sangiuolo 2017 , p. 4). 
Additionally, the Terms of Reference (ToR) adopted on 19 June 2017 by
negotiators in both the EU and the UK, which provide the negotiations’ struc-
ture, dates and priorities, include an entire section on transparency. However,
these provisions are concise and not very transparent. They stipulate the duty
of the two parties to cooperate to ensure that the ‘default position of trans-
parency’ is followed, but they also allow both parties to treat the negotiation
documents in accordance with their respective laws. They grant each party
the power to apply restrictions on the distribution of documents but impose
the obligation to consult the other party in advance before disclosing them. 12 
They also exclude public participation in actual negotiations between the EU
and the UK, stating that each round of negotiations should only involve public
officials from both sides. 13 The default position on transparency agreed in the
ToR was tactically implemented by both negotiating parties and effectively
relieved the UK from the legal consequences of transparency obligations under
EU law.
In the Brexit negotiations, the UK Government adopted an alternative strat-
egy befitting its own constitutional requirements. Initially, the negotiations led 
to distrust among the general British public as they were conducted in a rather 
vague manner. Although the EU referendum was a factor that legitimised the 
government’s approach to the negotiations, the referendum question did not 
include a description of the importance of Brexit. First of all, in an unprecedented 
manner, the Miller I case (2017) questioned the government’s power to assign a 
12 See paragraphs 11 to 14 of the ToR. 
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prior role in the negotiation process. Second, the authority of the May Govern-
ment was challenged on many occasions, which particularly resulted from the 
inability to reach an agreement by working out a compromise solution on the 
Withdrawal Agreement, which in turn led to the pursuit of the so-called hard 
Brexit. This resulted particularly in undermining the UK’s position in the Brexit 
negotiations on the international arena and on the domestic plane. It was believed 
that the government was divided and did not know what it actually wanted to 
achieve as a result of the ongoing negotiations. This led to the belief that the 
executive may not have sufficient constitutional power to agree on the terms of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Hence, there was the need to approve any 
withdrawal agreement that would be settled with the EU, and there was even the 
idea of holding a second withdrawal referendum ( Bogdanor 2017 ). Thereby, the 
divisions and disagreements in the cabinet regarding the direction of the Brexit 
negotiations hindered the adoption of a transparent approach. Third, the public 
narrative around Brexit was largely shaped by the media. On the one hand, the 
government’s initial reluctance to publish its positions in a manner similar to 
that adopted by the EU was received by the media with an element of hostility, 
which placed the EU in a more favourable position in shaping public opinion. 
On the other hand, after the High Court in the Miller case ruled on 3 Novem-
ber 2016 that the government needed parliamentary approval to trigger Article 
50(2) of the TEU, the three judges who expressed their opposition (Lord Reed, 
Lord Carnwath, and Lord Hughes) were verbally attacked by some people who 
believed that the decision to withdraw had already been made in a referendum. 
Grossly misleading press articles in such newspapers as the  Daily Mail, Daily 
Express, and Daily Telegraph, which campaigned for the UK to leave the EU, 
described the judges as ‘having blocked Brexit’ and as ‘enemies of the people’. 14 
The negotiations were also complicated by the fact that instead of trying to dispel 
the various rumours that appeared solely through the publication of documents 
presenting a uniform (common) position, there were many occasions of alleged 
‘leaks’ to the press from several cabinet ministers. 
On many occasions in the UK, it was also noticeable that the choice of infor-
mation to be released depended largely on the public interest, and the govern-
ment did not always keep the parliament informed of its intentions when it 
seemed desirable to achieve an effective negotiation result. It cannot be denied 
that the constitutional foundations of the British system conditioned the govern-
ment’s behaviour. Thus, under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, it was up 
to the government, specifically the cabinet, to determine the outcome that the 
UK wanted to achieve from the Brexit negotiations. Nonetheless, some consti-
tutional conventions and practices in the UK Constitution promote the principle 
of transparency. First, since the outcome of the negotiations was essentially a 
question of a national political compromise, conducted under the convention of 
14 See ‘‘We Must Get Out of the EU’ (Daily Express, 4 November 2016); ‘Enemies of the 
People’ (Daily Mail, 4 November 2016); ‘The Judges versus the People’ (Daily Telegraph, 
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collective ministerial responsibility, which requires uniform public involvement of 
ministers, misunderstandings should be resolved confidentially, as it was advisable 
to keep all objections private. Second, an important role was played by the parlia-
ment’s informing function, assigned by  Bagehot (1981 , p. 101), and in practice 
exercised by the UK’s Select Committees. The British Constitution places the 
control of the information related to the Brexit negotiations in the hands of 
the government. However, the extent to which the government will succeed in 
controlling this information depends on its majority in the House of Commons. 
After the general election on 8 June 2017, the government (and the Conserva-
tive Party) lost its parliamentary majority. This required cooperation with opposi-
tion parties to work out a compromise, but they did not necessarily share similar 
views on the importance of Brexit and the shape that the Withdrawal Agreement 
should take. 
Undoubtedly, Brexit talks were chaotic. They did not proceed smoothly and 
were characterised by a rather constant source of uncertainty for British politics, 
the economy, and the entire British law. This was largely due to the fact that the 
British side did not immediately present a coherent plan of what it would like to 
achieve when the negotiations started. Some political pundits also argued that in 
view of the fact that the government was unprepared for Brexit, the negotiation 
process was performed disastrously ( Powell 2020 ). Such a view is not surprising, 
since from the very beginning, before the formal start of the Brexit negotiation 
process, it had sparked basic constitutional dilemmas. It was not clear how this 
process should be shaped according to the British constitutional requirements, 
since it was difficult to anticipate the outcome of the EU referendum. A dispute 
over triggering Article 50 of the TEU arose, resulting in a fight against the back-
ground of scholars, but above all, the political views between the Brexiteers and 
those who were planning to stay, that is, the Remainers, ultimately resulting in a 
judicial intervention in the Miller I case, where the judiciary had no option but 
to discipline the executive branch. Then, the Brexit negotiations focused only on 
establishing the conditions for the withdrawal and led to reaching a consensus 
on the so-called Withdrawal Agreement, which would outline the future shape of 
British constitutional law by setting out the terms of the UK’s exit and the Politi-
cal Declaration on the framework for the future EU–UK relation. 
11.4 The Brexit negotiations and the UK Government’s 
accountability 
The constitutional objectives in the Brexit negotiations could only be accom-
plished by ensuring accountability in the decision-making process by the govern-
ment. The parliament has an obligation to monitor and control the negotiation 
process as a matter of accountability. However, to be effective, the negotiations 
should be held in an atmosphere of mutual trust, which naturally requires, first, 
secrecy and second, minimum public or parliamentary scrutiny to maximise the 
chances of their success. Against this background, what needs to be determined 
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Taking into account the meaning of the concept in question, constitutional 
scholars emphasise that accountability is ‘a complex and chameleon-like term’ 
( Mulgan 2000 , p. 555). A classic scholar of British constitutional thought is A. V.
Dicey; while writing about a ‘balanced constitution’, he presented the idealised 
concept of the rule of law, claiming two pillars—the political responsibility of 
ministers to the parliament and the personal legal liability of all public officials 
before the ordinary courts of the land ( 1982 , pp. 115–116). The distinction 
between these two forms of responsibility is crucial. Furthermore, when delving 
into the classic British constitutional theory, this chapter’s author originally came 
across the term ‘responsibility’, which means ‘the relations between Ministers 
of the Crown with, on the one hand, their departments and, on the other one, 
Parliament’ ( Harlow 2002 , p. 6). In turn, the concept of ‘accountability’ gained 
importance relatively recently, although it was already ingrained in the classic 
British constitutional theory. It was delineated as 
a framework for the exercise of state power in a liberal-democratic system, 
within which public bodies are forced to seek to promote the public interest 
and compelled to justify their actions in those terms or in other constitution-
ally acceptable terms (justice, humanity, equity); to modify policies if they 
should turn out to have been ill conceived; and to make amends if mistakes 
and errors of judgment have been made. 
( Oliver 1991 , p. 28) 
Eventually,  Mulgan (2000 , p. 555) observed: 
A word which a few decades ago was used only rarely and with relatively 
restricted meaning (and which, interestingly, has no obvious equivalent in 
other European languages) now crops up everywhere performing all manner 
of analytical and rhetorical tasks and carrying most of the burdens of demo-
cratic ‘governance’. 
There is no doubt that the doctrine has a considerable variety of conceptual 
defnitions of accountability relating to various aspects of its functioning ( Oli-
ver 2003 ;  Pyper 1996 ). However, in the context of Brexit negotiations, atten-
tion will be paid only to the effects that government transparency may have on 
accountability. The literature indicates that transparency has been considered an 
important factor contributing to the accountability of a democratic government 
( Grigorescu 2003 , p. 644). In the context of the negotiations on the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU, a greater level of transparency resulted in increased respon-
sibility. Openness and transparency are key elements in ensuring accountability 
in the decision-making process. The more open the Brexit process was, the more 
responsible the government became. Therefore, maintaining control over the 
dissemination of information, especially regarding disputes among the cabinet 
ministers on what form Brexit should take and how long it should last, was of 
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In the British Constitution, the actions of the government (ministers and 
their departments) are mostly regulated by constitutional conventions (see, e.g., 
Leyland 2016 , pp. 25–43;  Ellis 2004 ;  Marshall 1987 ); that is, the repeated and 
followed rules of established structural practice that define the way that the gov-
ernment operates and the exercise of royal prerogatives, as well as regulate the 
manner of incurring responsibility. 15 When thinking about accountability, one 
should distinguish between political and legal accountability. The UK model 
of the constitution takes as the paradigm form of accountability the practice 
that ministers are answerable to the parliament. In this context, the ultimate 
form of political accountability in British constitutional law is a general elec-
tion, prompted either by timing (one must be held every five years) 16 or by the 
cabinet’s loss of the support of the majority of the members of parliament (MPs) 
in the House of Commons. The legislative and executive branches can maintain 
their independent existence through the two ways in which an election can be 
triggered before the end of the five-year term: (1) if a motion for an early gen-
eral election is agreed on, either by at least two-thirds of the house or without 
a division; and (2) if a motion of no confidence is passed by a simple majority 
and no alternative government is found. Between elections, it is important that 
the central government be called on to explain its actions, inactions, and failures 
in several different ways (e.g., discussion of the annual Queen’s/throne speech, 
budget exposé, debate on a specific goal of a government policy in the House 
of Commons, or the inquiry procedure  questions). Therefore, against this back-
ground, a key role in the political responsibility of the government is played, on 
the one hand, by the will of the people, and on the other hand, by the principle 
of responsible government, manifested in the principle of the convention of col-
lective ministerial responsibility, or the position of the constitutional system of 
the head of government, regulated only by way of conventions. Ministers before 
the parliament are only responsible for the way in which they carry out their 
functions in terms of efficiency and the overall course of action. The government 
is required to have a substantially united front. Therefore, disputes have to be 
discussed in confidential meetings of the cabinet. Thus, public statements repre-
sent a collective stance, while the government’s policy is defended, irrespective of 
any different opinions expressed by the ministers ( Kendrick and Sangiuolo 2017 , 
p. 10). This convention is designed to ensure the government’s stability and its 
ability to inspire confidence in the House of Commons. Generally, during the 
Brexit negotiations, it was of utmost importance that the government (and the 
majority Conservative Party) maintained the confidence of the House of Com-
mons at all costs. However, the manner in which the referendum campaign was 
15 A. V. Dicey understood conventions of the constitution as ‘maxims or practices which, 
though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown, of ministers, and of other persons 
under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at all’. They are characterised by a non-legal 
and informal character, regulating systemic issues belonging to the area of constitutional 
matters ( 1982 , pp. 70, 277). 
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conducted or the two early general elections held at that time ( 2017 , 2019) only 
revealed different views in the cabinet. 
The specificity of British constitutional law also influenced the transpar-
ency of the Brexit negotiations through the role of the parliament. As already 
emphasised, the legitimacy of the government’s actions in the Brexit negotia-
tions resulted from the referendum ( Bogdanor 2016 , p. 314). Thus, in political 
terms, the result of the 2016 referendum took on a particularly political role 
because its effects made it impossible for the parliament to disregard the will of 
the people. Moreover, from the initial stage, the role of Westminster was signifi-
cantly reduced in the Brexit procedure, which had already been demonstrated in 
the context of the lack of statutory consent to trigger Article 50(2) of the TEU, 
which was eventually decided in the Miller I ruling. Furthermore, in relation to 
the Brexit negotiations, special attention should be paid to the role played in this 
process by the EU Select Committees functioning in the parliament and exercis-
ing control over the implementation of the provisions of the laws by the govern-
ment. Although the parliament is not responsible for implementing legislation, 
in a post-legislative scrutiny, its special committees can investigate how well an 
act (e.g., in such case the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 
or the European Union (Future Relationship) Act, and other statutes associated 
with the process of exiting the EU) is being implemented by the government and 
the effect that the new law is having. 
11.4.1 The role of the UK’s Select Committees in influencing 
the EU decision-making process 
One important issue of European integration has been the requirement to estab-
lish appropriate parliamentary bodies and procedures to ensure that the national 
legislative bodies of the member states have a real voice in the EU decision-
making process. Thus, the intensification of integration processes has resulted 
in the need to strengthen the UK parliamentary scrutiny in the areas under EU 
competence (see, e.g., Oliver 2003 , pp. 85–87). The UK membership in the 
EU structures and the Brexit process had increased the importance of the par-
liamentary EU Select Committees as a link between EU legislation and the UK 
Parliament. The two houses of the parliament developed individual scrutiny pro-
cedures. The core subject of scrutiny was the process by which, in accordance 
with the agreed ToR, legislative proposals and other EU documents had been 
analysed and the financial, administrative, legal, and political consequences that 
might have arisen for the UK, as a result of the adoption of the submitted legis-
lative proposals, had been taken into account ( Cygan 2017 ). Undoubtedly, the 
obligation to inform Westminster about European affairs has helped enable the 
UK Parliament to scrutinise the legislative processes undertaken at the EU level. 
In 1974, EU Select Committees were set up in both houses of the UK Parlia-
ment for the purpose of scrutinising draft legislative acts at the initial stage of the 
EU legislative process. In the House of Commons, three EU Select Committees 
had been set up, called European Committees, with their formal and legal basis 
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for operation laid down in Section 119 of the Standing Orders of the House of 
Commons 2018. Informing the parliament or its houses of the political and legal 
significance of individual EU documents and deciding which of those would 
require further examination were the tasks of the European Scrutiny Commit-
tee, whose remit is defined in detail in Section 143 of the Standing Orders of the 
House of Commons. The committee analysed draft EU legislation and reported 
to the house on the legal and political importance of each document. Its tasks 
also included monitoring and analysing government positions within the Council 
of Ministers and drawing up appropriate reports ( Ryan 2019 , p. 362). During 
the transition period, the European Scrutiny Committee analysed how the EU 
regulations and policies could still exert an influence on the UK after its exit from 
the EU and what changes would be required in the current control system, which 
has largely remained unaltered since the accession. Key issues that the European 
Scrutiny Committee addresses in its inquiry include (a) how the UK’s exit from 
the EU will affect the current system for scrutinising EU laws and policies and 
what changes might be needed; (b) whether and how EU laws and policies might 
affect the UK after Brexit; (c) what the purpose of the scrutiny of EU laws and 
policies should be in a post-exit world; (d) what action the government should 
take to support and facilitate a strong parliamentary scrutiny process post-exit; 
and (e) what form of scrutiny should be taken to maximise its effectiveness. 
The other two European Committees in the House of Commons are respon-
sible for matters relating to the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU. The 
European Statutory Instruments Committee is tasked with the selection (‘sift-
ing’) of the proposed negative statutory instruments resulting from the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 amended by the European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) 2020, which empowers the ministers to issue regulations on ‘defi-
ciencies in retained EU law’. In turn, the Exiting the European Union Commit-
tee was responsible for examining the expenditure, administration, and policy of 
the Department of Exiting the European Union, established in 2016 (by Prime 
Minister May), and evaluated as well as monitored its work (including the estab-
lished office of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union). This 
department was disbanded with the official completion of Brexit at the end of 
January 2020. In turn, in the beginning of March 2020, the Exiting the Euro-
pean Union Committee was transformed into the Committee on the Future 
Relationship with the European Union, responsible—as the name suggests—for 
negotiating and determining future British relations with the EU. 
In turn, in the upper house of the parliament, the EU Select Committee was 
established by virtue of Section 64 of the Standing Orders of the House of Lords 
2016, which coordinates the policies and actions of the British government in 
relation to the EU and considers EU documents submitted to the House of 
Lords by ministers and other matters concerning the EU ( Ryan 2019 , p. 362). 
The EU Select Committee assisted the house in the procedure for the submission 
of ‘reasoned opinions’ and represented the house in the interparliamentary coop-
eration within the EU as appropriate (it was responsible for the proper represen-
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Both houses of the parliament used similar parliamentary methods to scrutinise 
legislation and other EU affairs. The main methods of operation included (1) 
hearings of government ministers, (2) debates, and (3) investigative work by the 
EU Select Committees. In each house, reports were made by the committees on 
selected issues, and government ministers might be called on to respond to the 
findings and to provide explanations regarding the conduct of the negotiations 
in the European Council and on the legislative proposals made. The model of 
scrutiny exercised by the committees was based on documentary analysis. The 
work of the EU Select Committees covered both legislative proposals and non-
legislative documents. The types of documents that were subject to scrutiny (to 
be ‘deposited’) were agreed between the two houses of parliament and the gov-
ernment and included all legislative proposals, together with a number of other 
documents published by the EU institutions. 
One of the effective instruments for the parliamentary scrutiny of EU legisla-
tion was the so-called parliamentary scrutiny reserves. The parliament had certain 
powers to review and express opinions on EU draft legislative acts and any other 
documents falling within the remit of the EU Select Committees of both houses 
of parliament. The government supported the principle of effective scrutiny of 
European legislation, and both houses adopted appropriate resolutions on scru-
tiny reserve, which were published together with the Standing Orders (of the 
House of Commons or the House of Lords). On this basis, no minister of the 
Crown should agree to the adoption of EU legislation that had not yet been 
approved by the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons or by 
the EU Select Committee of the House of Lords. In general, these were acts or 
documents for which the scrutiny process had not yet been completed, as they 
were referred to the committee for debate. Thus, until the parliamentary scrutiny 
by the houses was completed, it was not possible for the government to accept 
the legislative proposals or other documents presented by the EU that had not 
been recommended by the EU Select Committees. 
The scrutiny process formally started when the government deposited an EU 
document in the UK Parliament; that is, it was sent to the relevant EU Select 
Committee in the House of Commons or the House of Lords for further scru-
tiny. The government then drew up an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) on each 
document submitted within 10 working days, in the course of which it analysed 
the legal basis and the political consequences that might result from its adoption. 
After the committee received the EM from the government, the committee chair 
(with the support of legal advisers) decided which documents should be subject to 
more detailed scrutiny ( Rogers and Walters 2015 , pp. 351–352). It was then up to 
the committee to decide on the angle of review of the document, selecting one of 
four possible solutions. First, the committee might refrain from undertaking fur-
ther scrutiny of the document, thus ‘clearing the document from scrutiny’. Sec-
ond, the committee might ask the government to forward a document for review 
to the competent minister, requesting further information in writing. Third, there 
was the possibility to hold evidence sessions or seminars with the stakeholders. 
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witnesses or stakeholders before requesting clarification from the government. 
Fourth, with regard to particularly important proposals, the committee might 
launch a full investigation, after which a report would be published, to which the 
government was required to respond within two months, and which was then 
discussed in the house. In the third and the fourth cases described, correspon-
dence between the committee and the government was continued until the com-
mittee was ‘satisfied’. The final stage of the scrutiny procedure by the committee 
should be included in the decision stating that the EU document was officially 
cleared from scrutiny. This was possible once the government had fully explained 
its position and the document itself was ‘approaching’ its adoption. It should then 
take the form of a legislative act acceptable to the UK Parliament; otherwise, it 
was definitively rejected. However, when a document had been the subject of a 
full investigation, it should automatically be cleared from scrutiny when the final 
report presented by the committee was discussed in a house session. 
It should be noted that it was also possible for the ministers to altogether repeal 
the scrutiny reserve resolutions adopted by the committees when there were spe-
cific reasons for doing so. In such a case, at the first possible opportunity, the 
government representatives should explain to the committee the reasons for this 
course of action. Most of the repeals occurred in situations of dynamically evolv-
ing yet sensitive policy areas, such as the decision to impose sanctions or when 
exceptional policy measures were required. However, it should be emphasised 
that the resolutions adopted by the houses regarding parliamentary reservation for 
the duration of the review were not in fact intended, after the audit process had 
been completed, to prevent the ministers from giving their consent to the adop-
tion of new EU commitments, even when the select committees in both houses 
had expressed reservations about the proposed directives, regulations, or deci-
sions. Nevertheless, there was considerable political pressure on the ministers who 
should take the reports presented by the committees into account, as they were 
responsible for the decisions made before the parliament. The formal scrutiny of 
EU draft legislation primarily served a constitutional function by strengthening 
the parliamentary accountability of the executive branch of government. Its aim 
at the restriction of scrutiny thus carried out, together with the opinion expressed 
by the UK Parliament, should restrict the activity of the ministers exercising their 
legislative role in the Council of the European Union. Against this backdrop, the 
EU Select Committees undoubtedly served a crucial function for Westminster, 
which did not play a direct role in the EU legislative process, and thanks to their 
work, had the ability to exercise a scrutiny function towards the government by its 
commitment to explain and justify its actions and expenditures in the EU. 
However, as a result, the EU Select Committees only seemingly formed an
effective mechanism to ensure that the UK Parliament could influence the EU 
decision-making and scrutinise government actions on the international stage. 
Notably, their twofold role was to act as subsidiary bodies of the British Parlia-
ment, focused primarily on providing opinions and scrutinising government 
actions regarding European affairs and to grant the national legislature influence
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legislative proposals. However, it would be a mistake to claim that the scrutiny of
EU legislative proposals was fully complete and did not raise any particular doubts.
Although it was a part of British constitutional law, the EU law was not created by
the national legislator but was the result of a legislative and political process over
which Westminster had no direct control. Therefore, the scrutiny of EU legislative
proposals and other documents in both houses of parliament provided two poten-
tial opportunities for the UK to influence the decision-making process of the EU.
The first possibility had the direct effect of influencing the ministers themselves
through pre-legislative scrutiny. On this basis, one of the objectives of the scrutiny
was to hold the UK ministers accountable, resulting in the possibility to ensure
that Westminster’s position was fully taken into account before negotiations in
the European Council. The second possibility of parliamentary influence on the
EU legislation was ensured by the institution of parliamentary reservation for the
period of review; within this framework, it was possible to issue reasoned opinions,
expressed directly by the houses, on the legitimacy of adopting the proposed EU
legislation. However, unlike the scrutiny of the executive branch, the latter form 
of scrutiny was less precise in terms of its importance, due in practice to the lack of 
a clear consensus between the two houses regarding the number of positions to be
taken on the issuance of reasoned opinions ( Cygan 2017 ). Scrutiny reserve reso-
lutions were perceived as tools to ensure that sufficient time was available to obtain 
information on EU legislative projects, but they were not intended to change the
views of the cabinet members. The MPs in the UK had an important tool in their
hands, but they did not use it to become political players. Detailed information
regarding the negotiation process allowed the MPs to inform the government at
an early stage about potential problems in its negotiating position. Furthermore,
the relevant literature ( Auel et al. 2012 , pp. 5–6) indicates that the system of par-
liamentary reservations was the result of a debate in the legal discourse on the
consequences of the UK’s membership in the EU, arising from the doctrine of
sovereignty of the parliament. It is noted that this system can be perceived as a
form of compensation for the restrictions imposed on Westminster as a result of its
participation in EU structures. However, parliamentary reservations could contrib-
ute to the development of informal cooperation between the parliament and the
government at both political and administrative levels ( Cygan 2007 ). Moreover,
the interparliamentary dialogue in the negotiations with the EU was necessary to
try to break the Brexit impasse.
11.4.2 The process of constitutional change in ‘regaining’ the UK 
Parliament’s sovereignty 
As a matter of the constitutional law of the UK, the institutional embodiment of 
legal accountability is judges, who also define the scope and limits of the powers 
of the government branches, including the executive. Judicial review of the law-
fulness of the ministers’ actions is an exclusive competence of the courts in this 
respect. The practice of judicial control of executive power, including ministers’ 
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of judicial activism in the second half of the 20th century was due to the stronger 
political position of the executive branch and its dominance over the parliament 
(mainly owing to the UK’s membership in the EU). This led to a certain activa-
tion of the courts as a factor guaranteeing balance in the constitutional system 
of the UK. The courts took full responsibility for verifying the legality of the 
executive branch’s actions after the impeachment procedure was discontinued. 
In the case of M. v. Home Office and Another,17 Lord Donaldson drew atten-
tion to the obligation of the executive authority to respect the courts’ powers to 
adjudicate on illegal activities of ministers, referring to the principle of separation 
of powers. In this context, the Miller I case judgement described above was an 
important aspect of legal liability in the Brexit procedure. The outcome of this 
case demonstrated that the courts had been forced again to draw the boundaries 
of constitutional competence between the executive branch and the parliament, 
in the sense that they had consistently backed the parliament. The main argument 
of the pro-Brexit campaign was to ‘take back control’ and consequently, regain 
sovereignty. This was due to the fact that the British constitutional scholars have 
long referred to certain legal and political arguments concerning the constraint 
on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty since the accession to the European 
Community (currently the European Union). 
Against this backdrop, the conceptualisation of the doctrine of sovereignty 
of the British Parliament and the clarification of its constitutional significance 
require a distinction between legal and political sovereignty. It is often not an 
easy task to distinguish its forms, since the lack of a clear distinction between 
politics and law is largely due to the unwritten nature of the British Constitution. 
More specifically, the difference between political and legal sovereignty is that 
the issue of political sovereignty refers to the highest political power in the state, 
which belongs to a collective entity—the people. It is related to a representative 
and accountable government whose members, based on their mandate, can exer-
cise power and implement their election promises. In contrast, legal sovereignty 
refers to the highest legislative authority in the country, whose subject is the 
monarch in the parliament. Formally speaking, therefore, it means that the parlia-
ment can make norms with no limits in terms of their substance. Undoubtedly, 
the classic definition of sovereignty, borrowed from constitutional law and not 
derived from a judicial perspective, is the one presented by  Dicey (1982 ), that 
is, it is necessary to separate political and legal issues and to recognise that in the 
current situation, legal sovereignty rests with the parliament, although there may 
be political constraints that effectively limit the exercise of these powers. From 
this perspective, it can be observed that the theoretical approach to the principle 
in question is currently limited by its practical application ( Allan 2013 , p. 72). 
Indeed, one of the manifestations of the modification of the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty was the EU law. It was caused by the impossibil-
ity of enacting provisions inconsistent with the directly effective European
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Community law (as a result of the enactment of two implementing statutes,
i.e., European Community Act 1972 and European Union Act 2011). The
reasons behind this are observed first and foremost in the process of the har-
monisation of legislations and the inclusion of the UK territory under the juris-
diction of the EU institutions. Both the principle of direct effectiveness and
efficiency of the EU law and the quasi-binding nature of the referendum do
not adhere to the fundamental principles of the British political system and the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 18 Pointing to the reason for such a state
of affairs, in the  Factortame case,19 Lord Bridge rightly stated that the reduced
sovereignty resulting from the EU membership was not a consequence of the
court decisions issued but the result of political decisions with the UK’s acces-
sion to the European Community’s structures. In the first place, the courts
expressly accepted the primacy of the EU law and the modification of the
approach to the traditional (orthodox) doctrine of sovereignty presented by
Dicey (1982 ), which meant (among others) the inability to apply the doctrine
of implied repeal to constitutional statutes. 20 Second, the UK courts kept exist-
ing constitutional law in line with actual constitutional practice. In this respect,
the principle of sovereignty should also be analysed in connection to the exist-
ing relation between the parliament and the judiciary. This particular boundary
between the two branches of government, as well as the notion that the courts
may be forced to deviate from the strict doctrine of supremacy in the face of
threats to the fundamental principles of democracy, has been the subject of the
ongoing debate.
In this respect, the literature on the subject portrays two distinct approaches 
to the above issue. The first is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of 
the parliament was permanently changed through the UK’s membership in the 
EU structures; the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not change this at all and 
will not restore the traditional doctrine presented by  Dicey (1982 ). Brexit will 
not remove the judicial threat to parliamentary sovereignty caused by the so-
called judicial activism; on the contrary, it will actually further deepen its erosion 
( Gee and Young 2016 , pp. 146–147;  Gordon 2016a , pp. 409ff.;  Gordon 2016b , 
p. 335; Bogdanor 2012 , pp. 179ff.). The second position emphasises that one 
of the arguments for Brexit was that leaving the EU would reinvigorate Britain’s 
centuries-old parliament, strengthening its position towards a doctrinal interpre-
tation of the principle of sovereignty ( Ewing 2017 , pp. 713, 725–772;  Bellamy 
2011 , pp. 93ff.;  Goldsworthy 2010 , pp. 12ff.). 
18 On the lack of coherence between the above-mentioned phenomena and the principle of 
supremacy of the British Parliament, see  Loveland (2003 , pp. 676–678). According to Dicey, 
a referendum is essentially a form of limiting the principle of sovereignty ( 1982 , p. 138). 
19 R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, per 
Lord Bridge. 
20 However, in practical terms, it is obvious that certain statutes are of special constitutional 
significance, for example, ECA 1972, EUA 2011, or the Human Rights Act 1998 (see espe-
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The flexible formula of the British Constitution results in a relative open-
ness to external influences. Prima facie, therefore, the decision to withdraw
from the EU should result in a ‘renaissance’ of the doctrine of Westminster
sovereignty, per  Dicey (1982 ). However, the continued validity of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (incorporated based on Human Rights
Act 1998) and the irreversible consequences of the devolution of competences
in the UK for Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland are factors that hinder
the possible restoration of such sovereignty. Thus, it is not entirely possible
to reverse the effects of the ‘soft’ modification of the foundations of the UK’s
system, which has often occurred in the sphere of the practical implementation
of the competences of particular branches of government. It is widely known
that the UK’s membership in the EU structures resulted in a progressive limi-
tation of the UK Parliament’s sovereignty, and the significant modification of
the relation between the judiciary and the parliament strengthened the role of
the courts. In the case of the UK’s membership in the EU, a political neces-
sity has brought about the situation, recognised by the UK judiciary, in which
European Community law prevails over inconsistent national legislation (see
the Factortame litigation). Now the UK’s return to the Diceyan traditional
(orthodox) doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty—as emphasised by  Bradley
and Ewing (2003 , p. 77)—would scarcely compensate for the disadvantages
of an isolationist policy within Europe. In legal terms, the expected results of
the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not lead to the resto-
ration of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty but may only
apparently result in the revitalisation of the current status quo of individual
state institutions. Although that doctrine has been modified (see, e.g., Gordon
2017 , p. 151)—which is not in doubt at present—it should be stressed that it
remains a key constitutional foundation that continues to shape the public law
superstructure that it supports ( Irvine 2003 , p. 184). In the current legal and
political reality, it is too early to unequivocally determine  pro futuro the post-
Brexit situation in this regard.
11.5 Conclusion 
The process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has resulted in some mod-
ifications at both legal and political levels. The 2016 EU referendum and its 
aftermath have exposed the extent to which the foundations of the British Con-
stitution have been eviscerated. While some scholars perceived the decision to 
hold a referendum on EU membership as triggering a severe constitutional crisis, 
others argued that the political and democratic dilemmas arising from Brexit 
were symptoms of a broader and constitutionally complex issue, with roots reach-
ing far beyond the 2016 EU referendum. On the one hand, controversy was 
stirred by the simple fact that the British people made the decision in favour of 
Brexit, as Prime Minister Cameron had counted on referendum voters’ rejection 
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legal circles, there emerged a rekindled interest in the topic of a newer and still 
fragile constitutional convention, stating that 
decisions of fundamental importance bearing on the constitution of the UK 
should be preceded by holding a referendum, regional or national, before 
legislation is introduced and passed into law by the national Parliament. 
( Lord Windlesham 2007 , p. 103) 
As a form of direct rather than parliamentary democracy, a referendum on ques-
tions of exceptional national or regional signifcance has not been typical in Brit-
ish constitutional practice. However, in recent years, new uses have been made of 
this process, which is increasingly becoming a more frequently applied systemic 
solution classifed as a form of direct democracy, which signifcantly affects the 
British legal order. 
The ‘unprecedented nature’ and implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU have required an assortment of unequalled measures. International negotia-
tions are based on diplomatic methods of operation and the pursuit of a com-
promise to reach the necessary agreement. In the Brexit negotiations, the high 
level of unity between the EU-27 and the EU institutions was a consequence 
of the strong negotiating position presented by the EU, which adopted a maxi-
mum level of transparency as a core principle. The UK Government embraced 
the Brexit talks in a particular way. On the one hand, the UK sought to avoid 
the scenario called the ‘no-deal’ Brexit. On the other hand, it consistently and 
accordingly exposed a tough line on the issues where it was difficult to reach 
an agreement, although it would result in the ‘hard Brexit’. In this context, 
the analysis presented in this chapter allowed the formulation of three impor-
tant conclusions. First, transparency as a public audit tool was a key element in 
enhancing democratic legitimacy. The arguments in favour of openness were the 
demonstration of unity and strength by each side to increase awareness and cre-
ate bonds with the society. Second, Brexit as a hybrid phenomenon, that is, both 
legal and political, is the next stage in the debate on the place and the role of the 
EU. Third, the use of the principle of transparency as a negotiating technique has 
increased the level of accountability of the government. 
As emphasised in this chapter, the UK Parliament had an obligation to monitor 
and control the negotiation process as a matter of accountability. This procedure 
required democratic scrutiny of the executive branch’s actions to ensure that 
the conditions under which political power would be exercised would not be 
subject to unlimited discretion. In Brexit talks, this was the only way to bring 
about government accountability and, consequently, for the legislature to fulfil 
its fundamental constitutional obligation. After all, without maximum access to 
government information on how the Brexit decisions were being made, there was 
no effective way to monitor the exercise of the government’s power and hold it 
accountable. Subsequently, it also contributed to the partial revision of the parlia-
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Miller I case. So far, national courts had tended to yield to the executive branch 
regarding international affairs, trying to keep themselves out of a field they per-
ceived as unsuitable for judicial decision-making. Moreover, in the case of the 
UK, the analysis of the impact of its withdrawal from the EU had to be correlated 
with the issue of great importance for British constitutionalism: the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Undoubtedly, this principle affects the essence of the 
functioning of the branches of government in the UK and determines their legal 
nature. As demonstrated by the expected result of the process of the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU, it will not lead to the restoration of the traditional (ortho-
dox) doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty presented by  Dicey (1982 ). 
The Brexit process has been the most protracted issue in recent years. How-
ever, it should be stressed that the entire political class in Britain is characterised 
by a certain cautiousness and restraint concerning rapid changes and the respect 
for tradition; as a result, there is also no social consent for radical actions to 
be taken. The Brexit negotiations had such a chaotic and unpredictable char-
acter that sometimes, speculations about what could happen in the near future 
as a result of the withdrawal seemed pointless. The situation was changing very 
dynamically, and it was not certain until the end whether this process would draw 
to a close and when. At this moment of the history of the UK, the Brexit process 
is done. On 31 January 2020, the UK left the EU, 47 years after its accession. 
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